Last week ‘The Nation’ magazine published an explosive article by Jeremy Scahill exposing the extent to which American private security firm Blackwater has become embroiled in Pakistan since the US-led ‘War on Terror’ begun in 2001. Furthermore, the article alleges that Blackwater operatives have been planning and carrying out assassinations of Taliban and al-Qaeda figures in the north west of the country, in part through a secret drone bombing campaign separate from the well known CIA programme, as well as themselves having representatives in theatre within Pakistan’s borders. Not only does this increase the pressure on Islamabad and Washington, who have both long been at pains to deny the existence of such operations in Pakistan, it also raises broader questions over the wisdom (and indeed the legality) of relying on private security firms such as Blackwater to carry out tasks that have traditionally been the domain of the professional military.
It is an open secret that American agents and private contractors have been carrying out US foreign policy within Pakistan for a number of years. In 2006 a deal was done between the Bush administration and General Pervez Musharraf to allow US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) operatives into Pakistan ostensibly to hunt Osama bin Laden. Islamabad would effectively turn a blind eye, whilst publically denying such permission had been given, and feigning outrage whenever evidence of American military activity within Pakistan came to light. However, the extent to which private contractors have been operating outside the military chain of command, largely free from accountability, is only now becoming clear. Under US law all CIA operations have to be reported to Congress, but since Donald Rumsfeld was Defence Secretary JSOC has been used to commit some of the most controversial and secretive operations on behalf of the US government, in part to keep them concealed from Congress. JSOC developed a close relationship with Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney, and worked in direct co-ordination with the White House. However, it seems that JSOC has become increasingly reliant on Blackwater in carrying out its activities, and Blackwater’s contracts are approved on a rolling basis at the request of JSOC, beyond public scrutiny. Blackwater is largely made up of ex-Special Forces operatives, and this has helped facilitate the cosy and increasingly entrenched relationship that has been established with JSOC.
Since Obama came to office in January 2009 the number of pilotless drone strikes within Pakistan has surpassed the number carried out under President Bush. In June this year CIA director Leon Panetta announced the termination of the agency’s assassination programme, but drone strikes have continued. Such attacks, which are reported to be the work of the CIA, are now believed often to be undertaken by JSOC and enabled by Blackwater contractors, who due to the nature of their classified contracts, are not accountable to Congress or to the public. The fact that the new military commander of the Afghan war, General Stanley McChrystal, headed JSOC from 2003 to 2008 not only demonstrates the rise in power of JSOC within the US military framework, but could well also be indicative of the increased reliance on contractors to execute American war objectives in Pakistan and Afghanistan as part of Obama’s ‘Af-Pak Strategy’.
However, there is growing disquiet within Pakistan over the use of contractors within its borders. US ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson was forced to state in September this year that ‘Blackwater is not operating in Pakistan’, and Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik said he would resign if Blackwater was found to be operating on Pakistani territory. Despite these statements, most still believe that Blackwater and other security firms acting on behalf of the US interests continue to operate in Pakistan. The prevailing view among much of Pakistani society is that America is meddling in Pakistani affairs, undermining and destabilising the country by continually infringing its sovereignty, and dragging it deeper into the US ‘War on Terror’. This burgeoning resentment was punctuated in September by the raiding of the Islamabad offices of Inter-Risk, a subsidiary of US security firm DynCorp, who are widely believed to be developing a clandestine network of security and intelligence personnel in the country. Suspicion of, and hostility towards US intentions can only increase as further evidence of shadowy American involvement in Pakistan emerges. There is a real danger for decision makers in Washington that the actions of a private company that increasingly cannot be held to account, operating outside the usual system of checks and balances, will lose the hearts and minds of a population that must be kept onside if any success is to be achieved in the ‘War on Terror’.
To have private contractors operating on the battlefield is not a new concept, but has grown to such an extent that it is generally accepted that in fighting a modern war, contractors will play an important role. The US has historically maintained a small army, and has only expanded its forces when facing a specific threat, such as during the Second World War. After the Korean War, in the context of the broader Cold War, US planners came to the conclusion that a large army must be maintained. As American soldiers became embroiled in Vietnam, the draft was introduced. The draft largely enabled the Vietnam adventure, and as the Vietnam War became increasingly unpopular, one aspect of the inevitable backlash was against the draft that facilitated it. However, the USSR was still perceived as a threat and an enemy, and the trend for utilising the private sector to effectively make up the shortfall in the professional military accelerated. This trend goes beyond military strategy, and is largely down to the enormous growth in the private sector since the end of the Cold War, exemplified by doubling in size of the US economy in this period. Dr James Carafano, author of ‘Private Sector and Public Wars’ has explained the phenomenon as ‘It’s really the United States leveraging the capabilities of the modern world efficiently that’s driving this’. While this is true to a certain extent, it also cannot be denied that US military strategy has become dependent on private contractors, and that US planners have made use of contractors for less honourable reasons than straightforward efficiency of service.
According to the Congressional Research Service, contractors accounted for 48% of the US Department of Defence workforce in Iraq, and 57% in Afghanistan. Such huge reliance on the private sector brings its own problems. There is undoubtedly a marked difference between contractors who prepare food or drive lorries to those security firms engaged in combat, but question marks will remain over loyalties and incentives for all contractors compared with the professional military, especially when it comes to local contractors in tribal societies in countries such as Afghanistan. However, the most pressing and potentially damaging issue arising from such dependence is that of accountability. The current situation with Blackwater in Pakistan is a prime example of this. While contractors have been traditionally used to overcome short-term strategic shortages, decision makers in Washington, particularly since the Bush era, have become increasingly willing to use contractors for reasons of so-called ‘plausible deniability’. A firm such as Blackwater can be used as a tool of US foreign policy in Pakistan, without an American soldier having to set foot in the country, and therefore the US government can deny all knowledge. Although this greater freedom to wage war will be seen by many in Washington as a good thing, it carries with it further risks. In order to continue to use private security firms in this capacity, contracts must be secretive and beyond public scrutiny. Therefore these private security firms act without accountability, which in turn makes them harder to control. Effectively, the government cannot have it both ways; it must either bring security firms under control, turning them over to public scrutiny and making them accountable to the public, or continue to use them to carry out their dirty work while running the risk that their actions cannot be contained.
Carafano states that ‘Winning wars is about matching ends, ways and means in the best combination’ and argues that the debate over the use of contractors should be framed in practical rather than ethical terms. However, the debate cannot take place in a moral vacuum. While the practical issues relating to the use of contractors, such as the clarity of the rules of engagement and co-ordination between the military and private security are essential in the undertaking of successful modern warfare, there is more at stake than trying to pay for a decent service at a decent price. The issue of accountability, whether seen as an ethical issue or not, can still have profound practical consequences for the success or otherwise in executing war. Private American military companies are now working for secretive organisations not answerable to Congress, in countries that the US has not declared war on, under contracts that are not scrutinised and are continually renewed while the public and those they elect to represent them largely turn a blind eye. It is perhaps inevitable that these security firms, allowed to act with impunity, will exercise less restraint than is wise in a war in which the capture of hearts and minds is of greater importance than the capture of any territory. As evidence mounts of growing US military activity in Pakistan, decision makers in Washington should not expect locals on the ground to emphasise the distinction between those in American uniform and those simply paid in American money.
Monday, 30 November 2009
Thursday, 12 November 2009
The War in Afghanistan and British Hearts and Minds
Historians of the future may well identify the past two weeks as the critical fortnight in which British public opinion turned decisively and irretrievably against the war in Afghanistan. A BBC poll taken over 4 and 5 November found that 64% of the public now believe the war is ‘unwinnable’, up 6% from July, and 63% now want to see all British forces withdrawn ‘as quickly as possible.’ Meanwhile, the Independent newspaper on 11 November reported that four out of five Britons do not believe that British involvement in Afghanistan is keeping the UK safe from terrorism. These figures come in the wake of a series of bad news stories coming out of Afghanistan, which have thrust Afghanistan to the top of the government’s agenda, and which have called into question the entire British mission. The Prime Minister’s speech of 6 November at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London, which aimed to clarify the mission’s objectives and shore up public support, has been widely portrayed in the media as contradictory and ineffective. Mr Brown appears to be on the defensive, reacting to events on the ground rather than affecting them. A catalogue of violent headline-grabbing incidents in the past 14 days has crystallised and underlined all that is going wrong for the British and NATO in Afghanistan, and brings into sharp relief the monumental difficulties inherent in bringing stability to a country all too used to brutality and bloodshed.
The dawn attack on the UN guest house in the Shar-i-Naw district of Kabul on 28 October was shocking in its audacity, and immediately made headlines around the world. Five UN staff were left dead and 9 injured in a brazen assault by insurgents with automatic weapons and grenades. However, more significant was the message this atrocity delivered; that even in the supposedly most secure part of the country, no institution can be safe from terrorism. The UN is an organisation with a stated purpose ‘to work for peace and development, based on the principles of justice, human dignity and the well-being of all people.’ As an act of terrorism, this attack was successful in that it emphasises the fact that there are those with the means and the will to fight against what are almost unanimously believed to be fundamental human values. Such barbarity, coupled with the ease with which the attackers were able to execute their plans, only serves to reinforce the impression of lawlessness, fragility and vulnerability enveloping the country. As a result of the attack, it was declared that almost half of the 1300 foreign UN staff in Afghanistan are to be relocated. This has given the impression that law and order has broken down and that insurgents are setting the agenda. It also serves as a reminder of the 2003 bombing of the UN in Baghdad, which came to be emblematic of the moment any victory became unattainable, and came to be symbolic of the ‘lost cause’.
The attack on the UN was carried out against the backdrop of the then ongoing Afghan election saga, which has caused a real crisis of confidence in the ability of Afghan politicians to solve the myriad problems that beset the country. Since the original election of 20 August, now exposed as marred by widespread fraud, the electoral process has descended into farce. In the original poll, 1.3 million votes for Hamid Karzai were eventually judged to be invalid by the Electoral Complaints Commission, thus leaving him with less than the 50% needed to avoid a run-off with his main challenger, Dr Abdullah Abdullah. Just days before the second round of voting was to take place on 7 November, Dr Abdullah pulled out of the race as his demands that election officials involved in the discredited first poll be sacked were refused by Karzai. The seven members of Afghanistan’s so-called Independent Election Commission (IEC), in reality appointed by Karzai and arguably Karzai stooges, called off the election and declared Karzai the winner. Notwithstanding the fact that Karzai did not achieve a majority in the only vote and whose legitimacy is therefore doubtful, this whole process begs the question of whether a man as tainted by fraud and corruption as the current President can govern successfully. Free and fair this election certainly was not. It should not be forgotten that at the time of writing, at least 39 British soldiers have died since July, the month when 700 extra British troops were sent to Afghanistan to provide extra security for the election. The British public are entitled to wonder if British soldiers are fighting (and dying) for a corrupt, illegitimate and morally bankrupt regime.
Barely a day after Hamid Karzai was declared the winner of the election that never was, and Western leaders congratulated him on his ‘victory’, news filtered through of the deaths of 5 British servicemen, murdered on 3 November by a member of the Afghan police they were training. The attack occurred in the Nad Ali district of Helmand province, at a national police checkpoint. Eight more were wounded at the scene before the killer fled. As with the attack on the UN guest house, it is the ease with which such an act of violence can occur which is most shocking. It also calls into question the loyalty of the Afghan police and inevitably will lead to suspicions that trust has broken down between the British army in Helmand and those they are supposed to be mentoring. As if to emphasise this point, British General Jim Dutton has stated publically that this ‘probably won’t be the last’ of this kind of atrocity. Gordon Brown underlined the importance of the mentoring of the Afghan police by declaring that this strategy of mentoring ‘is what distinguishes a liberating army from an army of occupation.’ However, when ‘liberators’ are killed by the supposed liberated, it is logical to question whether the ‘liberators’ are any longer welcome. And when an apparently central plank of the British strategy suffers such a failure, it is legitimate to question the very validity of the entire strategy, which appears more untenable with each seemingly inevitable setback.
In Brown’s speech at the Royal College of Defence Studies on 6 November, he stated that ‘what separates successful counter-insurgency from unsuccessful counter-insurgency is that it is won on the ground and not in the air.’ As if to reinforce the point, on the very same day at least 8 Afghans working with US forces were mistakenly killed by a NATO airstrike. While this is not by a distance the most innocents killed in one strike by NATO (for example upwards of 30 civilians were killed in a NATO airstrike in Kunduz province in September this year and 40 were killed in a strike on a wedding party in Kandahar in November 2008), the timing of the blunder could not have come at a worse time for NATO, when it appears that bad news follows worse coming out of Afghanistan on an almost daily basis. The airstrike on 6 November occurred in Badghis province in the northwest of the country, where a ceasefire deal was made in July this year with the Taliban, a ceasefire now in tatters. It is the seemingly indiscriminate nature of attacks from the air as well as the more general problem of civilian casualties that have been blamed time and again for the Afghan population turning against NATO, and what appears to be indicative of a failing strategy in the case of the Badghis attack will undoubtedly add to the pressure on leaders such as Gordon Brown to begin winding down the whole Afghan mission.
The Prime Minister’s speech of 6 November, which was written with the aim of clarifying the British mission, was riddled with contradictions. For example, Brown called the war in Afghanistan one fought out ‘of necessity, not of choice’ and then stated that he was ‘not prepared to put the lives of British men and women in harm’s way for a government that does not stand up against corruption’, suggesting that he could still yet choose to cease the fight. The Afghan electoral process was defended with talk of ‘A people for so long denied a say in their future, now beginning to take the destiny of their country into their own hands.’ This appears to be wilfully ignoring the fact that the votes cast in the Presidential election have been proven not to fairly represent the will of the people. The very same people were denied their right to vote in the second round by Karzai’s refusal to remove those involved in the fraudulent first round of voting, and the IEC decision to hand the election to Karzai. It seems that the British public are becoming wise to the fact that despite what Western leaders say, elections in themselves are not proof positive of progress, let alone representative government.
When Brown spoke of British soldiers ‘protecting our nation and the rest of the world from the threat of global terrorism’, the public simply do not believe him. Defenders of the Afghan mission claim that this is because the Prime Minister is unpopular and blame his poor communication skills; that a more popular leader will be able to win over public opinion. However, winning back public opinion would be a herculean task, and most observers would surely have to admit that once it’s lost, it’s lost. This is particularly true with regards to the way the media now report the general perception of the Afghan war. Eight years ago, those who opposed the war were seen as self-indulgent eccentrics. They were the usual suspects, old-fashioned, misguided and therefore essentially harmless. They were to be humoured and basically ignored. However, the very same people are now seen as holding mainstream views. The debate has moved on, and it now appears that the British public think it is Mr Brown whose views are stuck in the past.
The dawn attack on the UN guest house in the Shar-i-Naw district of Kabul on 28 October was shocking in its audacity, and immediately made headlines around the world. Five UN staff were left dead and 9 injured in a brazen assault by insurgents with automatic weapons and grenades. However, more significant was the message this atrocity delivered; that even in the supposedly most secure part of the country, no institution can be safe from terrorism. The UN is an organisation with a stated purpose ‘to work for peace and development, based on the principles of justice, human dignity and the well-being of all people.’ As an act of terrorism, this attack was successful in that it emphasises the fact that there are those with the means and the will to fight against what are almost unanimously believed to be fundamental human values. Such barbarity, coupled with the ease with which the attackers were able to execute their plans, only serves to reinforce the impression of lawlessness, fragility and vulnerability enveloping the country. As a result of the attack, it was declared that almost half of the 1300 foreign UN staff in Afghanistan are to be relocated. This has given the impression that law and order has broken down and that insurgents are setting the agenda. It also serves as a reminder of the 2003 bombing of the UN in Baghdad, which came to be emblematic of the moment any victory became unattainable, and came to be symbolic of the ‘lost cause’.
The attack on the UN was carried out against the backdrop of the then ongoing Afghan election saga, which has caused a real crisis of confidence in the ability of Afghan politicians to solve the myriad problems that beset the country. Since the original election of 20 August, now exposed as marred by widespread fraud, the electoral process has descended into farce. In the original poll, 1.3 million votes for Hamid Karzai were eventually judged to be invalid by the Electoral Complaints Commission, thus leaving him with less than the 50% needed to avoid a run-off with his main challenger, Dr Abdullah Abdullah. Just days before the second round of voting was to take place on 7 November, Dr Abdullah pulled out of the race as his demands that election officials involved in the discredited first poll be sacked were refused by Karzai. The seven members of Afghanistan’s so-called Independent Election Commission (IEC), in reality appointed by Karzai and arguably Karzai stooges, called off the election and declared Karzai the winner. Notwithstanding the fact that Karzai did not achieve a majority in the only vote and whose legitimacy is therefore doubtful, this whole process begs the question of whether a man as tainted by fraud and corruption as the current President can govern successfully. Free and fair this election certainly was not. It should not be forgotten that at the time of writing, at least 39 British soldiers have died since July, the month when 700 extra British troops were sent to Afghanistan to provide extra security for the election. The British public are entitled to wonder if British soldiers are fighting (and dying) for a corrupt, illegitimate and morally bankrupt regime.
Barely a day after Hamid Karzai was declared the winner of the election that never was, and Western leaders congratulated him on his ‘victory’, news filtered through of the deaths of 5 British servicemen, murdered on 3 November by a member of the Afghan police they were training. The attack occurred in the Nad Ali district of Helmand province, at a national police checkpoint. Eight more were wounded at the scene before the killer fled. As with the attack on the UN guest house, it is the ease with which such an act of violence can occur which is most shocking. It also calls into question the loyalty of the Afghan police and inevitably will lead to suspicions that trust has broken down between the British army in Helmand and those they are supposed to be mentoring. As if to emphasise this point, British General Jim Dutton has stated publically that this ‘probably won’t be the last’ of this kind of atrocity. Gordon Brown underlined the importance of the mentoring of the Afghan police by declaring that this strategy of mentoring ‘is what distinguishes a liberating army from an army of occupation.’ However, when ‘liberators’ are killed by the supposed liberated, it is logical to question whether the ‘liberators’ are any longer welcome. And when an apparently central plank of the British strategy suffers such a failure, it is legitimate to question the very validity of the entire strategy, which appears more untenable with each seemingly inevitable setback.
In Brown’s speech at the Royal College of Defence Studies on 6 November, he stated that ‘what separates successful counter-insurgency from unsuccessful counter-insurgency is that it is won on the ground and not in the air.’ As if to reinforce the point, on the very same day at least 8 Afghans working with US forces were mistakenly killed by a NATO airstrike. While this is not by a distance the most innocents killed in one strike by NATO (for example upwards of 30 civilians were killed in a NATO airstrike in Kunduz province in September this year and 40 were killed in a strike on a wedding party in Kandahar in November 2008), the timing of the blunder could not have come at a worse time for NATO, when it appears that bad news follows worse coming out of Afghanistan on an almost daily basis. The airstrike on 6 November occurred in Badghis province in the northwest of the country, where a ceasefire deal was made in July this year with the Taliban, a ceasefire now in tatters. It is the seemingly indiscriminate nature of attacks from the air as well as the more general problem of civilian casualties that have been blamed time and again for the Afghan population turning against NATO, and what appears to be indicative of a failing strategy in the case of the Badghis attack will undoubtedly add to the pressure on leaders such as Gordon Brown to begin winding down the whole Afghan mission.
The Prime Minister’s speech of 6 November, which was written with the aim of clarifying the British mission, was riddled with contradictions. For example, Brown called the war in Afghanistan one fought out ‘of necessity, not of choice’ and then stated that he was ‘not prepared to put the lives of British men and women in harm’s way for a government that does not stand up against corruption’, suggesting that he could still yet choose to cease the fight. The Afghan electoral process was defended with talk of ‘A people for so long denied a say in their future, now beginning to take the destiny of their country into their own hands.’ This appears to be wilfully ignoring the fact that the votes cast in the Presidential election have been proven not to fairly represent the will of the people. The very same people were denied their right to vote in the second round by Karzai’s refusal to remove those involved in the fraudulent first round of voting, and the IEC decision to hand the election to Karzai. It seems that the British public are becoming wise to the fact that despite what Western leaders say, elections in themselves are not proof positive of progress, let alone representative government.
When Brown spoke of British soldiers ‘protecting our nation and the rest of the world from the threat of global terrorism’, the public simply do not believe him. Defenders of the Afghan mission claim that this is because the Prime Minister is unpopular and blame his poor communication skills; that a more popular leader will be able to win over public opinion. However, winning back public opinion would be a herculean task, and most observers would surely have to admit that once it’s lost, it’s lost. This is particularly true with regards to the way the media now report the general perception of the Afghan war. Eight years ago, those who opposed the war were seen as self-indulgent eccentrics. They were the usual suspects, old-fashioned, misguided and therefore essentially harmless. They were to be humoured and basically ignored. However, the very same people are now seen as holding mainstream views. The debate has moved on, and it now appears that the British public think it is Mr Brown whose views are stuck in the past.
Labels:
Afghanistan,
British public opinion,
War on Terror
Sunday, 1 November 2009
Iranian Nuclear Negotiations and the 'Trust Deficit'
Despite the protraction of negotiations between Iran and the West over Tehran’s nuclear programme and the palpable sense of frustration emanating from Washington over what are perceived to be Iranian stalling tactics, there is more reason than ever to be optimistic that a peaceful solution to the impasse can be achieved. As Tehran makes its initial response to the deal formed in Vienna last week, attention now shifts to how Washington will react. Under the terms of the deal brokered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran would send about 75% (1200kg) of its low-enriched uranium to Russia, from where it would be sent to France for conversion into fuel rods, before being shipped back to Iran for use in Tehran’s research reactor, which produces radioisotopes for medical use. As the technology used to enrich uranium for use as fuel in nuclear power is the same as that of the higher-level enrichment needed to make the fissile core of an atomic bomb, it would be a significant step towards decreasing tensions if most of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium is removed from the country. The amount of low-enriched uranium needed to produce a single nuclear bomb is 1000kg, so the proposal would theoretically prevent Iran from being able to build a bomb, at least until it has enriched enough uranium to replace what has been shipped abroad. The deal would thus buy time and create space for further negotiations.
Thursday’s response from Tehran to the IAEA proposal, while far from being the blanket positive response desired by the US, Russia and France, at least leaves the door open for further discussion. Prospects for breaking the deadlock had looked unlikely when speaker of the Iranian parliament Ali Larijani had declared that ‘Westerners are insisting to go in a direction that speaks of cheating’, but President Ahmadinejad has since expressed willingness to work within the framework of the IAEA deal, albeit with conditions of his own. Tehran would like to amend the proposal so that its low-enriched uranium would be gradually shipped abroad, and so that the ‘simultaneous exchange’ of nuclear fuel takes place in return.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the Iranian response. Firstly, it appears that the Iranian leadership is divided over how to react to the IAEA proposal, and that Ahmadinejad’s conditions for accepting the deal are to demonstrate to his hard-line power base that he will not sacrifice too much in negotiating with the West. It must also be borne in mind that the Iranian ‘right’ to enrich uranium for fuel on its own soil is supported by the majority of Iranians. However, the disputed presidential election of June 2009 and the economic hardship in Iran have weakened Ahmadinejad’s position at home, and if further economic sanctions are to be imposed by the US and its allies, then the President needs to be in a position where he can blame the West for the breakdown of negotiations. Secondly, the Iranian response, while seen by many as a delaying tactic in Washington, can be read as an indication of the mistrust that exists between the US and Iran. To use diplomatic parlance, it is this ‘trust deficit’, stretching back well into the last century, which is at the root of the Iranian nuclear impasse, and which must be overcome if a solution is to be found. While negotiations can appear frustratingly slow, it is only by such negotiations that trust and understanding can be built, two necessary preconditions for any long-term settlement.
A major sticking point in the terms of the current proposal for Tehran is the fact that it historically does not trust other countries when it comes to energy security or fuel supply. This mistrust can be traced back to Iranian dealings with the British controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in the first half of the 20th century, which Iran believed was unfairly profiting from Iranian resources at the expense of the Iranian people. Following the AIOC’s nationalisation and the subsequent American organised and British backed coup to remove the popular pro-nationalisation Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq from power, Iranian mistrust of Western intentions relating to energy provision in Iran have only intensified. Suspicions that the West is using the nuclear issue to try to stop Iran developing into a regional power based on its energy security have been strengthened only in the past few days as the ‘Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act’ passed the committee stage in US Congress. This law would hinder Iran’s ability to import and produce petroleum products, having a potentially profound effect on the Iranian economy, as Iran currently imports nearly 40% of its gas and diesel. Tehran also does not see France as an honest link in the fuel-providing chain in the current dispute, as President Sarkozy has manoeuvred the French position much closer to that of the US than his predecessor in the Elysee Palace.
Further proof in Iranian eyes that the nuclear issue is being used as cover for surreptitious Western plans to keep Iran weak can be found in the American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2007. NIEs are produced by the US intelligence community to provide the American administration with up to date and authoritative information in order that decision makers can make sound judgements relating to matters of national security. The NIE of 2007 stated that ‘We judge with high confidence that in the fall of 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons programme’. It further stated that ‘Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons programme suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005.’ These statements, coupled with IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei’s assertion in September 2009 that ‘I do not think based on what we see that Iran has an ongoing nuclear weapons programme’ have further served to increase Tehran’s suspicions of duplicitous Western motives.
However, Western mistrust of Iranian intentions is equally as entrenched, and must equally be conquered if a means can be found to overcome the US-Iranian deadlock. The US and its allies declare the need to be sure that Iran will not build a bomb, and that the best way to do this is to ensure it cannot do so. They point to the fact that for 18 years the Iranians ran a covert nuclear weapons programme, and that therefore stringent measures and rules must now be put in place in order that no such concealment can occur in future. Western leaders believe that they simply cannot afford to take stated Iranian intentions at face value, given Tehran’s past record of deception. The West sees further evidence of Iranian untrustworthiness demonstrated by the fact that numerous United Nations resolutions calling for Tehran to cease enriching uranium have been ignored, and President Ahmadinejad’s talk of wiping Israel off the map is at the very least unhelpful and at the other extremity dangerously threatening, and either way is too serious to turn a blind eye to.
Iranian non-disclosure of its second enrichment plant near Qom is indicative of mutual suspicions between the protagonists in the ongoing dispute. This plant is thought to be big enough to enrich enough uranium for a bomb, though Tehran’s position is that its existence was declared to the IAEA in time, and that it will only be used to enrich uranium to a low level. While some in Washington see the second plant as proof that Iran has something to hide, many in Iran see the Qom plant as an insurance policy, given that if the US or Israel attacked Iran, the well-known plant of Natanz would be a certain target. This mindset is especially prevalent, as Iran sees itself surrounded by hostile forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, and interprets American talk of ‘all options being on the table’ as a blatant threat to its security. Add to this reports coming out of Washington in early October that a new 30000 pound ‘bunker-buster’ bomb known as the ‘Massive Ordnance Penetrator’ is being developed, and it is easy to understand the feeling in Iran that such an insurance policy might be necessary, as such a weapon is clearly not designed for fighting insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Despite the history of antagonism, provocation and mutual suspicion between particularly the US and Iran, and despite the frustratingly slow nature of the negotiations between the two sides so far, there are grounds for optimism. Firstly, it is in everyone’s interests to find a peaceful solution to the standoff. From the Iranian domestic perspective, President Ahmadinejad would have nothing to gain in being seen to provoke a military strike from the US, and the long term anti-American backlash across the Muslim (and Arab) world if military action was taken would immediately negate any (short-term) benefits the US might theoretically gain from delaying any perceived Iranian nuclear weapons development. Tehran does not stand to gain from having continuous economic sanctions imposed against it in a political climate where dissatisfaction with the establishment in its handling of the economy, and of the disputed election, has been visible and growing. Obama will also want to be seen to be giving negotiations every possible chance, so as not to shore up the position of the hardliners in Iran.
The stated aims of the US and Iran are not incompatible in their simplest forms, in that Washington states it does not want Iran to have a bomb, and Tehran states it does not seek one. The main issue dividing the two sides is the lack of trust. Only by continued engagement can trust be established, whereby a solution can be agreed. Both sides of the negotiating table want to be seen to be making an offer the other would appear unreasonable to refuse, given their stated aims. While this is making negotiations extremely protracted, it is a necessary prerequisite to establishing trust, in that this form of shadow boxing is a way of ensuring that those round the table are willing to take actions that match their words. In the latest talks, American acceptance of low-level enrichment of uranium in Iran before shipment to Russia implies a flexibility and pragmatism in Obama’s approach that his predecessor lacked. It is small steps such as this that will prepare the ground for a future settlement. No one should be in any doubt that this will be a drawn-out process, probably with many setbacks on the way, but mutual acrimony will only be dissipated through understanding. The art of successful diplomacy necessarily requires empathy, and this requires engagement. To find a lasting solution requires trust, which in turn requires patience. Negotiations between the West and Iran are in their infancy and it will be a long and difficult road, but optimism should be taken from the fact that the right track has now been taken.
Thursday’s response from Tehran to the IAEA proposal, while far from being the blanket positive response desired by the US, Russia and France, at least leaves the door open for further discussion. Prospects for breaking the deadlock had looked unlikely when speaker of the Iranian parliament Ali Larijani had declared that ‘Westerners are insisting to go in a direction that speaks of cheating’, but President Ahmadinejad has since expressed willingness to work within the framework of the IAEA deal, albeit with conditions of his own. Tehran would like to amend the proposal so that its low-enriched uranium would be gradually shipped abroad, and so that the ‘simultaneous exchange’ of nuclear fuel takes place in return.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the Iranian response. Firstly, it appears that the Iranian leadership is divided over how to react to the IAEA proposal, and that Ahmadinejad’s conditions for accepting the deal are to demonstrate to his hard-line power base that he will not sacrifice too much in negotiating with the West. It must also be borne in mind that the Iranian ‘right’ to enrich uranium for fuel on its own soil is supported by the majority of Iranians. However, the disputed presidential election of June 2009 and the economic hardship in Iran have weakened Ahmadinejad’s position at home, and if further economic sanctions are to be imposed by the US and its allies, then the President needs to be in a position where he can blame the West for the breakdown of negotiations. Secondly, the Iranian response, while seen by many as a delaying tactic in Washington, can be read as an indication of the mistrust that exists between the US and Iran. To use diplomatic parlance, it is this ‘trust deficit’, stretching back well into the last century, which is at the root of the Iranian nuclear impasse, and which must be overcome if a solution is to be found. While negotiations can appear frustratingly slow, it is only by such negotiations that trust and understanding can be built, two necessary preconditions for any long-term settlement.
A major sticking point in the terms of the current proposal for Tehran is the fact that it historically does not trust other countries when it comes to energy security or fuel supply. This mistrust can be traced back to Iranian dealings with the British controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in the first half of the 20th century, which Iran believed was unfairly profiting from Iranian resources at the expense of the Iranian people. Following the AIOC’s nationalisation and the subsequent American organised and British backed coup to remove the popular pro-nationalisation Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq from power, Iranian mistrust of Western intentions relating to energy provision in Iran have only intensified. Suspicions that the West is using the nuclear issue to try to stop Iran developing into a regional power based on its energy security have been strengthened only in the past few days as the ‘Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act’ passed the committee stage in US Congress. This law would hinder Iran’s ability to import and produce petroleum products, having a potentially profound effect on the Iranian economy, as Iran currently imports nearly 40% of its gas and diesel. Tehran also does not see France as an honest link in the fuel-providing chain in the current dispute, as President Sarkozy has manoeuvred the French position much closer to that of the US than his predecessor in the Elysee Palace.
Further proof in Iranian eyes that the nuclear issue is being used as cover for surreptitious Western plans to keep Iran weak can be found in the American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2007. NIEs are produced by the US intelligence community to provide the American administration with up to date and authoritative information in order that decision makers can make sound judgements relating to matters of national security. The NIE of 2007 stated that ‘We judge with high confidence that in the fall of 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons programme’. It further stated that ‘Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons programme suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005.’ These statements, coupled with IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei’s assertion in September 2009 that ‘I do not think based on what we see that Iran has an ongoing nuclear weapons programme’ have further served to increase Tehran’s suspicions of duplicitous Western motives.
However, Western mistrust of Iranian intentions is equally as entrenched, and must equally be conquered if a means can be found to overcome the US-Iranian deadlock. The US and its allies declare the need to be sure that Iran will not build a bomb, and that the best way to do this is to ensure it cannot do so. They point to the fact that for 18 years the Iranians ran a covert nuclear weapons programme, and that therefore stringent measures and rules must now be put in place in order that no such concealment can occur in future. Western leaders believe that they simply cannot afford to take stated Iranian intentions at face value, given Tehran’s past record of deception. The West sees further evidence of Iranian untrustworthiness demonstrated by the fact that numerous United Nations resolutions calling for Tehran to cease enriching uranium have been ignored, and President Ahmadinejad’s talk of wiping Israel off the map is at the very least unhelpful and at the other extremity dangerously threatening, and either way is too serious to turn a blind eye to.
Iranian non-disclosure of its second enrichment plant near Qom is indicative of mutual suspicions between the protagonists in the ongoing dispute. This plant is thought to be big enough to enrich enough uranium for a bomb, though Tehran’s position is that its existence was declared to the IAEA in time, and that it will only be used to enrich uranium to a low level. While some in Washington see the second plant as proof that Iran has something to hide, many in Iran see the Qom plant as an insurance policy, given that if the US or Israel attacked Iran, the well-known plant of Natanz would be a certain target. This mindset is especially prevalent, as Iran sees itself surrounded by hostile forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, and interprets American talk of ‘all options being on the table’ as a blatant threat to its security. Add to this reports coming out of Washington in early October that a new 30000 pound ‘bunker-buster’ bomb known as the ‘Massive Ordnance Penetrator’ is being developed, and it is easy to understand the feeling in Iran that such an insurance policy might be necessary, as such a weapon is clearly not designed for fighting insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Despite the history of antagonism, provocation and mutual suspicion between particularly the US and Iran, and despite the frustratingly slow nature of the negotiations between the two sides so far, there are grounds for optimism. Firstly, it is in everyone’s interests to find a peaceful solution to the standoff. From the Iranian domestic perspective, President Ahmadinejad would have nothing to gain in being seen to provoke a military strike from the US, and the long term anti-American backlash across the Muslim (and Arab) world if military action was taken would immediately negate any (short-term) benefits the US might theoretically gain from delaying any perceived Iranian nuclear weapons development. Tehran does not stand to gain from having continuous economic sanctions imposed against it in a political climate where dissatisfaction with the establishment in its handling of the economy, and of the disputed election, has been visible and growing. Obama will also want to be seen to be giving negotiations every possible chance, so as not to shore up the position of the hardliners in Iran.
The stated aims of the US and Iran are not incompatible in their simplest forms, in that Washington states it does not want Iran to have a bomb, and Tehran states it does not seek one. The main issue dividing the two sides is the lack of trust. Only by continued engagement can trust be established, whereby a solution can be agreed. Both sides of the negotiating table want to be seen to be making an offer the other would appear unreasonable to refuse, given their stated aims. While this is making negotiations extremely protracted, it is a necessary prerequisite to establishing trust, in that this form of shadow boxing is a way of ensuring that those round the table are willing to take actions that match their words. In the latest talks, American acceptance of low-level enrichment of uranium in Iran before shipment to Russia implies a flexibility and pragmatism in Obama’s approach that his predecessor lacked. It is small steps such as this that will prepare the ground for a future settlement. No one should be in any doubt that this will be a drawn-out process, probably with many setbacks on the way, but mutual acrimony will only be dissipated through understanding. The art of successful diplomacy necessarily requires empathy, and this requires engagement. To find a lasting solution requires trust, which in turn requires patience. Negotiations between the West and Iran are in their infancy and it will be a long and difficult road, but optimism should be taken from the fact that the right track has now been taken.
Saturday, 24 October 2009
Iran's War on Terror and the New Great Game
Last Sunday’s bomb attack in the southeast Iranian province of Sistan-Balochistan, while on the face of it appearing to be carried out by local militants with local grievances, may yet have far-reaching implications for the wider region and the outside world. Much will depend on the reaction of the Iranian government. Details of the attack still remain unclear, but it seems that a suicide bomber from the Sunni militant group Jundullah detonated an explosive belt in the city of Sarbaz, killing at least 42 people including 6 Revolutionary Guard Commanders at a meeting between members of the Revolutionary Guard and tribal leaders, set up to foster better relations between the Shiite government of Iran and the Balochis, who are a mainly Sunni people living in southeast Iran and southwest Pakistan, as well as in southwest Afghanistan. Given the shocking nature of this act of terrorism, which killed the second in command of the Revolutionary Guard’s ground forces, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Iranian authorities have reverted to the default position of blaming the US and Britain. Also held responsible has been Pakistan, for allegedly harbouring Jundullah militants within its borders. However, to best understand the reasons for the bombing and the potential consequences, attention must be given to who stands to benefit from the attack, and to the violent resentment of the Iranian government felt by many Balochis.
It is estimated that 6 million Balochis live on the Pakistani side of the border while 4 million live on the Iranian side. The province of Sistan-Balochistan, in which Sarbaz is located, is the poorest of Iran’s 30 provinces, largely neglected by Tehran. Criminal gangs operate largely unchecked, while the majority Sunni population that live there are conservative in outlook. It was against this backdrop in 2003 that Jundullah was formed, under the leadership of Abdolmalek Rigi. He has claimed that Jundullah, which is based on the Pakistani side of the border, does not harbour separatist ambitions for the Balochis, but rather seeks equal rights for the Sunnis of the region. Jundullah, or ‘Soldiers of God’, have engaged in acts of terrorism in the past, most notably the Zahedan bombing of 2007, and are also accused of kidnappings and drug smuggling to fund their activities.
In a statement following the Sarbaz attack, the head of the Revolutionary Guards ground forces, General Mohammad Pakpour claimed that ‘The terrorists were trained in the neighbouring country by the Americans and British’, promising a ‘very harsh and crushing response’. While it is true that the CIA are alleged to have aided Jundullah in a bid to undermine Iran’s government, a claim notably made by the captured brother of the Jundullah leader before his execution in Iran earlier this year, it is unlikely that the US had any direct involvement in this attack. It would not make sense for Washington to antagonise or provoke Tehran in such a manner while negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme are ongoing, especially as they enter a delicate and critical stage. It should not be forgotten that President Obama has invested significant political capital in engaging with Iran to try to find a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue.
Iranian President Ahmadinajad has also laid blame at Pakistan’s door, asserting that ‘some security agents in Pakistan are co-operating with the main elements of this terrorist incident’ and demanding Pakistan hand over those responsible. There is little doubt that Jundullah has been operating from within Pakistan, but it would be entirely misleading to suggest the Pakistani authorities encouraged the Sarbaz bombing. Pakistan has no strategic interest in allying itself with Sunni militants against the Iranian government when it is engaged in a fierce battle against Sunni extremism in South Waziristan, and there is nothing for Pakistan to gain in making an enemy of Iran when it is not only preoccupied with its fight against the Pakistani Taliban, but has to contend with ever-present tensions on the border with India and in Kashmir. It is also unlikely that Pakistan would risk supporting a militant group comprising of ethnic Balochis within its own borders, despite the claims of Jundullah that it is a sectarian rather than separatist group.
Islamabad and Tehran have also been enjoying relatively good relations, exemplified by the signing in May 2009 of an agreement between the two countries whereby Iran would sell gas to Pakistan from its South Pars field for 25 years. Under this agreement, the Iran-Pakistan pipeline (IP pipeline, or ‘Peace Pipeline’) would be built, against the wishes of the US, who favour a trans-Afghan pipeline running from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. Jundullah opposes the IP pipeline, which would run through Pakistani Balochistan and Iranian Balochistan, as they do not want to see Balochistan used as a gas corridor, and do not believe resulting gas profits would be redistributed to the Sunnis of the region. Last Sunday’s bombing may well serve to make foreign and domestic investors think twice about the risks involved in the IP pipeline, as well as sowing suspicion between Tehran and Islamabad. Such a scenario would not only harm Iran, but also China, who had agreed with Pakistan to import most of the Iranian gas from the IP pipeline in order that it would not have to import so much through the Strait of Malacca, which Beijing sees as less secure. The US would benefit if the trans-Afghan pipeline became a more viable alternative, as it has always favoured a pipeline bypassing Iran and Russia for its own energy security. Paradoxically, the US could stand to benefit further if Iran launches its own military action against Balochi militants, creating further instability in the region where the proposed IP pipeline is to run.
The Iranian government has been quick to blame its external rivals for the Sarbaz bombing, and it is possible that the US could benefit strategically in the medium or long term if events in Sistan-Balochistan make the IP pipeline unviable. However, such accusations from Iran and speculation over the potential strategic consequences deflects attention from the fact that to carry out such a well planned and executed attack, Jundullah must have had good intelligence on the ground. This points to there being strong local tribal alliances across the Pakistan-Iran border. Indeed, it is hard to see how such an attack could be carried out without significant intelligence from within Iran, especially as such high-ranking Revolutionary Guards from Tehran were killed in the blast. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, Iran has chosen to lash out at foreign agents rather than to look at the long-standing problems festering in its most restive region. The border area between Iran and Pakistan is impoverished and volatile, where criminal groups act with impunity. Armed organisations with varying ethnic, religious and nationalist agendas operate against a backdrop made more complex by the fact that it is where the 21st century’s great powers- China, the US and Russia- are overtly and covertly vying for influence. It remains to be seen whether what begun as a local dispute will grow into a wider conflict of global strategic significance.
It is estimated that 6 million Balochis live on the Pakistani side of the border while 4 million live on the Iranian side. The province of Sistan-Balochistan, in which Sarbaz is located, is the poorest of Iran’s 30 provinces, largely neglected by Tehran. Criminal gangs operate largely unchecked, while the majority Sunni population that live there are conservative in outlook. It was against this backdrop in 2003 that Jundullah was formed, under the leadership of Abdolmalek Rigi. He has claimed that Jundullah, which is based on the Pakistani side of the border, does not harbour separatist ambitions for the Balochis, but rather seeks equal rights for the Sunnis of the region. Jundullah, or ‘Soldiers of God’, have engaged in acts of terrorism in the past, most notably the Zahedan bombing of 2007, and are also accused of kidnappings and drug smuggling to fund their activities.
In a statement following the Sarbaz attack, the head of the Revolutionary Guards ground forces, General Mohammad Pakpour claimed that ‘The terrorists were trained in the neighbouring country by the Americans and British’, promising a ‘very harsh and crushing response’. While it is true that the CIA are alleged to have aided Jundullah in a bid to undermine Iran’s government, a claim notably made by the captured brother of the Jundullah leader before his execution in Iran earlier this year, it is unlikely that the US had any direct involvement in this attack. It would not make sense for Washington to antagonise or provoke Tehran in such a manner while negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme are ongoing, especially as they enter a delicate and critical stage. It should not be forgotten that President Obama has invested significant political capital in engaging with Iran to try to find a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue.
Iranian President Ahmadinajad has also laid blame at Pakistan’s door, asserting that ‘some security agents in Pakistan are co-operating with the main elements of this terrorist incident’ and demanding Pakistan hand over those responsible. There is little doubt that Jundullah has been operating from within Pakistan, but it would be entirely misleading to suggest the Pakistani authorities encouraged the Sarbaz bombing. Pakistan has no strategic interest in allying itself with Sunni militants against the Iranian government when it is engaged in a fierce battle against Sunni extremism in South Waziristan, and there is nothing for Pakistan to gain in making an enemy of Iran when it is not only preoccupied with its fight against the Pakistani Taliban, but has to contend with ever-present tensions on the border with India and in Kashmir. It is also unlikely that Pakistan would risk supporting a militant group comprising of ethnic Balochis within its own borders, despite the claims of Jundullah that it is a sectarian rather than separatist group.
Islamabad and Tehran have also been enjoying relatively good relations, exemplified by the signing in May 2009 of an agreement between the two countries whereby Iran would sell gas to Pakistan from its South Pars field for 25 years. Under this agreement, the Iran-Pakistan pipeline (IP pipeline, or ‘Peace Pipeline’) would be built, against the wishes of the US, who favour a trans-Afghan pipeline running from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. Jundullah opposes the IP pipeline, which would run through Pakistani Balochistan and Iranian Balochistan, as they do not want to see Balochistan used as a gas corridor, and do not believe resulting gas profits would be redistributed to the Sunnis of the region. Last Sunday’s bombing may well serve to make foreign and domestic investors think twice about the risks involved in the IP pipeline, as well as sowing suspicion between Tehran and Islamabad. Such a scenario would not only harm Iran, but also China, who had agreed with Pakistan to import most of the Iranian gas from the IP pipeline in order that it would not have to import so much through the Strait of Malacca, which Beijing sees as less secure. The US would benefit if the trans-Afghan pipeline became a more viable alternative, as it has always favoured a pipeline bypassing Iran and Russia for its own energy security. Paradoxically, the US could stand to benefit further if Iran launches its own military action against Balochi militants, creating further instability in the region where the proposed IP pipeline is to run.
The Iranian government has been quick to blame its external rivals for the Sarbaz bombing, and it is possible that the US could benefit strategically in the medium or long term if events in Sistan-Balochistan make the IP pipeline unviable. However, such accusations from Iran and speculation over the potential strategic consequences deflects attention from the fact that to carry out such a well planned and executed attack, Jundullah must have had good intelligence on the ground. This points to there being strong local tribal alliances across the Pakistan-Iran border. Indeed, it is hard to see how such an attack could be carried out without significant intelligence from within Iran, especially as such high-ranking Revolutionary Guards from Tehran were killed in the blast. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, Iran has chosen to lash out at foreign agents rather than to look at the long-standing problems festering in its most restive region. The border area between Iran and Pakistan is impoverished and volatile, where criminal groups act with impunity. Armed organisations with varying ethnic, religious and nationalist agendas operate against a backdrop made more complex by the fact that it is where the 21st century’s great powers- China, the US and Russia- are overtly and covertly vying for influence. It remains to be seen whether what begun as a local dispute will grow into a wider conflict of global strategic significance.
Labels:
Iran,
Jundullah,
New Great Game,
Sistan-Balochistan
Friday, 16 October 2009
American Influence in Pakistan and the Next 'Mother Of All Battles'
Thursday morning saw upwards of 38 people killed in a series of co-ordinated attacks across northwest Pakistan. As fierce gun battles raged between security forces and militants in Lahore, car bombs brought carnage to the streets of Peshawar and Kohat, representing the latest in a litany of bloody reminders of the turmoil and instability gripping parts of the country. These attacks follow hard on the heels of Monday’s suicide attack in the Swat Valley, and the weekend’s audacious assault on the Pakistan Army General Headquarters at Rawalpindi, which only ended when Pakistani commandos were sent in to kill the militants and free the hostages. The increasing number of attacks is in part a response to the government’s intensified activity and preparations for an all-out offensive into South Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, but also in more general terms is indicative of the violent opposition to the government policy of alliance with the US in its ‘war on terror’ since 2001. However, it is not only the frequency and audacity of the militant attacks, but also the expanding geographical area in which the attacks take place and from which the militants come that will be of grave concern to Islamabad and Washington.
The promised push into South Waziristan is something that President Obama has been pressing President Zardari to undertake as part of his broader strategy in the region to stop insurgents having a safe haven from which to plan and execute attacks in Afghanistan, but it does not come without its risks. On 27 March 2009 Obama explicitly linked the two conflicts in a speech announcing what he termed ‘a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan’, and since the death of Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud in a CIA drone attack on 5 August, a sustained ground offensive in South Waziristan has been expected. American special envoy Richard Holbrooke spent five days in Pakistan holding high-level meetings in August, and Chief of US Central Command David Petraeus was also in the country talking with army commanders about providing American logistical support to the operation. It appears that Islamabad believes the death of Mehsud has fundamentally weakened the Taliban position in South Waziristan, and following the army’s success in capturing Swat Valley from the militants in the North West Frontier Province, they have been preparing the ground for the looming offensive by sealing off the area and employing the use of artillery and aerial bombardments against Taliban positions.
On the surface, American and Pakistani policy seems to be working towards a common objective, namely the destruction of a common enemy, and the two countries appear to be co-operating as never before. Indeed President Obama has signalled his commitment to, and investment in Pakistan, through the Kerry-Lugar bill, which will provide $1.5 billion a year in American aid for the next 5 years to go towards Pakistani democratic, economic and social development programmes. A vast new American embassy in Islamabad for 1000 staff is also being planned. However, closer American engagement with Pakistan (even if it is a necessary part of Obama’s strategy for success in Afghanistan) brings into sharp focus the differences between the two countries, particularly in terms of cultural sensitivities and trust. As such, it risks alienating vast swathes of Pakistani society, including the very people that need to support the strategy if it is to succeed.
Opposition to the Kerry-Lugar bill in Pakistan has come from the military, opposition parliamentarians, and even members of the ruling coalition. Despite support for the bill from Zardari in principle, it remains unclear in what form the bill will finally be implemented. Many are opposed to what they see as unreasonable conditions attached to the aid package, which is seen as American meddling at best, national humiliation at worst. Pakistani Muslim League-N opposition member Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan articulated the concerns of many by stating that ‘each and every page of the bill is reflective of the insulting attitude towards Pakistan.’ Of most concern to Pakistan’s military is the condition that the US must assess the extent of control the government has over the armed forces, including budgets and the chain of command. The bill also refers to the southwest city of Quetta and the eastern town of Muridke as safe havens for militants, increasing the fear of US drone attacks, which many Pakistanis regard as a blatant infringement of sovereignty. Suspicion of American intentions in Pakistan has also been increased by the actions of US security contractors DynCorp, widely believed to be a tool of American foreign policy to develop a shadow network of security and intelligence personnel in the country. September saw a local company hired by DynCorp have its offices raided and its owner arrested. Islamabad is frustrated at not being more widely consulted in Washington’s decision to send more troops to Afghanistan, and in turn Washington is suspicious that the Pakistani military contains elements that support the militants, especially as the captured militant from the Rawalpindi siege, Mohammed Aquil, was himself once a member of Pakistan’s army.
The escalating violence and bitter opposition to the Kerry-Lugar bill in Pakistan do not provide an auspicious backdrop to Obama’s grand Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. The risk for Obama (and also for Pakistan) is that by being seen to influence or attempt to influence Pakistani policy, this will strengthen the hand of the militants and reduce the civilian government’s support. In a country that has spent roughly half of its existence under military rule, Obama must tread carefully or risk his strategy unravelling. However, events in Pakistan have produced their own momentum, and there are many reasons for those who crave stability to be pessimistic. Violent extremism appears to have gained a foothold across large areas of northwest Pakistan, as demonstrated in the past two weeks by attacks in the North West Frontier Province and Punjab, while the Federally Administered Tribal Areas remain outside Islamabad’s jurisdiction, and parts of Balochistan are believed to be safe havens for senior Taliban figures. It is a worrying phenomenon that in some cases of terrorism, al-Qaeda is thought to provide the funding, the Taliban the training and Punjabi organisations the militants. Indeed, it appears that the government is only now waking up to the Punjabi threat. In the Failed States Index, a collaboration between US ‘Foreign Policy Magazine’ and think-tank ‘The Fund For Peace’, Pakistan is ranked 9th, three places worse off than in 2007 when General Musharraf was in power.
Despite American support and a fresh determination from Islamabad to take the fight to the militants, it is by no means guaranteed that Pakistan’s offensive in South Waziristan will be successful, in terms of either Pakistani objectives of reducing acts of terrorism within its borders or US objectives of clearing areas from where militants launch attacks within Afghanistan. Monday’s attack in Swat Valley, an area supposedly cleared of militants at the cost of 300 soldiers this summer, only serves to demonstrate the risks inherent in taking on the Taliban on their own turf. South Waziristan is known as the Taliban heartland, or the ‘crucible of global terrorism’ according to Gordon Brown, and conditions are expected to be tougher for the army than was the case in the Swat Valley. South Waziristan can reach -20 degrees celcius in winter and the terrain is brutally unforgiving. It should not be forgotten that three times in the past has the army tried to take control of the area, failing each time. Between 2001 and 2008, somewhere in the region of 4000 troops are thought to have been lost trying to bring the Tribal Areas and the North West Frontier Province within Islamabad’s remit.
President Obama will be painfully aware that Afghanistan’s future stability is to a large extent dependent on public opinion in Pakistan, in that it remains to be seen how popular the military offensive in South Waziristan will be if the army suffers casualties on a large scale. It will be of concern to Washington that Islamabad may lose its nerve and leave the job ‘half-done’ by dealing only with the militants that pose a threat to Pakistani security, while stopping short of taking on (or worse, making a deal with) those that pose a threat to American interests in Afghanistan. American aid and support, however large, can only do so much to influence events on the ground, and the next few months will be critical. It is clear that what appears to be a plausible ‘comprehensive new strategy’ on paper, is in reality rife with pitfalls, assumptions, unknown quantities and risks at every turn. Indeed, there is no guarantee of success, and failure could potentially destabilise nuclear-armed Pakistan with disastrous consequences for the region and for the West. What should worry those who wish to see a moderate and stable Pakistan bordering a peaceful Afghanistan is not that the dangers of failure have been overlooked, but that this is still seen as the best shot at success.
The promised push into South Waziristan is something that President Obama has been pressing President Zardari to undertake as part of his broader strategy in the region to stop insurgents having a safe haven from which to plan and execute attacks in Afghanistan, but it does not come without its risks. On 27 March 2009 Obama explicitly linked the two conflicts in a speech announcing what he termed ‘a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan’, and since the death of Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud in a CIA drone attack on 5 August, a sustained ground offensive in South Waziristan has been expected. American special envoy Richard Holbrooke spent five days in Pakistan holding high-level meetings in August, and Chief of US Central Command David Petraeus was also in the country talking with army commanders about providing American logistical support to the operation. It appears that Islamabad believes the death of Mehsud has fundamentally weakened the Taliban position in South Waziristan, and following the army’s success in capturing Swat Valley from the militants in the North West Frontier Province, they have been preparing the ground for the looming offensive by sealing off the area and employing the use of artillery and aerial bombardments against Taliban positions.
On the surface, American and Pakistani policy seems to be working towards a common objective, namely the destruction of a common enemy, and the two countries appear to be co-operating as never before. Indeed President Obama has signalled his commitment to, and investment in Pakistan, through the Kerry-Lugar bill, which will provide $1.5 billion a year in American aid for the next 5 years to go towards Pakistani democratic, economic and social development programmes. A vast new American embassy in Islamabad for 1000 staff is also being planned. However, closer American engagement with Pakistan (even if it is a necessary part of Obama’s strategy for success in Afghanistan) brings into sharp focus the differences between the two countries, particularly in terms of cultural sensitivities and trust. As such, it risks alienating vast swathes of Pakistani society, including the very people that need to support the strategy if it is to succeed.
Opposition to the Kerry-Lugar bill in Pakistan has come from the military, opposition parliamentarians, and even members of the ruling coalition. Despite support for the bill from Zardari in principle, it remains unclear in what form the bill will finally be implemented. Many are opposed to what they see as unreasonable conditions attached to the aid package, which is seen as American meddling at best, national humiliation at worst. Pakistani Muslim League-N opposition member Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan articulated the concerns of many by stating that ‘each and every page of the bill is reflective of the insulting attitude towards Pakistan.’ Of most concern to Pakistan’s military is the condition that the US must assess the extent of control the government has over the armed forces, including budgets and the chain of command. The bill also refers to the southwest city of Quetta and the eastern town of Muridke as safe havens for militants, increasing the fear of US drone attacks, which many Pakistanis regard as a blatant infringement of sovereignty. Suspicion of American intentions in Pakistan has also been increased by the actions of US security contractors DynCorp, widely believed to be a tool of American foreign policy to develop a shadow network of security and intelligence personnel in the country. September saw a local company hired by DynCorp have its offices raided and its owner arrested. Islamabad is frustrated at not being more widely consulted in Washington’s decision to send more troops to Afghanistan, and in turn Washington is suspicious that the Pakistani military contains elements that support the militants, especially as the captured militant from the Rawalpindi siege, Mohammed Aquil, was himself once a member of Pakistan’s army.
The escalating violence and bitter opposition to the Kerry-Lugar bill in Pakistan do not provide an auspicious backdrop to Obama’s grand Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. The risk for Obama (and also for Pakistan) is that by being seen to influence or attempt to influence Pakistani policy, this will strengthen the hand of the militants and reduce the civilian government’s support. In a country that has spent roughly half of its existence under military rule, Obama must tread carefully or risk his strategy unravelling. However, events in Pakistan have produced their own momentum, and there are many reasons for those who crave stability to be pessimistic. Violent extremism appears to have gained a foothold across large areas of northwest Pakistan, as demonstrated in the past two weeks by attacks in the North West Frontier Province and Punjab, while the Federally Administered Tribal Areas remain outside Islamabad’s jurisdiction, and parts of Balochistan are believed to be safe havens for senior Taliban figures. It is a worrying phenomenon that in some cases of terrorism, al-Qaeda is thought to provide the funding, the Taliban the training and Punjabi organisations the militants. Indeed, it appears that the government is only now waking up to the Punjabi threat. In the Failed States Index, a collaboration between US ‘Foreign Policy Magazine’ and think-tank ‘The Fund For Peace’, Pakistan is ranked 9th, three places worse off than in 2007 when General Musharraf was in power.
Despite American support and a fresh determination from Islamabad to take the fight to the militants, it is by no means guaranteed that Pakistan’s offensive in South Waziristan will be successful, in terms of either Pakistani objectives of reducing acts of terrorism within its borders or US objectives of clearing areas from where militants launch attacks within Afghanistan. Monday’s attack in Swat Valley, an area supposedly cleared of militants at the cost of 300 soldiers this summer, only serves to demonstrate the risks inherent in taking on the Taliban on their own turf. South Waziristan is known as the Taliban heartland, or the ‘crucible of global terrorism’ according to Gordon Brown, and conditions are expected to be tougher for the army than was the case in the Swat Valley. South Waziristan can reach -20 degrees celcius in winter and the terrain is brutally unforgiving. It should not be forgotten that three times in the past has the army tried to take control of the area, failing each time. Between 2001 and 2008, somewhere in the region of 4000 troops are thought to have been lost trying to bring the Tribal Areas and the North West Frontier Province within Islamabad’s remit.
President Obama will be painfully aware that Afghanistan’s future stability is to a large extent dependent on public opinion in Pakistan, in that it remains to be seen how popular the military offensive in South Waziristan will be if the army suffers casualties on a large scale. It will be of concern to Washington that Islamabad may lose its nerve and leave the job ‘half-done’ by dealing only with the militants that pose a threat to Pakistani security, while stopping short of taking on (or worse, making a deal with) those that pose a threat to American interests in Afghanistan. American aid and support, however large, can only do so much to influence events on the ground, and the next few months will be critical. It is clear that what appears to be a plausible ‘comprehensive new strategy’ on paper, is in reality rife with pitfalls, assumptions, unknown quantities and risks at every turn. Indeed, there is no guarantee of success, and failure could potentially destabilise nuclear-armed Pakistan with disastrous consequences for the region and for the West. What should worry those who wish to see a moderate and stable Pakistan bordering a peaceful Afghanistan is not that the dangers of failure have been overlooked, but that this is still seen as the best shot at success.
Saturday, 10 October 2009
Afghanistan, Democracy and the End of the Beginning of the End of History
This week saw the eighth anniversary of the beginning of the war in Afghanistan and the opening salvos of the so-called Global War on Terror, the American-led response to the terrorist atrocities of 9/11. In the aftermath of the Afghan Presidential election that appears to have divided more than unified the country, and as President Obama decides whether to deploy the extra tens of thousands of troops deemed necessary by NATO commander General McChrystal, it is now more than ever essential to assess the failings of Western powers and the mind-set that led to those failures, and to establish what can be done by NATO governments whereby the majority of foreign forces can leave the country and its destiny in Afghan hands as soon as is practically and politically possible.
Few would have argued in 2001 that what we are witnessing in Afghanistan in 2009 could be classed as anything other than failure for the West and for NATO. As the military offensive of Operation Enduring Freedom began in October 2001, talk was not only of destroying Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but of bringing freedom and democracy to a people that had for too long lived in fear, under dictatorship and brutal repression. Western leaders mistakenly saw 9/11 not as proof that the world-view famously espoused by Francis Fukuyama in his 1989 essay ‘The End of History?’ was a myth, but as a golden opportunity to confirm its pre-eminence. The belief that the final stage of mankind’s ideological evolution had been reached in the form of liberal democracy manifested itself as an ultimately clumsy and ill-conceived war and counter-insurgency from which the West does not seem able to extricate itself.
In the Afghan Presidential election of 2009 voter turnout particularly in Taliban-dominated territory was pitifully low, and as many as a quarter of votes cast are suspected of being fraudulent, according to EU election monitors. Given that NATO pledged thousands of extra troops to increase security ahead of the election, and that the holding of free and fair elections is a cornerstone of a democratic society, this begs the question of how the West got it so wrong in Afghanistan. Talk in NATO capitals is now of redefining what ‘victory’ entails and of scaling back ambitions when it comes to the imposition of democracy, whereby leaving behind a unified and stable country devoid of terrorist training camps can be presented as a success. Politicians, with a nod to public opinion, are making noises about modifying objectives and re-assessing what is actually achievable.
However, even public statements from Western leaders showing willingness to lower the threshold for what constitutes ‘victory’ does not mean that their troops will necessarily be able to withdraw any sooner. The reason for this can be traced back to the end of the Cold War and the seductive nature of Fukuyama’s thesis, which gained traction most notably among American neo-conservatives throughout the 1990s as previously closed societies, particularly in the former Eastern bloc, liberalised their economies and embraced Western-style democracy. Such events, which with the benefit of hindsight and historical perspective appear transient, were then widely perceived as evidence to support Fukuyama’s theory. The Western political class were won over by the idea of the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy, believing it to be the shining beacon that every closed society aspired to, an indefatigable system of government, and proof positive of Western cultural and moral superiority. Worryingly, the default view still appears to be of the perfection of such democracy. It is not only ironic, but tragic that a system of government that by its very nature allows criticism and scrutiny came to be the only system of government of which such scrutiny is deemed unnecessary.
The unquestioning belief in the supremacy of Western democracy has bred complacency to such an extent that democracy has taken on an almost mythical status; that democracy is the answer to all the world’s ills, and that anything ‘less’ than Western-style democracy is at best misguided and at worst evil. The belief that the end of the road has been reached in terms of ideological evolution is both foolish and dangerous. It implies that the West is not only further advanced and morally superior, but more importantly that no further improvement to this form of government can be made. This entrenched world-view among American and European decision makers paradoxically makes the triumph of ‘freedom and democracy’ in Afghanistan lesser rather than greater. The reason for this is that anything less than absolute victory is a defeat, because war is being fought on the premise that freedom does not come in degrees.
Western leaders, in an attempt to bolster support for the war in Afghanistan, declare that they are fighting for the freedom of those back home. They may not know it, but this is true. However, they have got the wrong enemy. The real enemy is not the man with a Kalashnikov taking pot shots at NATO forces in Helmand, nor is it the latest pantomime rabble-rouser provoking the right-wing press; rather it is the fear and misunderstanding that compels Western citizens to acquiesce in the erosion of the very principles people are dying for on their behalf. The successful execution of war necessarily requires the manipulation of information, in order not to give advantage to those against whom war is being waged. This is crudely exemplified by the fact that no government would be willing to declare how many soldiers they would be willing to lose before the war becomes unworthy of the cost. However, freedom of information is a vital pillar of a democratic society. It is therefore a paradox that waging war in the name of one’s democracy will inevitably chip away at the very freedoms that underpin that democracy. The fact that Western politicians are willing to accept that individuals’ liberties may be curtailed to preserve the principle of freedom proves that there are degrees of freedom. So where is the line to be drawn? And who is to judge? Western governments, with an arrogant belief that theirs is the system marking the final stage of ideological evolution, would appear to demonstrate by their actions that they believe this right is theirs. When war is being fought by a coalition that defines itself by its democratic principles, it becomes convenient for those pulling the levers to ignore the irony that they are reducing liberties in their own countries, lest it exposes the superficiality of the way they measure others’ worth.
Wars fought for strategic necessity or for natural resources (however morally questionable) can at least be rationalised. However, freedom as a principle is a subjective concept, and it does not make sense to fight for a principle that cannot be clearly defined. This is the reason the message of why the West is in Afghanistan is both confused and diffuse, and consequently misunderstood. It is easier for politicians to make the case for continuing the war in black and white terms, however misguided, than to convince people to die for a shade of grey. Western leaders need to adopt a more nuanced approach to democracy, its limitations and its relevance to the war in Afghanistan, if ever tangible achievements can be made before the withdrawal of their forces. Indeed, only by doing so will they be able to withdraw their forces at all. Unless it is accepted and admitted that democracy comes in degrees, NATO will be waging war indefinitely for a goal that cannot be realised and does not exist. And only by admitting to specific flaws in their own democracies can Western governments grow in moral stature and mitigate the effects of those flaws. For example, when America’s NATO allies are asked to send more troops to Afghanistan, the fact must be considered that it is easier even for democracies to escalate wars than to withdraw from them, as any elected leader will know that if all goes wrong, then after the next election it will be someone else’s war and someone else’s problem. Most importantly, it must be accepted that democracy is a process and can never be an end in itself. Democracy in every society must be an aspiration, and it must never be assumed that the End Of History has been reached.
Few would have argued in 2001 that what we are witnessing in Afghanistan in 2009 could be classed as anything other than failure for the West and for NATO. As the military offensive of Operation Enduring Freedom began in October 2001, talk was not only of destroying Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but of bringing freedom and democracy to a people that had for too long lived in fear, under dictatorship and brutal repression. Western leaders mistakenly saw 9/11 not as proof that the world-view famously espoused by Francis Fukuyama in his 1989 essay ‘The End of History?’ was a myth, but as a golden opportunity to confirm its pre-eminence. The belief that the final stage of mankind’s ideological evolution had been reached in the form of liberal democracy manifested itself as an ultimately clumsy and ill-conceived war and counter-insurgency from which the West does not seem able to extricate itself.
In the Afghan Presidential election of 2009 voter turnout particularly in Taliban-dominated territory was pitifully low, and as many as a quarter of votes cast are suspected of being fraudulent, according to EU election monitors. Given that NATO pledged thousands of extra troops to increase security ahead of the election, and that the holding of free and fair elections is a cornerstone of a democratic society, this begs the question of how the West got it so wrong in Afghanistan. Talk in NATO capitals is now of redefining what ‘victory’ entails and of scaling back ambitions when it comes to the imposition of democracy, whereby leaving behind a unified and stable country devoid of terrorist training camps can be presented as a success. Politicians, with a nod to public opinion, are making noises about modifying objectives and re-assessing what is actually achievable.
However, even public statements from Western leaders showing willingness to lower the threshold for what constitutes ‘victory’ does not mean that their troops will necessarily be able to withdraw any sooner. The reason for this can be traced back to the end of the Cold War and the seductive nature of Fukuyama’s thesis, which gained traction most notably among American neo-conservatives throughout the 1990s as previously closed societies, particularly in the former Eastern bloc, liberalised their economies and embraced Western-style democracy. Such events, which with the benefit of hindsight and historical perspective appear transient, were then widely perceived as evidence to support Fukuyama’s theory. The Western political class were won over by the idea of the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy, believing it to be the shining beacon that every closed society aspired to, an indefatigable system of government, and proof positive of Western cultural and moral superiority. Worryingly, the default view still appears to be of the perfection of such democracy. It is not only ironic, but tragic that a system of government that by its very nature allows criticism and scrutiny came to be the only system of government of which such scrutiny is deemed unnecessary.
The unquestioning belief in the supremacy of Western democracy has bred complacency to such an extent that democracy has taken on an almost mythical status; that democracy is the answer to all the world’s ills, and that anything ‘less’ than Western-style democracy is at best misguided and at worst evil. The belief that the end of the road has been reached in terms of ideological evolution is both foolish and dangerous. It implies that the West is not only further advanced and morally superior, but more importantly that no further improvement to this form of government can be made. This entrenched world-view among American and European decision makers paradoxically makes the triumph of ‘freedom and democracy’ in Afghanistan lesser rather than greater. The reason for this is that anything less than absolute victory is a defeat, because war is being fought on the premise that freedom does not come in degrees.
Western leaders, in an attempt to bolster support for the war in Afghanistan, declare that they are fighting for the freedom of those back home. They may not know it, but this is true. However, they have got the wrong enemy. The real enemy is not the man with a Kalashnikov taking pot shots at NATO forces in Helmand, nor is it the latest pantomime rabble-rouser provoking the right-wing press; rather it is the fear and misunderstanding that compels Western citizens to acquiesce in the erosion of the very principles people are dying for on their behalf. The successful execution of war necessarily requires the manipulation of information, in order not to give advantage to those against whom war is being waged. This is crudely exemplified by the fact that no government would be willing to declare how many soldiers they would be willing to lose before the war becomes unworthy of the cost. However, freedom of information is a vital pillar of a democratic society. It is therefore a paradox that waging war in the name of one’s democracy will inevitably chip away at the very freedoms that underpin that democracy. The fact that Western politicians are willing to accept that individuals’ liberties may be curtailed to preserve the principle of freedom proves that there are degrees of freedom. So where is the line to be drawn? And who is to judge? Western governments, with an arrogant belief that theirs is the system marking the final stage of ideological evolution, would appear to demonstrate by their actions that they believe this right is theirs. When war is being fought by a coalition that defines itself by its democratic principles, it becomes convenient for those pulling the levers to ignore the irony that they are reducing liberties in their own countries, lest it exposes the superficiality of the way they measure others’ worth.
Wars fought for strategic necessity or for natural resources (however morally questionable) can at least be rationalised. However, freedom as a principle is a subjective concept, and it does not make sense to fight for a principle that cannot be clearly defined. This is the reason the message of why the West is in Afghanistan is both confused and diffuse, and consequently misunderstood. It is easier for politicians to make the case for continuing the war in black and white terms, however misguided, than to convince people to die for a shade of grey. Western leaders need to adopt a more nuanced approach to democracy, its limitations and its relevance to the war in Afghanistan, if ever tangible achievements can be made before the withdrawal of their forces. Indeed, only by doing so will they be able to withdraw their forces at all. Unless it is accepted and admitted that democracy comes in degrees, NATO will be waging war indefinitely for a goal that cannot be realised and does not exist. And only by admitting to specific flaws in their own democracies can Western governments grow in moral stature and mitigate the effects of those flaws. For example, when America’s NATO allies are asked to send more troops to Afghanistan, the fact must be considered that it is easier even for democracies to escalate wars than to withdraw from them, as any elected leader will know that if all goes wrong, then after the next election it will be someone else’s war and someone else’s problem. Most importantly, it must be accepted that democracy is a process and can never be an end in itself. Democracy in every society must be an aspiration, and it must never be assumed that the End Of History has been reached.
Monday, 5 October 2009
The Commonwealth at 60
The Commonwealth is 60 years old this year, though one can be forgiven for not having noticed. This 53 nation club appears to be marking the occasion with just enough fanfare to justify its existence, while simultaneously attempting not to draw too much attention to itself, lest awkward questions are asked of its purpose in the modern world. Sixty years on from the London Declaration that marked the birth of the modern Commonwealth, it is now fitting to shine the spotlight on the workings of this organisation, to ask whether it can achieve its aims and objectives, and to question whether it can live up to the principles its members have pledged to embrace.
On 1 September this year, Commonwealth Secretary-General Kamalesh Sharma announced ‘with deep regret’ that Fiji was suspended from the association. With no indication that Fiji was ready to comply with the terms set out by the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group in July 2009 to restore democracy following the 2006 coup, this was not an unexpected move. After all, one of the guiding principles of the Commonwealth is the supremacy of democracy, and any member found not to abide by these principles can expect censure.
But this is not always the case. While Fiji may miss out on taking part in Commonwealth sporting events and attending intergovernmental Commonwealth meetings (something that Tony Blair reportedly said in 2002 he would rather be at home watching football than doing), another member of the Commonwealth family appears to be able to flout its guiding principles with impunity. Sri Lanka’s 26 year civil war was declared over in May this year, amidst widespread celebrations within the country’s Sinhalese majority, but the steady trickle of information in the form of eye-witness testimony and video evidence emerging from the war-torn region of the rebels’ last stand is raising serious questions as to the conduct of the Sri Lankan military and the nature of the Sri Lankan government itself.
The Commonwealth cannot argue that the issues currently affecting Sri Lanka do not fall within its remit. On conflict prevention and mediation the Commonwealth asserts ‘The Secretariat’s objective is to prevent and resolve conflict while also strengthening the ability of member countries to promote our fundamental values.’ The Commonwealth has however remained silent as thousands of Tamil civilians were killed during army shelling in the last weeks of the war and stood idly by as scores of Tamils have ‘disappeared’ both during and after the fighting. Conflict mediation this is not. On human rights the Commonwealth declares ‘The Secretariat aims to increase awareness of and respect for human rights in the Commonwealth’. At the time of writing, up to 300 000 Tamils remain interned in camps, one third of under-fives reportedly suffering malnutrition. The Sri Lankan government state that they have arrested at least 10000 suspects, although the International Committee of the Red Cross has access to only 2000. These suspects have no access to legal support and next to no hope of a fair trial. While Minister for Disaster Management and Human Rights Mahinda Samarasinghe assures UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon that the Sri Lankan government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa is committed to resettling the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), it seems certain that this process is set to drag on much longer than the six months promised by the Sri Lankan government back in May.
Freedom of speech, a vital pillar of democracy, has also been compromised. Journalists have been murdered and intimidated, and the courts have been politicised, giving the government a stick with which to beat those who have the nerve to speak out. The journalist J. S. Tissainayagan was sentenced to 20 years hard labour in August for criticising army tactics, a fate President Obama declared was ‘emblematic of the hundreds of journalists who face intimidation, censorship and arbitrary arrest’. It is not only Obama who has criticised the Sri Lankan government. Amnesty International have criticised not only the conduct of the war but also the government’s denial of basic human rights including freedom of movement to civilians in the internment camps, and the EU has stated that ‘Sri Lanka has failed to honour important human-rights commitments.’ Human Rights Watch has reasserted the need for an international commission of inquiry into possible war crimes following the video obtained by ‘Journalists for Democracy’ showing alleged executions of naked and bound Tamils by government soldiers. The Sri Lankan government has claimed the video is a fake and has threatened legal action against Channel 4 for airing the video, though UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has discussed the implications of the images with the human rights minister, and the US ambassador to the UN has expressed ‘grave concern.’
So why has the Commonwealth apparently turned a blind eye to the ongoing crisis in Sri Lanka? One problem is that the organisation has no clear role and mission. For all its (no doubt well-intentioned) public utterances and assertions on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, the Commonwealth has few real powers, and therefore has little influence. The Commonwealth does not coordinate foreign or defence policy, and lacks the budget and authority to make a real difference in the world. There is nothing in the way of trade privileges for members that could be seen as adding purpose to the organisation. Self-interest will always take precedence over commonwealth solidarity, and it is more convenient for countries such as Britain to express mild concern over events in Sri Lanka and be thankful that the war is over than to ask awkward questions, especially when the British government has itself waged divisive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This does however mean that the Commonwealth all too frequently fails to practice what it preaches and takes the path of least resistance, only taking uncontroversial decisions leading to inconsequential outcomes.
The Commonwealth covers 2 billion people around the world, and to mark 60 years since the London Declaration, the Royal Commonwealth Society in London is ‘facilitating the largest global dialogue ever undertaken between peoples of the Commonwealth about their association.’ To the question ‘Do you think the Commonwealth is still relevant?’, at the time of writing only 35% have answered in the affirmative, but much more telling is the number of votes cast, just 743. It is also to be noted that 81% of respondents associate the Commonwealth with empire. This feeds into the widespread impression that the Commonwealth is an anachronism, an echo of a bygone age, and increasingly superfluous in the modern world.
The Commonwealth prides itself on being a values-based organisation and a forum for dialogue, and no doubt it has proved useful, arguably in no small part for Britain in easing the decline from imperial overlord to mid-ranking European power. However, it needs to stop appearing to wear its weakness as a badge of honour. Events in Sri Lanka should serve to highlight the impotence of the Commonwealth in its current guise, and to expose as hollow its assertions on standing up for the principles on which it is based. The fact that the Commonwealth appears unwilling, unable, or more likely both to get its hands dirty in Sri Lanka, is symptomatic of the impotence which feeds the organisation’s inertia. When Commonwealth leaders meet in Trinidad and Tobago in November, it should not this time be to hammer out a justification for meeting again in two years time. It should be to reassess its aims and objectives and how it will realise them, and to find a viable way to adapt to meet the challenges facing the world of today. Failure to do so will only make it increasingly unlikely that the association will be celebrating anything 60 years hence.
On 1 September this year, Commonwealth Secretary-General Kamalesh Sharma announced ‘with deep regret’ that Fiji was suspended from the association. With no indication that Fiji was ready to comply with the terms set out by the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group in July 2009 to restore democracy following the 2006 coup, this was not an unexpected move. After all, one of the guiding principles of the Commonwealth is the supremacy of democracy, and any member found not to abide by these principles can expect censure.
But this is not always the case. While Fiji may miss out on taking part in Commonwealth sporting events and attending intergovernmental Commonwealth meetings (something that Tony Blair reportedly said in 2002 he would rather be at home watching football than doing), another member of the Commonwealth family appears to be able to flout its guiding principles with impunity. Sri Lanka’s 26 year civil war was declared over in May this year, amidst widespread celebrations within the country’s Sinhalese majority, but the steady trickle of information in the form of eye-witness testimony and video evidence emerging from the war-torn region of the rebels’ last stand is raising serious questions as to the conduct of the Sri Lankan military and the nature of the Sri Lankan government itself.
The Commonwealth cannot argue that the issues currently affecting Sri Lanka do not fall within its remit. On conflict prevention and mediation the Commonwealth asserts ‘The Secretariat’s objective is to prevent and resolve conflict while also strengthening the ability of member countries to promote our fundamental values.’ The Commonwealth has however remained silent as thousands of Tamil civilians were killed during army shelling in the last weeks of the war and stood idly by as scores of Tamils have ‘disappeared’ both during and after the fighting. Conflict mediation this is not. On human rights the Commonwealth declares ‘The Secretariat aims to increase awareness of and respect for human rights in the Commonwealth’. At the time of writing, up to 300 000 Tamils remain interned in camps, one third of under-fives reportedly suffering malnutrition. The Sri Lankan government state that they have arrested at least 10000 suspects, although the International Committee of the Red Cross has access to only 2000. These suspects have no access to legal support and next to no hope of a fair trial. While Minister for Disaster Management and Human Rights Mahinda Samarasinghe assures UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon that the Sri Lankan government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa is committed to resettling the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), it seems certain that this process is set to drag on much longer than the six months promised by the Sri Lankan government back in May.
Freedom of speech, a vital pillar of democracy, has also been compromised. Journalists have been murdered and intimidated, and the courts have been politicised, giving the government a stick with which to beat those who have the nerve to speak out. The journalist J. S. Tissainayagan was sentenced to 20 years hard labour in August for criticising army tactics, a fate President Obama declared was ‘emblematic of the hundreds of journalists who face intimidation, censorship and arbitrary arrest’. It is not only Obama who has criticised the Sri Lankan government. Amnesty International have criticised not only the conduct of the war but also the government’s denial of basic human rights including freedom of movement to civilians in the internment camps, and the EU has stated that ‘Sri Lanka has failed to honour important human-rights commitments.’ Human Rights Watch has reasserted the need for an international commission of inquiry into possible war crimes following the video obtained by ‘Journalists for Democracy’ showing alleged executions of naked and bound Tamils by government soldiers. The Sri Lankan government has claimed the video is a fake and has threatened legal action against Channel 4 for airing the video, though UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has discussed the implications of the images with the human rights minister, and the US ambassador to the UN has expressed ‘grave concern.’
So why has the Commonwealth apparently turned a blind eye to the ongoing crisis in Sri Lanka? One problem is that the organisation has no clear role and mission. For all its (no doubt well-intentioned) public utterances and assertions on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, the Commonwealth has few real powers, and therefore has little influence. The Commonwealth does not coordinate foreign or defence policy, and lacks the budget and authority to make a real difference in the world. There is nothing in the way of trade privileges for members that could be seen as adding purpose to the organisation. Self-interest will always take precedence over commonwealth solidarity, and it is more convenient for countries such as Britain to express mild concern over events in Sri Lanka and be thankful that the war is over than to ask awkward questions, especially when the British government has itself waged divisive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This does however mean that the Commonwealth all too frequently fails to practice what it preaches and takes the path of least resistance, only taking uncontroversial decisions leading to inconsequential outcomes.
The Commonwealth covers 2 billion people around the world, and to mark 60 years since the London Declaration, the Royal Commonwealth Society in London is ‘facilitating the largest global dialogue ever undertaken between peoples of the Commonwealth about their association.’ To the question ‘Do you think the Commonwealth is still relevant?’, at the time of writing only 35% have answered in the affirmative, but much more telling is the number of votes cast, just 743. It is also to be noted that 81% of respondents associate the Commonwealth with empire. This feeds into the widespread impression that the Commonwealth is an anachronism, an echo of a bygone age, and increasingly superfluous in the modern world.
The Commonwealth prides itself on being a values-based organisation and a forum for dialogue, and no doubt it has proved useful, arguably in no small part for Britain in easing the decline from imperial overlord to mid-ranking European power. However, it needs to stop appearing to wear its weakness as a badge of honour. Events in Sri Lanka should serve to highlight the impotence of the Commonwealth in its current guise, and to expose as hollow its assertions on standing up for the principles on which it is based. The fact that the Commonwealth appears unwilling, unable, or more likely both to get its hands dirty in Sri Lanka, is symptomatic of the impotence which feeds the organisation’s inertia. When Commonwealth leaders meet in Trinidad and Tobago in November, it should not this time be to hammer out a justification for meeting again in two years time. It should be to reassess its aims and objectives and how it will realise them, and to find a viable way to adapt to meet the challenges facing the world of today. Failure to do so will only make it increasingly unlikely that the association will be celebrating anything 60 years hence.
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