Thursday saw Iran mark the anniversary of the 1979 revolution that swept Ayatollah Khomeini to power as supreme leader of the new Islamic theocracy and ushered in an era of fractious relations with the West that continues to this day. As hundreds of thousands of Iranians rallied to mark the occasion, a reinforced security presence was on hand to ensure opponents of President Ahmadinejad were unable to use the anniversary to protest in any great number against the disputed election result of June 2008 that saw Ahmadinejad returned to office and the perceived failings of the Islamic Revolution. The President took the opportunity to further ramp up the tension between Tehran and the West over Iranian nuclear ambitions, declaring to a jubilant flag-waving crowd that Iran had produced its first stockpile of 20% enriched atomic fuel and that it was now able to enrich to 80%, just short of the 90% enrichment needed to build a bomb. Ahmadinejad’s bombastic rhetoric comes partly in response to American-led calls for harsher sanctions to be imposed on Tehran, which in turn has been played out against the backdrop of the increased militarisation of the region and a growing fear that preparations are being made for military confrontation.
Over the weekend of 30-31 January it emerged that the US is significantly increasing its missile defence systems in the region, and putting in place measures to protect its vital strategic interests in the event of an American or Israeli strike on targets within Iran. These measures include the deployment of two Patriot Missile Defence Systems on the ground in each of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. US Navy vessels with Aegis anti-missile systems are also to be stationed in the Mediterranean at all times, and the 10000 strong protection force trained to defend oil terminals and other key infrastructure in Saudi Arabia will be tripled in size. The region-wide military build-up is estimated to cost Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar in excess of $25 billion, with the UAE alone buying 80 F16 fighter jets.
On the face of it, this military build-up appears to be clear preparation for military confrontation with Iran, particularly as the threat of sanctions does not seem to overtly concern the government in Tehran, which has maintained its intransigent stance and belligerent tone. Tehran has in the past threatened to respond to any attack on its nuclear facilities with missile attacks of its own against Gulf states allied with the US. Defence adviser to Ayatollah Khamenei, Admiral Ali Shamkhani has declared that ‘The objective would be to overwhelm US missile defence systems with dozens and maybe hundreds of missiles fired simultaneously at specific targets.’ He also accused Gulf states of ‘helping the US establish legitimacy for its anticipated aggression against Iran.’ It would therefore appear prudent for the US to put plans in place to protect oil refineries and power stations in the region in the event of any conflict, not least because GCC countries are estimated to supply the US with a third of its oil and own up to $500 billion of US capital.
There are however suggestions that the sale of military hardware to GCC countries is less to do with preparing for military confrontation in the short term than further isolating Iran in the region and increasing the pressure on Tehran to offer concessions to the West over its disputed nuclear programme. Chief of staff of Iranian armed forces Major General Hassan Firouabadi has called the US move ‘psychological war.’ The predominantly Sunni Arab middle east has become increasingly wary of the growing influence of Shiite Iran, particularly as the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq has removed a counter-balance to Iranian power, giving Iran the space to expand its regional authority. Tehran for its part has portrayed the American plan as a classic ‘divide and rule’ strategy, and has cautioned its neighbours against allowing hostile US policy to come between them. President Ahmadinejad met the Crown Prince of Qatar on 2 February and warned him that ‘Westerners do not want friendly relations between countries in the region. Their life is dependent on rifts and insecurity.’
It could well simply be the case that this possible change of approach in US policy towards Iran has necessarily occurred as a result of the failure President Obama’s stated policy of engagement with Tehran. The deal brokered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna whereby Iran would send 75% of its low-enriched uranium abroad for conversion into fuel rods for its research reactor in Tehran has collapsed amidst recriminations from both sides, and Obama’s call for Ahmadinejad to unclench the Iranian fist and halt his country’s nuclear programme has not borne fruit. Whilst the aim of preventing Iran from acquiring the bomb has not changed, uncertainty over how to eventually deal with the issue appears to prevail in Washington, and the plan to further militarise the region can be regarded as indicative of this uncertainty rather than the manifestation of a well-planned and coherent Iran strategy. It is certainly the case that American desires to impose tougher sanctions on Iran through the UN Security Council has been hampered by Chinese unwillingness to target an important economic partner, and it should not be forgotten that China has lucrative business interests in Iran, particularly in the oil and gas sector. China has warned that talks of fresh sanctions would ‘complicate the situation’ and has stated its belief that such talk can only hinder diplomatic efforts.
Whether or not the bolstering of GCC countries’ defence capabilities and heightened military presence in the region is specifically put in place as a precursor to an attack on Iran, the danger is that such a military build-up will inevitably lead to an increased likelihood of violent confrontation. This American gambit in conjunction with combative rhetoric emanating from Washington has raised fears that the dispute between Tehran and the West will ultimately only be resolved by force. US Vice-President Joe Biden has stated that the Iranian leaders are ‘sowing the seeds of their own destruction’ and Israeli President Shimon Peres has also chosen to ratchet up the tension by declaring on 2 February that ‘We must recruit the whole world to fight Ahmadinejad.’ There are also signs that the stance of GCC nations is hardening in the face of what is perceived to be Iranian prevarication and obstinacy. Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University Dr Abdullah Al Shayji articulated the increasingly prevalent opinion among the ruling classes when he stated that ‘It is time to change course in order to deal with Iran.’ He further suggested that previous GCC attempts to productively engage with Tehran have only resulted in Iranian ‘bellicose [and] arrogant rhetoric.’ The parallels with the descent to war with Iraq during 2002 are obvious. Then as now, an American President is raising fears of a Middle Eastern country led by an anti-Western leader having the capability and desire to use weapons of mass destruction. The danger is that further militarising an already delicately balanced region risks events spinning out of control and leading to circumstances where war becomes the only (or easiest) option left. As Iran expert and chair of the Political Science Department at the University of Alabama Nader Entessar surmises: ‘Any time you [raise the tension] like that, the consequences of what may follow are unpredictable even if the intention is not necessarily to have near-term or medium-term military confrontation.’
Despite the risks inherent in facilitating an arms build-up in the region, there are still good reasons why an attack on Iran may not be in US interests and therefore not forthcoming. An unintended consequence of striking at Iran could well be that the position of the hardliners in Tehran is strengthened. As head of US Central Command General Petraeus himself stated, ‘It’s possible [a strike] could be used to play to nationalist tendencies.’ Indications from Iran are that the opposition Green Movement, who rally behind 2008’s defeated presidential candidate Mir Hossein Moussavi, are likely to be a permanent feature of the Iranian political landscape, and the US will not want to undermine this fledgling movement by playing into the hands of the hardline nationalists who currently hold power. It should also not be forgotten that Iran has the capability to create instability across the region and harm US interests by influencing and encouraging Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine and the Houthi rebels in Northern Yemen. Tehran also has the means to foment instability in Iraq, and has in the past also been accused of aiding insurgents in Afghanistan. Any strike against Iran would likely result in Tehran using its significant regional influence to hit back at American interests, with the potential to cause long-term setbacks to US strategic ambitions in the region.
President Obama will also have domestic economic considerations to take into account when deciding how to deal with Iran. The danger of a strike on Iran is that the price of oil will soar and the consequence will be to plunge the fragile global economy back into crisis and to cause a much dreaded ‘double dip’ recession. In 2008 the price of a barrel of oil reached $150, and if it were to rise to such a price again as a result of conflict in the Middle East then the cost to the American consumer in terms of heating and petrol prices would be considerable. As economic recovery depends on consumer spending, and with the American economy being particularly dependent on affordable fuel, the return to stability would be severely hindered. Uncertainty over oil supply in the short and medium term would affect the markets and greatly increase the price, which would benefit the oil producers, ironically including the Iranian government. Obama may decide that the political risk as well as the risk to the global economy is simply too great.
Those who pull the leavers in Iran will be well aware of the difficult position in which Obama and his Western allies find themselves in trying to prevent Iran from pursuing its nuclear programme, and are thus in a position of relative strength. However, the patience of Western leaders and the Israeli government is not without limit and the danger is that events will overtake any coherent diplomatic strategy and military confrontation will become the only option left on the table. The fact that Iranian atomic energy chief Ali Akbar Salehi declared on 7 February that Iran plans to build 10 new uranium enrichment facilities in the next Iranian year, coupled with Ahmadinejad effectively throwing down the gauntlet to the West by announcing the successful production of its first stockpile of 20% enriched atomic fuel, therefore appears to be a clumsy and unwise diplomatic gambit. These statements can only antagonise and provoke opponents of Tehran. However, this is in the context of the Western narrative; that time is running out. The clerical leadership of Iran, led by Ayatollah Khamenei, believes that the nuclear issue is just another stick for the West to beat Iran with; the ultimate goal being regime change in Tehran. They consequently do not see the potential benefits of making concessions, as the prevalent view is that the West would manufacture another crisis in an attempt to undermine the Islamic Republic. Ahmadinejad for his part has staked his personal authority on refusing to offer concessions to the West, and his weakened domestic position has further encouraged him to play to the hardliners and shore up his power base. American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is currently in Saudi Arabia to discuss the role Riyadh can play in reassuring China that any disruption in oil supplies as a result of further sanctions will be offset so as not to harm Chinese interests. It appears that in any event, further sanctions will be imposed on Iran, with their effectiveness or otherwise dependent on the level of Chinese support. However, if they are ineffective this can only increase the chances of the standoff between Iran and the West reaching a violent climax.
Sunday, 14 February 2010
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