Last week ‘The Nation’ magazine published an explosive article by Jeremy Scahill exposing the extent to which American private security firm Blackwater has become embroiled in Pakistan since the US-led ‘War on Terror’ begun in 2001. Furthermore, the article alleges that Blackwater operatives have been planning and carrying out assassinations of Taliban and al-Qaeda figures in the north west of the country, in part through a secret drone bombing campaign separate from the well known CIA programme, as well as themselves having representatives in theatre within Pakistan’s borders. Not only does this increase the pressure on Islamabad and Washington, who have both long been at pains to deny the existence of such operations in Pakistan, it also raises broader questions over the wisdom (and indeed the legality) of relying on private security firms such as Blackwater to carry out tasks that have traditionally been the domain of the professional military.
It is an open secret that American agents and private contractors have been carrying out US foreign policy within Pakistan for a number of years. In 2006 a deal was done between the Bush administration and General Pervez Musharraf to allow US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) operatives into Pakistan ostensibly to hunt Osama bin Laden. Islamabad would effectively turn a blind eye, whilst publically denying such permission had been given, and feigning outrage whenever evidence of American military activity within Pakistan came to light. However, the extent to which private contractors have been operating outside the military chain of command, largely free from accountability, is only now becoming clear. Under US law all CIA operations have to be reported to Congress, but since Donald Rumsfeld was Defence Secretary JSOC has been used to commit some of the most controversial and secretive operations on behalf of the US government, in part to keep them concealed from Congress. JSOC developed a close relationship with Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney, and worked in direct co-ordination with the White House. However, it seems that JSOC has become increasingly reliant on Blackwater in carrying out its activities, and Blackwater’s contracts are approved on a rolling basis at the request of JSOC, beyond public scrutiny. Blackwater is largely made up of ex-Special Forces operatives, and this has helped facilitate the cosy and increasingly entrenched relationship that has been established with JSOC.
Since Obama came to office in January 2009 the number of pilotless drone strikes within Pakistan has surpassed the number carried out under President Bush. In June this year CIA director Leon Panetta announced the termination of the agency’s assassination programme, but drone strikes have continued. Such attacks, which are reported to be the work of the CIA, are now believed often to be undertaken by JSOC and enabled by Blackwater contractors, who due to the nature of their classified contracts, are not accountable to Congress or to the public. The fact that the new military commander of the Afghan war, General Stanley McChrystal, headed JSOC from 2003 to 2008 not only demonstrates the rise in power of JSOC within the US military framework, but could well also be indicative of the increased reliance on contractors to execute American war objectives in Pakistan and Afghanistan as part of Obama’s ‘Af-Pak Strategy’.
However, there is growing disquiet within Pakistan over the use of contractors within its borders. US ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson was forced to state in September this year that ‘Blackwater is not operating in Pakistan’, and Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik said he would resign if Blackwater was found to be operating on Pakistani territory. Despite these statements, most still believe that Blackwater and other security firms acting on behalf of the US interests continue to operate in Pakistan. The prevailing view among much of Pakistani society is that America is meddling in Pakistani affairs, undermining and destabilising the country by continually infringing its sovereignty, and dragging it deeper into the US ‘War on Terror’. This burgeoning resentment was punctuated in September by the raiding of the Islamabad offices of Inter-Risk, a subsidiary of US security firm DynCorp, who are widely believed to be developing a clandestine network of security and intelligence personnel in the country. Suspicion of, and hostility towards US intentions can only increase as further evidence of shadowy American involvement in Pakistan emerges. There is a real danger for decision makers in Washington that the actions of a private company that increasingly cannot be held to account, operating outside the usual system of checks and balances, will lose the hearts and minds of a population that must be kept onside if any success is to be achieved in the ‘War on Terror’.
To have private contractors operating on the battlefield is not a new concept, but has grown to such an extent that it is generally accepted that in fighting a modern war, contractors will play an important role. The US has historically maintained a small army, and has only expanded its forces when facing a specific threat, such as during the Second World War. After the Korean War, in the context of the broader Cold War, US planners came to the conclusion that a large army must be maintained. As American soldiers became embroiled in Vietnam, the draft was introduced. The draft largely enabled the Vietnam adventure, and as the Vietnam War became increasingly unpopular, one aspect of the inevitable backlash was against the draft that facilitated it. However, the USSR was still perceived as a threat and an enemy, and the trend for utilising the private sector to effectively make up the shortfall in the professional military accelerated. This trend goes beyond military strategy, and is largely down to the enormous growth in the private sector since the end of the Cold War, exemplified by doubling in size of the US economy in this period. Dr James Carafano, author of ‘Private Sector and Public Wars’ has explained the phenomenon as ‘It’s really the United States leveraging the capabilities of the modern world efficiently that’s driving this’. While this is true to a certain extent, it also cannot be denied that US military strategy has become dependent on private contractors, and that US planners have made use of contractors for less honourable reasons than straightforward efficiency of service.
According to the Congressional Research Service, contractors accounted for 48% of the US Department of Defence workforce in Iraq, and 57% in Afghanistan. Such huge reliance on the private sector brings its own problems. There is undoubtedly a marked difference between contractors who prepare food or drive lorries to those security firms engaged in combat, but question marks will remain over loyalties and incentives for all contractors compared with the professional military, especially when it comes to local contractors in tribal societies in countries such as Afghanistan. However, the most pressing and potentially damaging issue arising from such dependence is that of accountability. The current situation with Blackwater in Pakistan is a prime example of this. While contractors have been traditionally used to overcome short-term strategic shortages, decision makers in Washington, particularly since the Bush era, have become increasingly willing to use contractors for reasons of so-called ‘plausible deniability’. A firm such as Blackwater can be used as a tool of US foreign policy in Pakistan, without an American soldier having to set foot in the country, and therefore the US government can deny all knowledge. Although this greater freedom to wage war will be seen by many in Washington as a good thing, it carries with it further risks. In order to continue to use private security firms in this capacity, contracts must be secretive and beyond public scrutiny. Therefore these private security firms act without accountability, which in turn makes them harder to control. Effectively, the government cannot have it both ways; it must either bring security firms under control, turning them over to public scrutiny and making them accountable to the public, or continue to use them to carry out their dirty work while running the risk that their actions cannot be contained.
Carafano states that ‘Winning wars is about matching ends, ways and means in the best combination’ and argues that the debate over the use of contractors should be framed in practical rather than ethical terms. However, the debate cannot take place in a moral vacuum. While the practical issues relating to the use of contractors, such as the clarity of the rules of engagement and co-ordination between the military and private security are essential in the undertaking of successful modern warfare, there is more at stake than trying to pay for a decent service at a decent price. The issue of accountability, whether seen as an ethical issue or not, can still have profound practical consequences for the success or otherwise in executing war. Private American military companies are now working for secretive organisations not answerable to Congress, in countries that the US has not declared war on, under contracts that are not scrutinised and are continually renewed while the public and those they elect to represent them largely turn a blind eye. It is perhaps inevitable that these security firms, allowed to act with impunity, will exercise less restraint than is wise in a war in which the capture of hearts and minds is of greater importance than the capture of any territory. As evidence mounts of growing US military activity in Pakistan, decision makers in Washington should not expect locals on the ground to emphasise the distinction between those in American uniform and those simply paid in American money.
Showing posts with label JSOC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label JSOC. Show all posts
Monday, 30 November 2009
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