Last week ‘The Nation’ magazine published an explosive article by Jeremy Scahill exposing the extent to which American private security firm Blackwater has become embroiled in Pakistan since the US-led ‘War on Terror’ begun in 2001. Furthermore, the article alleges that Blackwater operatives have been planning and carrying out assassinations of Taliban and al-Qaeda figures in the north west of the country, in part through a secret drone bombing campaign separate from the well known CIA programme, as well as themselves having representatives in theatre within Pakistan’s borders. Not only does this increase the pressure on Islamabad and Washington, who have both long been at pains to deny the existence of such operations in Pakistan, it also raises broader questions over the wisdom (and indeed the legality) of relying on private security firms such as Blackwater to carry out tasks that have traditionally been the domain of the professional military.
It is an open secret that American agents and private contractors have been carrying out US foreign policy within Pakistan for a number of years. In 2006 a deal was done between the Bush administration and General Pervez Musharraf to allow US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) operatives into Pakistan ostensibly to hunt Osama bin Laden. Islamabad would effectively turn a blind eye, whilst publically denying such permission had been given, and feigning outrage whenever evidence of American military activity within Pakistan came to light. However, the extent to which private contractors have been operating outside the military chain of command, largely free from accountability, is only now becoming clear. Under US law all CIA operations have to be reported to Congress, but since Donald Rumsfeld was Defence Secretary JSOC has been used to commit some of the most controversial and secretive operations on behalf of the US government, in part to keep them concealed from Congress. JSOC developed a close relationship with Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney, and worked in direct co-ordination with the White House. However, it seems that JSOC has become increasingly reliant on Blackwater in carrying out its activities, and Blackwater’s contracts are approved on a rolling basis at the request of JSOC, beyond public scrutiny. Blackwater is largely made up of ex-Special Forces operatives, and this has helped facilitate the cosy and increasingly entrenched relationship that has been established with JSOC.
Since Obama came to office in January 2009 the number of pilotless drone strikes within Pakistan has surpassed the number carried out under President Bush. In June this year CIA director Leon Panetta announced the termination of the agency’s assassination programme, but drone strikes have continued. Such attacks, which are reported to be the work of the CIA, are now believed often to be undertaken by JSOC and enabled by Blackwater contractors, who due to the nature of their classified contracts, are not accountable to Congress or to the public. The fact that the new military commander of the Afghan war, General Stanley McChrystal, headed JSOC from 2003 to 2008 not only demonstrates the rise in power of JSOC within the US military framework, but could well also be indicative of the increased reliance on contractors to execute American war objectives in Pakistan and Afghanistan as part of Obama’s ‘Af-Pak Strategy’.
However, there is growing disquiet within Pakistan over the use of contractors within its borders. US ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson was forced to state in September this year that ‘Blackwater is not operating in Pakistan’, and Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik said he would resign if Blackwater was found to be operating on Pakistani territory. Despite these statements, most still believe that Blackwater and other security firms acting on behalf of the US interests continue to operate in Pakistan. The prevailing view among much of Pakistani society is that America is meddling in Pakistani affairs, undermining and destabilising the country by continually infringing its sovereignty, and dragging it deeper into the US ‘War on Terror’. This burgeoning resentment was punctuated in September by the raiding of the Islamabad offices of Inter-Risk, a subsidiary of US security firm DynCorp, who are widely believed to be developing a clandestine network of security and intelligence personnel in the country. Suspicion of, and hostility towards US intentions can only increase as further evidence of shadowy American involvement in Pakistan emerges. There is a real danger for decision makers in Washington that the actions of a private company that increasingly cannot be held to account, operating outside the usual system of checks and balances, will lose the hearts and minds of a population that must be kept onside if any success is to be achieved in the ‘War on Terror’.
To have private contractors operating on the battlefield is not a new concept, but has grown to such an extent that it is generally accepted that in fighting a modern war, contractors will play an important role. The US has historically maintained a small army, and has only expanded its forces when facing a specific threat, such as during the Second World War. After the Korean War, in the context of the broader Cold War, US planners came to the conclusion that a large army must be maintained. As American soldiers became embroiled in Vietnam, the draft was introduced. The draft largely enabled the Vietnam adventure, and as the Vietnam War became increasingly unpopular, one aspect of the inevitable backlash was against the draft that facilitated it. However, the USSR was still perceived as a threat and an enemy, and the trend for utilising the private sector to effectively make up the shortfall in the professional military accelerated. This trend goes beyond military strategy, and is largely down to the enormous growth in the private sector since the end of the Cold War, exemplified by doubling in size of the US economy in this period. Dr James Carafano, author of ‘Private Sector and Public Wars’ has explained the phenomenon as ‘It’s really the United States leveraging the capabilities of the modern world efficiently that’s driving this’. While this is true to a certain extent, it also cannot be denied that US military strategy has become dependent on private contractors, and that US planners have made use of contractors for less honourable reasons than straightforward efficiency of service.
According to the Congressional Research Service, contractors accounted for 48% of the US Department of Defence workforce in Iraq, and 57% in Afghanistan. Such huge reliance on the private sector brings its own problems. There is undoubtedly a marked difference between contractors who prepare food or drive lorries to those security firms engaged in combat, but question marks will remain over loyalties and incentives for all contractors compared with the professional military, especially when it comes to local contractors in tribal societies in countries such as Afghanistan. However, the most pressing and potentially damaging issue arising from such dependence is that of accountability. The current situation with Blackwater in Pakistan is a prime example of this. While contractors have been traditionally used to overcome short-term strategic shortages, decision makers in Washington, particularly since the Bush era, have become increasingly willing to use contractors for reasons of so-called ‘plausible deniability’. A firm such as Blackwater can be used as a tool of US foreign policy in Pakistan, without an American soldier having to set foot in the country, and therefore the US government can deny all knowledge. Although this greater freedom to wage war will be seen by many in Washington as a good thing, it carries with it further risks. In order to continue to use private security firms in this capacity, contracts must be secretive and beyond public scrutiny. Therefore these private security firms act without accountability, which in turn makes them harder to control. Effectively, the government cannot have it both ways; it must either bring security firms under control, turning them over to public scrutiny and making them accountable to the public, or continue to use them to carry out their dirty work while running the risk that their actions cannot be contained.
Carafano states that ‘Winning wars is about matching ends, ways and means in the best combination’ and argues that the debate over the use of contractors should be framed in practical rather than ethical terms. However, the debate cannot take place in a moral vacuum. While the practical issues relating to the use of contractors, such as the clarity of the rules of engagement and co-ordination between the military and private security are essential in the undertaking of successful modern warfare, there is more at stake than trying to pay for a decent service at a decent price. The issue of accountability, whether seen as an ethical issue or not, can still have profound practical consequences for the success or otherwise in executing war. Private American military companies are now working for secretive organisations not answerable to Congress, in countries that the US has not declared war on, under contracts that are not scrutinised and are continually renewed while the public and those they elect to represent them largely turn a blind eye. It is perhaps inevitable that these security firms, allowed to act with impunity, will exercise less restraint than is wise in a war in which the capture of hearts and minds is of greater importance than the capture of any territory. As evidence mounts of growing US military activity in Pakistan, decision makers in Washington should not expect locals on the ground to emphasise the distinction between those in American uniform and those simply paid in American money.
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Monday, 30 November 2009
Friday, 16 October 2009
American Influence in Pakistan and the Next 'Mother Of All Battles'
Thursday morning saw upwards of 38 people killed in a series of co-ordinated attacks across northwest Pakistan. As fierce gun battles raged between security forces and militants in Lahore, car bombs brought carnage to the streets of Peshawar and Kohat, representing the latest in a litany of bloody reminders of the turmoil and instability gripping parts of the country. These attacks follow hard on the heels of Monday’s suicide attack in the Swat Valley, and the weekend’s audacious assault on the Pakistan Army General Headquarters at Rawalpindi, which only ended when Pakistani commandos were sent in to kill the militants and free the hostages. The increasing number of attacks is in part a response to the government’s intensified activity and preparations for an all-out offensive into South Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, but also in more general terms is indicative of the violent opposition to the government policy of alliance with the US in its ‘war on terror’ since 2001. However, it is not only the frequency and audacity of the militant attacks, but also the expanding geographical area in which the attacks take place and from which the militants come that will be of grave concern to Islamabad and Washington.
The promised push into South Waziristan is something that President Obama has been pressing President Zardari to undertake as part of his broader strategy in the region to stop insurgents having a safe haven from which to plan and execute attacks in Afghanistan, but it does not come without its risks. On 27 March 2009 Obama explicitly linked the two conflicts in a speech announcing what he termed ‘a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan’, and since the death of Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud in a CIA drone attack on 5 August, a sustained ground offensive in South Waziristan has been expected. American special envoy Richard Holbrooke spent five days in Pakistan holding high-level meetings in August, and Chief of US Central Command David Petraeus was also in the country talking with army commanders about providing American logistical support to the operation. It appears that Islamabad believes the death of Mehsud has fundamentally weakened the Taliban position in South Waziristan, and following the army’s success in capturing Swat Valley from the militants in the North West Frontier Province, they have been preparing the ground for the looming offensive by sealing off the area and employing the use of artillery and aerial bombardments against Taliban positions.
On the surface, American and Pakistani policy seems to be working towards a common objective, namely the destruction of a common enemy, and the two countries appear to be co-operating as never before. Indeed President Obama has signalled his commitment to, and investment in Pakistan, through the Kerry-Lugar bill, which will provide $1.5 billion a year in American aid for the next 5 years to go towards Pakistani democratic, economic and social development programmes. A vast new American embassy in Islamabad for 1000 staff is also being planned. However, closer American engagement with Pakistan (even if it is a necessary part of Obama’s strategy for success in Afghanistan) brings into sharp focus the differences between the two countries, particularly in terms of cultural sensitivities and trust. As such, it risks alienating vast swathes of Pakistani society, including the very people that need to support the strategy if it is to succeed.
Opposition to the Kerry-Lugar bill in Pakistan has come from the military, opposition parliamentarians, and even members of the ruling coalition. Despite support for the bill from Zardari in principle, it remains unclear in what form the bill will finally be implemented. Many are opposed to what they see as unreasonable conditions attached to the aid package, which is seen as American meddling at best, national humiliation at worst. Pakistani Muslim League-N opposition member Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan articulated the concerns of many by stating that ‘each and every page of the bill is reflective of the insulting attitude towards Pakistan.’ Of most concern to Pakistan’s military is the condition that the US must assess the extent of control the government has over the armed forces, including budgets and the chain of command. The bill also refers to the southwest city of Quetta and the eastern town of Muridke as safe havens for militants, increasing the fear of US drone attacks, which many Pakistanis regard as a blatant infringement of sovereignty. Suspicion of American intentions in Pakistan has also been increased by the actions of US security contractors DynCorp, widely believed to be a tool of American foreign policy to develop a shadow network of security and intelligence personnel in the country. September saw a local company hired by DynCorp have its offices raided and its owner arrested. Islamabad is frustrated at not being more widely consulted in Washington’s decision to send more troops to Afghanistan, and in turn Washington is suspicious that the Pakistani military contains elements that support the militants, especially as the captured militant from the Rawalpindi siege, Mohammed Aquil, was himself once a member of Pakistan’s army.
The escalating violence and bitter opposition to the Kerry-Lugar bill in Pakistan do not provide an auspicious backdrop to Obama’s grand Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. The risk for Obama (and also for Pakistan) is that by being seen to influence or attempt to influence Pakistani policy, this will strengthen the hand of the militants and reduce the civilian government’s support. In a country that has spent roughly half of its existence under military rule, Obama must tread carefully or risk his strategy unravelling. However, events in Pakistan have produced their own momentum, and there are many reasons for those who crave stability to be pessimistic. Violent extremism appears to have gained a foothold across large areas of northwest Pakistan, as demonstrated in the past two weeks by attacks in the North West Frontier Province and Punjab, while the Federally Administered Tribal Areas remain outside Islamabad’s jurisdiction, and parts of Balochistan are believed to be safe havens for senior Taliban figures. It is a worrying phenomenon that in some cases of terrorism, al-Qaeda is thought to provide the funding, the Taliban the training and Punjabi organisations the militants. Indeed, it appears that the government is only now waking up to the Punjabi threat. In the Failed States Index, a collaboration between US ‘Foreign Policy Magazine’ and think-tank ‘The Fund For Peace’, Pakistan is ranked 9th, three places worse off than in 2007 when General Musharraf was in power.
Despite American support and a fresh determination from Islamabad to take the fight to the militants, it is by no means guaranteed that Pakistan’s offensive in South Waziristan will be successful, in terms of either Pakistani objectives of reducing acts of terrorism within its borders or US objectives of clearing areas from where militants launch attacks within Afghanistan. Monday’s attack in Swat Valley, an area supposedly cleared of militants at the cost of 300 soldiers this summer, only serves to demonstrate the risks inherent in taking on the Taliban on their own turf. South Waziristan is known as the Taliban heartland, or the ‘crucible of global terrorism’ according to Gordon Brown, and conditions are expected to be tougher for the army than was the case in the Swat Valley. South Waziristan can reach -20 degrees celcius in winter and the terrain is brutally unforgiving. It should not be forgotten that three times in the past has the army tried to take control of the area, failing each time. Between 2001 and 2008, somewhere in the region of 4000 troops are thought to have been lost trying to bring the Tribal Areas and the North West Frontier Province within Islamabad’s remit.
President Obama will be painfully aware that Afghanistan’s future stability is to a large extent dependent on public opinion in Pakistan, in that it remains to be seen how popular the military offensive in South Waziristan will be if the army suffers casualties on a large scale. It will be of concern to Washington that Islamabad may lose its nerve and leave the job ‘half-done’ by dealing only with the militants that pose a threat to Pakistani security, while stopping short of taking on (or worse, making a deal with) those that pose a threat to American interests in Afghanistan. American aid and support, however large, can only do so much to influence events on the ground, and the next few months will be critical. It is clear that what appears to be a plausible ‘comprehensive new strategy’ on paper, is in reality rife with pitfalls, assumptions, unknown quantities and risks at every turn. Indeed, there is no guarantee of success, and failure could potentially destabilise nuclear-armed Pakistan with disastrous consequences for the region and for the West. What should worry those who wish to see a moderate and stable Pakistan bordering a peaceful Afghanistan is not that the dangers of failure have been overlooked, but that this is still seen as the best shot at success.
The promised push into South Waziristan is something that President Obama has been pressing President Zardari to undertake as part of his broader strategy in the region to stop insurgents having a safe haven from which to plan and execute attacks in Afghanistan, but it does not come without its risks. On 27 March 2009 Obama explicitly linked the two conflicts in a speech announcing what he termed ‘a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan’, and since the death of Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud in a CIA drone attack on 5 August, a sustained ground offensive in South Waziristan has been expected. American special envoy Richard Holbrooke spent five days in Pakistan holding high-level meetings in August, and Chief of US Central Command David Petraeus was also in the country talking with army commanders about providing American logistical support to the operation. It appears that Islamabad believes the death of Mehsud has fundamentally weakened the Taliban position in South Waziristan, and following the army’s success in capturing Swat Valley from the militants in the North West Frontier Province, they have been preparing the ground for the looming offensive by sealing off the area and employing the use of artillery and aerial bombardments against Taliban positions.
On the surface, American and Pakistani policy seems to be working towards a common objective, namely the destruction of a common enemy, and the two countries appear to be co-operating as never before. Indeed President Obama has signalled his commitment to, and investment in Pakistan, through the Kerry-Lugar bill, which will provide $1.5 billion a year in American aid for the next 5 years to go towards Pakistani democratic, economic and social development programmes. A vast new American embassy in Islamabad for 1000 staff is also being planned. However, closer American engagement with Pakistan (even if it is a necessary part of Obama’s strategy for success in Afghanistan) brings into sharp focus the differences between the two countries, particularly in terms of cultural sensitivities and trust. As such, it risks alienating vast swathes of Pakistani society, including the very people that need to support the strategy if it is to succeed.
Opposition to the Kerry-Lugar bill in Pakistan has come from the military, opposition parliamentarians, and even members of the ruling coalition. Despite support for the bill from Zardari in principle, it remains unclear in what form the bill will finally be implemented. Many are opposed to what they see as unreasonable conditions attached to the aid package, which is seen as American meddling at best, national humiliation at worst. Pakistani Muslim League-N opposition member Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan articulated the concerns of many by stating that ‘each and every page of the bill is reflective of the insulting attitude towards Pakistan.’ Of most concern to Pakistan’s military is the condition that the US must assess the extent of control the government has over the armed forces, including budgets and the chain of command. The bill also refers to the southwest city of Quetta and the eastern town of Muridke as safe havens for militants, increasing the fear of US drone attacks, which many Pakistanis regard as a blatant infringement of sovereignty. Suspicion of American intentions in Pakistan has also been increased by the actions of US security contractors DynCorp, widely believed to be a tool of American foreign policy to develop a shadow network of security and intelligence personnel in the country. September saw a local company hired by DynCorp have its offices raided and its owner arrested. Islamabad is frustrated at not being more widely consulted in Washington’s decision to send more troops to Afghanistan, and in turn Washington is suspicious that the Pakistani military contains elements that support the militants, especially as the captured militant from the Rawalpindi siege, Mohammed Aquil, was himself once a member of Pakistan’s army.
The escalating violence and bitter opposition to the Kerry-Lugar bill in Pakistan do not provide an auspicious backdrop to Obama’s grand Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. The risk for Obama (and also for Pakistan) is that by being seen to influence or attempt to influence Pakistani policy, this will strengthen the hand of the militants and reduce the civilian government’s support. In a country that has spent roughly half of its existence under military rule, Obama must tread carefully or risk his strategy unravelling. However, events in Pakistan have produced their own momentum, and there are many reasons for those who crave stability to be pessimistic. Violent extremism appears to have gained a foothold across large areas of northwest Pakistan, as demonstrated in the past two weeks by attacks in the North West Frontier Province and Punjab, while the Federally Administered Tribal Areas remain outside Islamabad’s jurisdiction, and parts of Balochistan are believed to be safe havens for senior Taliban figures. It is a worrying phenomenon that in some cases of terrorism, al-Qaeda is thought to provide the funding, the Taliban the training and Punjabi organisations the militants. Indeed, it appears that the government is only now waking up to the Punjabi threat. In the Failed States Index, a collaboration between US ‘Foreign Policy Magazine’ and think-tank ‘The Fund For Peace’, Pakistan is ranked 9th, three places worse off than in 2007 when General Musharraf was in power.
Despite American support and a fresh determination from Islamabad to take the fight to the militants, it is by no means guaranteed that Pakistan’s offensive in South Waziristan will be successful, in terms of either Pakistani objectives of reducing acts of terrorism within its borders or US objectives of clearing areas from where militants launch attacks within Afghanistan. Monday’s attack in Swat Valley, an area supposedly cleared of militants at the cost of 300 soldiers this summer, only serves to demonstrate the risks inherent in taking on the Taliban on their own turf. South Waziristan is known as the Taliban heartland, or the ‘crucible of global terrorism’ according to Gordon Brown, and conditions are expected to be tougher for the army than was the case in the Swat Valley. South Waziristan can reach -20 degrees celcius in winter and the terrain is brutally unforgiving. It should not be forgotten that three times in the past has the army tried to take control of the area, failing each time. Between 2001 and 2008, somewhere in the region of 4000 troops are thought to have been lost trying to bring the Tribal Areas and the North West Frontier Province within Islamabad’s remit.
President Obama will be painfully aware that Afghanistan’s future stability is to a large extent dependent on public opinion in Pakistan, in that it remains to be seen how popular the military offensive in South Waziristan will be if the army suffers casualties on a large scale. It will be of concern to Washington that Islamabad may lose its nerve and leave the job ‘half-done’ by dealing only with the militants that pose a threat to Pakistani security, while stopping short of taking on (or worse, making a deal with) those that pose a threat to American interests in Afghanistan. American aid and support, however large, can only do so much to influence events on the ground, and the next few months will be critical. It is clear that what appears to be a plausible ‘comprehensive new strategy’ on paper, is in reality rife with pitfalls, assumptions, unknown quantities and risks at every turn. Indeed, there is no guarantee of success, and failure could potentially destabilise nuclear-armed Pakistan with disastrous consequences for the region and for the West. What should worry those who wish to see a moderate and stable Pakistan bordering a peaceful Afghanistan is not that the dangers of failure have been overlooked, but that this is still seen as the best shot at success.
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