Thursday saw Iran mark the anniversary of the 1979 revolution that swept Ayatollah Khomeini to power as supreme leader of the new Islamic theocracy and ushered in an era of fractious relations with the West that continues to this day. As hundreds of thousands of Iranians rallied to mark the occasion, a reinforced security presence was on hand to ensure opponents of President Ahmadinejad were unable to use the anniversary to protest in any great number against the disputed election result of June 2008 that saw Ahmadinejad returned to office and the perceived failings of the Islamic Revolution. The President took the opportunity to further ramp up the tension between Tehran and the West over Iranian nuclear ambitions, declaring to a jubilant flag-waving crowd that Iran had produced its first stockpile of 20% enriched atomic fuel and that it was now able to enrich to 80%, just short of the 90% enrichment needed to build a bomb. Ahmadinejad’s bombastic rhetoric comes partly in response to American-led calls for harsher sanctions to be imposed on Tehran, which in turn has been played out against the backdrop of the increased militarisation of the region and a growing fear that preparations are being made for military confrontation.
Over the weekend of 30-31 January it emerged that the US is significantly increasing its missile defence systems in the region, and putting in place measures to protect its vital strategic interests in the event of an American or Israeli strike on targets within Iran. These measures include the deployment of two Patriot Missile Defence Systems on the ground in each of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. US Navy vessels with Aegis anti-missile systems are also to be stationed in the Mediterranean at all times, and the 10000 strong protection force trained to defend oil terminals and other key infrastructure in Saudi Arabia will be tripled in size. The region-wide military build-up is estimated to cost Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar in excess of $25 billion, with the UAE alone buying 80 F16 fighter jets.
On the face of it, this military build-up appears to be clear preparation for military confrontation with Iran, particularly as the threat of sanctions does not seem to overtly concern the government in Tehran, which has maintained its intransigent stance and belligerent tone. Tehran has in the past threatened to respond to any attack on its nuclear facilities with missile attacks of its own against Gulf states allied with the US. Defence adviser to Ayatollah Khamenei, Admiral Ali Shamkhani has declared that ‘The objective would be to overwhelm US missile defence systems with dozens and maybe hundreds of missiles fired simultaneously at specific targets.’ He also accused Gulf states of ‘helping the US establish legitimacy for its anticipated aggression against Iran.’ It would therefore appear prudent for the US to put plans in place to protect oil refineries and power stations in the region in the event of any conflict, not least because GCC countries are estimated to supply the US with a third of its oil and own up to $500 billion of US capital.
There are however suggestions that the sale of military hardware to GCC countries is less to do with preparing for military confrontation in the short term than further isolating Iran in the region and increasing the pressure on Tehran to offer concessions to the West over its disputed nuclear programme. Chief of staff of Iranian armed forces Major General Hassan Firouabadi has called the US move ‘psychological war.’ The predominantly Sunni Arab middle east has become increasingly wary of the growing influence of Shiite Iran, particularly as the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq has removed a counter-balance to Iranian power, giving Iran the space to expand its regional authority. Tehran for its part has portrayed the American plan as a classic ‘divide and rule’ strategy, and has cautioned its neighbours against allowing hostile US policy to come between them. President Ahmadinejad met the Crown Prince of Qatar on 2 February and warned him that ‘Westerners do not want friendly relations between countries in the region. Their life is dependent on rifts and insecurity.’
It could well simply be the case that this possible change of approach in US policy towards Iran has necessarily occurred as a result of the failure President Obama’s stated policy of engagement with Tehran. The deal brokered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna whereby Iran would send 75% of its low-enriched uranium abroad for conversion into fuel rods for its research reactor in Tehran has collapsed amidst recriminations from both sides, and Obama’s call for Ahmadinejad to unclench the Iranian fist and halt his country’s nuclear programme has not borne fruit. Whilst the aim of preventing Iran from acquiring the bomb has not changed, uncertainty over how to eventually deal with the issue appears to prevail in Washington, and the plan to further militarise the region can be regarded as indicative of this uncertainty rather than the manifestation of a well-planned and coherent Iran strategy. It is certainly the case that American desires to impose tougher sanctions on Iran through the UN Security Council has been hampered by Chinese unwillingness to target an important economic partner, and it should not be forgotten that China has lucrative business interests in Iran, particularly in the oil and gas sector. China has warned that talks of fresh sanctions would ‘complicate the situation’ and has stated its belief that such talk can only hinder diplomatic efforts.
Whether or not the bolstering of GCC countries’ defence capabilities and heightened military presence in the region is specifically put in place as a precursor to an attack on Iran, the danger is that such a military build-up will inevitably lead to an increased likelihood of violent confrontation. This American gambit in conjunction with combative rhetoric emanating from Washington has raised fears that the dispute between Tehran and the West will ultimately only be resolved by force. US Vice-President Joe Biden has stated that the Iranian leaders are ‘sowing the seeds of their own destruction’ and Israeli President Shimon Peres has also chosen to ratchet up the tension by declaring on 2 February that ‘We must recruit the whole world to fight Ahmadinejad.’ There are also signs that the stance of GCC nations is hardening in the face of what is perceived to be Iranian prevarication and obstinacy. Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University Dr Abdullah Al Shayji articulated the increasingly prevalent opinion among the ruling classes when he stated that ‘It is time to change course in order to deal with Iran.’ He further suggested that previous GCC attempts to productively engage with Tehran have only resulted in Iranian ‘bellicose [and] arrogant rhetoric.’ The parallels with the descent to war with Iraq during 2002 are obvious. Then as now, an American President is raising fears of a Middle Eastern country led by an anti-Western leader having the capability and desire to use weapons of mass destruction. The danger is that further militarising an already delicately balanced region risks events spinning out of control and leading to circumstances where war becomes the only (or easiest) option left. As Iran expert and chair of the Political Science Department at the University of Alabama Nader Entessar surmises: ‘Any time you [raise the tension] like that, the consequences of what may follow are unpredictable even if the intention is not necessarily to have near-term or medium-term military confrontation.’
Despite the risks inherent in facilitating an arms build-up in the region, there are still good reasons why an attack on Iran may not be in US interests and therefore not forthcoming. An unintended consequence of striking at Iran could well be that the position of the hardliners in Tehran is strengthened. As head of US Central Command General Petraeus himself stated, ‘It’s possible [a strike] could be used to play to nationalist tendencies.’ Indications from Iran are that the opposition Green Movement, who rally behind 2008’s defeated presidential candidate Mir Hossein Moussavi, are likely to be a permanent feature of the Iranian political landscape, and the US will not want to undermine this fledgling movement by playing into the hands of the hardline nationalists who currently hold power. It should also not be forgotten that Iran has the capability to create instability across the region and harm US interests by influencing and encouraging Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine and the Houthi rebels in Northern Yemen. Tehran also has the means to foment instability in Iraq, and has in the past also been accused of aiding insurgents in Afghanistan. Any strike against Iran would likely result in Tehran using its significant regional influence to hit back at American interests, with the potential to cause long-term setbacks to US strategic ambitions in the region.
President Obama will also have domestic economic considerations to take into account when deciding how to deal with Iran. The danger of a strike on Iran is that the price of oil will soar and the consequence will be to plunge the fragile global economy back into crisis and to cause a much dreaded ‘double dip’ recession. In 2008 the price of a barrel of oil reached $150, and if it were to rise to such a price again as a result of conflict in the Middle East then the cost to the American consumer in terms of heating and petrol prices would be considerable. As economic recovery depends on consumer spending, and with the American economy being particularly dependent on affordable fuel, the return to stability would be severely hindered. Uncertainty over oil supply in the short and medium term would affect the markets and greatly increase the price, which would benefit the oil producers, ironically including the Iranian government. Obama may decide that the political risk as well as the risk to the global economy is simply too great.
Those who pull the leavers in Iran will be well aware of the difficult position in which Obama and his Western allies find themselves in trying to prevent Iran from pursuing its nuclear programme, and are thus in a position of relative strength. However, the patience of Western leaders and the Israeli government is not without limit and the danger is that events will overtake any coherent diplomatic strategy and military confrontation will become the only option left on the table. The fact that Iranian atomic energy chief Ali Akbar Salehi declared on 7 February that Iran plans to build 10 new uranium enrichment facilities in the next Iranian year, coupled with Ahmadinejad effectively throwing down the gauntlet to the West by announcing the successful production of its first stockpile of 20% enriched atomic fuel, therefore appears to be a clumsy and unwise diplomatic gambit. These statements can only antagonise and provoke opponents of Tehran. However, this is in the context of the Western narrative; that time is running out. The clerical leadership of Iran, led by Ayatollah Khamenei, believes that the nuclear issue is just another stick for the West to beat Iran with; the ultimate goal being regime change in Tehran. They consequently do not see the potential benefits of making concessions, as the prevalent view is that the West would manufacture another crisis in an attempt to undermine the Islamic Republic. Ahmadinejad for his part has staked his personal authority on refusing to offer concessions to the West, and his weakened domestic position has further encouraged him to play to the hardliners and shore up his power base. American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is currently in Saudi Arabia to discuss the role Riyadh can play in reassuring China that any disruption in oil supplies as a result of further sanctions will be offset so as not to harm Chinese interests. It appears that in any event, further sanctions will be imposed on Iran, with their effectiveness or otherwise dependent on the level of Chinese support. However, if they are ineffective this can only increase the chances of the standoff between Iran and the West reaching a violent climax.
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Sunday, 14 February 2010
Sunday, 1 November 2009
Iranian Nuclear Negotiations and the 'Trust Deficit'
Despite the protraction of negotiations between Iran and the West over Tehran’s nuclear programme and the palpable sense of frustration emanating from Washington over what are perceived to be Iranian stalling tactics, there is more reason than ever to be optimistic that a peaceful solution to the impasse can be achieved. As Tehran makes its initial response to the deal formed in Vienna last week, attention now shifts to how Washington will react. Under the terms of the deal brokered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran would send about 75% (1200kg) of its low-enriched uranium to Russia, from where it would be sent to France for conversion into fuel rods, before being shipped back to Iran for use in Tehran’s research reactor, which produces radioisotopes for medical use. As the technology used to enrich uranium for use as fuel in nuclear power is the same as that of the higher-level enrichment needed to make the fissile core of an atomic bomb, it would be a significant step towards decreasing tensions if most of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium is removed from the country. The amount of low-enriched uranium needed to produce a single nuclear bomb is 1000kg, so the proposal would theoretically prevent Iran from being able to build a bomb, at least until it has enriched enough uranium to replace what has been shipped abroad. The deal would thus buy time and create space for further negotiations.
Thursday’s response from Tehran to the IAEA proposal, while far from being the blanket positive response desired by the US, Russia and France, at least leaves the door open for further discussion. Prospects for breaking the deadlock had looked unlikely when speaker of the Iranian parliament Ali Larijani had declared that ‘Westerners are insisting to go in a direction that speaks of cheating’, but President Ahmadinejad has since expressed willingness to work within the framework of the IAEA deal, albeit with conditions of his own. Tehran would like to amend the proposal so that its low-enriched uranium would be gradually shipped abroad, and so that the ‘simultaneous exchange’ of nuclear fuel takes place in return.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the Iranian response. Firstly, it appears that the Iranian leadership is divided over how to react to the IAEA proposal, and that Ahmadinejad’s conditions for accepting the deal are to demonstrate to his hard-line power base that he will not sacrifice too much in negotiating with the West. It must also be borne in mind that the Iranian ‘right’ to enrich uranium for fuel on its own soil is supported by the majority of Iranians. However, the disputed presidential election of June 2009 and the economic hardship in Iran have weakened Ahmadinejad’s position at home, and if further economic sanctions are to be imposed by the US and its allies, then the President needs to be in a position where he can blame the West for the breakdown of negotiations. Secondly, the Iranian response, while seen by many as a delaying tactic in Washington, can be read as an indication of the mistrust that exists between the US and Iran. To use diplomatic parlance, it is this ‘trust deficit’, stretching back well into the last century, which is at the root of the Iranian nuclear impasse, and which must be overcome if a solution is to be found. While negotiations can appear frustratingly slow, it is only by such negotiations that trust and understanding can be built, two necessary preconditions for any long-term settlement.
A major sticking point in the terms of the current proposal for Tehran is the fact that it historically does not trust other countries when it comes to energy security or fuel supply. This mistrust can be traced back to Iranian dealings with the British controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in the first half of the 20th century, which Iran believed was unfairly profiting from Iranian resources at the expense of the Iranian people. Following the AIOC’s nationalisation and the subsequent American organised and British backed coup to remove the popular pro-nationalisation Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq from power, Iranian mistrust of Western intentions relating to energy provision in Iran have only intensified. Suspicions that the West is using the nuclear issue to try to stop Iran developing into a regional power based on its energy security have been strengthened only in the past few days as the ‘Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act’ passed the committee stage in US Congress. This law would hinder Iran’s ability to import and produce petroleum products, having a potentially profound effect on the Iranian economy, as Iran currently imports nearly 40% of its gas and diesel. Tehran also does not see France as an honest link in the fuel-providing chain in the current dispute, as President Sarkozy has manoeuvred the French position much closer to that of the US than his predecessor in the Elysee Palace.
Further proof in Iranian eyes that the nuclear issue is being used as cover for surreptitious Western plans to keep Iran weak can be found in the American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2007. NIEs are produced by the US intelligence community to provide the American administration with up to date and authoritative information in order that decision makers can make sound judgements relating to matters of national security. The NIE of 2007 stated that ‘We judge with high confidence that in the fall of 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons programme’. It further stated that ‘Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons programme suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005.’ These statements, coupled with IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei’s assertion in September 2009 that ‘I do not think based on what we see that Iran has an ongoing nuclear weapons programme’ have further served to increase Tehran’s suspicions of duplicitous Western motives.
However, Western mistrust of Iranian intentions is equally as entrenched, and must equally be conquered if a means can be found to overcome the US-Iranian deadlock. The US and its allies declare the need to be sure that Iran will not build a bomb, and that the best way to do this is to ensure it cannot do so. They point to the fact that for 18 years the Iranians ran a covert nuclear weapons programme, and that therefore stringent measures and rules must now be put in place in order that no such concealment can occur in future. Western leaders believe that they simply cannot afford to take stated Iranian intentions at face value, given Tehran’s past record of deception. The West sees further evidence of Iranian untrustworthiness demonstrated by the fact that numerous United Nations resolutions calling for Tehran to cease enriching uranium have been ignored, and President Ahmadinejad’s talk of wiping Israel off the map is at the very least unhelpful and at the other extremity dangerously threatening, and either way is too serious to turn a blind eye to.
Iranian non-disclosure of its second enrichment plant near Qom is indicative of mutual suspicions between the protagonists in the ongoing dispute. This plant is thought to be big enough to enrich enough uranium for a bomb, though Tehran’s position is that its existence was declared to the IAEA in time, and that it will only be used to enrich uranium to a low level. While some in Washington see the second plant as proof that Iran has something to hide, many in Iran see the Qom plant as an insurance policy, given that if the US or Israel attacked Iran, the well-known plant of Natanz would be a certain target. This mindset is especially prevalent, as Iran sees itself surrounded by hostile forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, and interprets American talk of ‘all options being on the table’ as a blatant threat to its security. Add to this reports coming out of Washington in early October that a new 30000 pound ‘bunker-buster’ bomb known as the ‘Massive Ordnance Penetrator’ is being developed, and it is easy to understand the feeling in Iran that such an insurance policy might be necessary, as such a weapon is clearly not designed for fighting insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Despite the history of antagonism, provocation and mutual suspicion between particularly the US and Iran, and despite the frustratingly slow nature of the negotiations between the two sides so far, there are grounds for optimism. Firstly, it is in everyone’s interests to find a peaceful solution to the standoff. From the Iranian domestic perspective, President Ahmadinejad would have nothing to gain in being seen to provoke a military strike from the US, and the long term anti-American backlash across the Muslim (and Arab) world if military action was taken would immediately negate any (short-term) benefits the US might theoretically gain from delaying any perceived Iranian nuclear weapons development. Tehran does not stand to gain from having continuous economic sanctions imposed against it in a political climate where dissatisfaction with the establishment in its handling of the economy, and of the disputed election, has been visible and growing. Obama will also want to be seen to be giving negotiations every possible chance, so as not to shore up the position of the hardliners in Iran.
The stated aims of the US and Iran are not incompatible in their simplest forms, in that Washington states it does not want Iran to have a bomb, and Tehran states it does not seek one. The main issue dividing the two sides is the lack of trust. Only by continued engagement can trust be established, whereby a solution can be agreed. Both sides of the negotiating table want to be seen to be making an offer the other would appear unreasonable to refuse, given their stated aims. While this is making negotiations extremely protracted, it is a necessary prerequisite to establishing trust, in that this form of shadow boxing is a way of ensuring that those round the table are willing to take actions that match their words. In the latest talks, American acceptance of low-level enrichment of uranium in Iran before shipment to Russia implies a flexibility and pragmatism in Obama’s approach that his predecessor lacked. It is small steps such as this that will prepare the ground for a future settlement. No one should be in any doubt that this will be a drawn-out process, probably with many setbacks on the way, but mutual acrimony will only be dissipated through understanding. The art of successful diplomacy necessarily requires empathy, and this requires engagement. To find a lasting solution requires trust, which in turn requires patience. Negotiations between the West and Iran are in their infancy and it will be a long and difficult road, but optimism should be taken from the fact that the right track has now been taken.
Thursday’s response from Tehran to the IAEA proposal, while far from being the blanket positive response desired by the US, Russia and France, at least leaves the door open for further discussion. Prospects for breaking the deadlock had looked unlikely when speaker of the Iranian parliament Ali Larijani had declared that ‘Westerners are insisting to go in a direction that speaks of cheating’, but President Ahmadinejad has since expressed willingness to work within the framework of the IAEA deal, albeit with conditions of his own. Tehran would like to amend the proposal so that its low-enriched uranium would be gradually shipped abroad, and so that the ‘simultaneous exchange’ of nuclear fuel takes place in return.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the Iranian response. Firstly, it appears that the Iranian leadership is divided over how to react to the IAEA proposal, and that Ahmadinejad’s conditions for accepting the deal are to demonstrate to his hard-line power base that he will not sacrifice too much in negotiating with the West. It must also be borne in mind that the Iranian ‘right’ to enrich uranium for fuel on its own soil is supported by the majority of Iranians. However, the disputed presidential election of June 2009 and the economic hardship in Iran have weakened Ahmadinejad’s position at home, and if further economic sanctions are to be imposed by the US and its allies, then the President needs to be in a position where he can blame the West for the breakdown of negotiations. Secondly, the Iranian response, while seen by many as a delaying tactic in Washington, can be read as an indication of the mistrust that exists between the US and Iran. To use diplomatic parlance, it is this ‘trust deficit’, stretching back well into the last century, which is at the root of the Iranian nuclear impasse, and which must be overcome if a solution is to be found. While negotiations can appear frustratingly slow, it is only by such negotiations that trust and understanding can be built, two necessary preconditions for any long-term settlement.
A major sticking point in the terms of the current proposal for Tehran is the fact that it historically does not trust other countries when it comes to energy security or fuel supply. This mistrust can be traced back to Iranian dealings with the British controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in the first half of the 20th century, which Iran believed was unfairly profiting from Iranian resources at the expense of the Iranian people. Following the AIOC’s nationalisation and the subsequent American organised and British backed coup to remove the popular pro-nationalisation Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq from power, Iranian mistrust of Western intentions relating to energy provision in Iran have only intensified. Suspicions that the West is using the nuclear issue to try to stop Iran developing into a regional power based on its energy security have been strengthened only in the past few days as the ‘Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act’ passed the committee stage in US Congress. This law would hinder Iran’s ability to import and produce petroleum products, having a potentially profound effect on the Iranian economy, as Iran currently imports nearly 40% of its gas and diesel. Tehran also does not see France as an honest link in the fuel-providing chain in the current dispute, as President Sarkozy has manoeuvred the French position much closer to that of the US than his predecessor in the Elysee Palace.
Further proof in Iranian eyes that the nuclear issue is being used as cover for surreptitious Western plans to keep Iran weak can be found in the American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2007. NIEs are produced by the US intelligence community to provide the American administration with up to date and authoritative information in order that decision makers can make sound judgements relating to matters of national security. The NIE of 2007 stated that ‘We judge with high confidence that in the fall of 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons programme’. It further stated that ‘Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons programme suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005.’ These statements, coupled with IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei’s assertion in September 2009 that ‘I do not think based on what we see that Iran has an ongoing nuclear weapons programme’ have further served to increase Tehran’s suspicions of duplicitous Western motives.
However, Western mistrust of Iranian intentions is equally as entrenched, and must equally be conquered if a means can be found to overcome the US-Iranian deadlock. The US and its allies declare the need to be sure that Iran will not build a bomb, and that the best way to do this is to ensure it cannot do so. They point to the fact that for 18 years the Iranians ran a covert nuclear weapons programme, and that therefore stringent measures and rules must now be put in place in order that no such concealment can occur in future. Western leaders believe that they simply cannot afford to take stated Iranian intentions at face value, given Tehran’s past record of deception. The West sees further evidence of Iranian untrustworthiness demonstrated by the fact that numerous United Nations resolutions calling for Tehran to cease enriching uranium have been ignored, and President Ahmadinejad’s talk of wiping Israel off the map is at the very least unhelpful and at the other extremity dangerously threatening, and either way is too serious to turn a blind eye to.
Iranian non-disclosure of its second enrichment plant near Qom is indicative of mutual suspicions between the protagonists in the ongoing dispute. This plant is thought to be big enough to enrich enough uranium for a bomb, though Tehran’s position is that its existence was declared to the IAEA in time, and that it will only be used to enrich uranium to a low level. While some in Washington see the second plant as proof that Iran has something to hide, many in Iran see the Qom plant as an insurance policy, given that if the US or Israel attacked Iran, the well-known plant of Natanz would be a certain target. This mindset is especially prevalent, as Iran sees itself surrounded by hostile forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, and interprets American talk of ‘all options being on the table’ as a blatant threat to its security. Add to this reports coming out of Washington in early October that a new 30000 pound ‘bunker-buster’ bomb known as the ‘Massive Ordnance Penetrator’ is being developed, and it is easy to understand the feeling in Iran that such an insurance policy might be necessary, as such a weapon is clearly not designed for fighting insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Despite the history of antagonism, provocation and mutual suspicion between particularly the US and Iran, and despite the frustratingly slow nature of the negotiations between the two sides so far, there are grounds for optimism. Firstly, it is in everyone’s interests to find a peaceful solution to the standoff. From the Iranian domestic perspective, President Ahmadinejad would have nothing to gain in being seen to provoke a military strike from the US, and the long term anti-American backlash across the Muslim (and Arab) world if military action was taken would immediately negate any (short-term) benefits the US might theoretically gain from delaying any perceived Iranian nuclear weapons development. Tehran does not stand to gain from having continuous economic sanctions imposed against it in a political climate where dissatisfaction with the establishment in its handling of the economy, and of the disputed election, has been visible and growing. Obama will also want to be seen to be giving negotiations every possible chance, so as not to shore up the position of the hardliners in Iran.
The stated aims of the US and Iran are not incompatible in their simplest forms, in that Washington states it does not want Iran to have a bomb, and Tehran states it does not seek one. The main issue dividing the two sides is the lack of trust. Only by continued engagement can trust be established, whereby a solution can be agreed. Both sides of the negotiating table want to be seen to be making an offer the other would appear unreasonable to refuse, given their stated aims. While this is making negotiations extremely protracted, it is a necessary prerequisite to establishing trust, in that this form of shadow boxing is a way of ensuring that those round the table are willing to take actions that match their words. In the latest talks, American acceptance of low-level enrichment of uranium in Iran before shipment to Russia implies a flexibility and pragmatism in Obama’s approach that his predecessor lacked. It is small steps such as this that will prepare the ground for a future settlement. No one should be in any doubt that this will be a drawn-out process, probably with many setbacks on the way, but mutual acrimony will only be dissipated through understanding. The art of successful diplomacy necessarily requires empathy, and this requires engagement. To find a lasting solution requires trust, which in turn requires patience. Negotiations between the West and Iran are in their infancy and it will be a long and difficult road, but optimism should be taken from the fact that the right track has now been taken.
Saturday, 24 October 2009
Iran's War on Terror and the New Great Game
Last Sunday’s bomb attack in the southeast Iranian province of Sistan-Balochistan, while on the face of it appearing to be carried out by local militants with local grievances, may yet have far-reaching implications for the wider region and the outside world. Much will depend on the reaction of the Iranian government. Details of the attack still remain unclear, but it seems that a suicide bomber from the Sunni militant group Jundullah detonated an explosive belt in the city of Sarbaz, killing at least 42 people including 6 Revolutionary Guard Commanders at a meeting between members of the Revolutionary Guard and tribal leaders, set up to foster better relations between the Shiite government of Iran and the Balochis, who are a mainly Sunni people living in southeast Iran and southwest Pakistan, as well as in southwest Afghanistan. Given the shocking nature of this act of terrorism, which killed the second in command of the Revolutionary Guard’s ground forces, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Iranian authorities have reverted to the default position of blaming the US and Britain. Also held responsible has been Pakistan, for allegedly harbouring Jundullah militants within its borders. However, to best understand the reasons for the bombing and the potential consequences, attention must be given to who stands to benefit from the attack, and to the violent resentment of the Iranian government felt by many Balochis.
It is estimated that 6 million Balochis live on the Pakistani side of the border while 4 million live on the Iranian side. The province of Sistan-Balochistan, in which Sarbaz is located, is the poorest of Iran’s 30 provinces, largely neglected by Tehran. Criminal gangs operate largely unchecked, while the majority Sunni population that live there are conservative in outlook. It was against this backdrop in 2003 that Jundullah was formed, under the leadership of Abdolmalek Rigi. He has claimed that Jundullah, which is based on the Pakistani side of the border, does not harbour separatist ambitions for the Balochis, but rather seeks equal rights for the Sunnis of the region. Jundullah, or ‘Soldiers of God’, have engaged in acts of terrorism in the past, most notably the Zahedan bombing of 2007, and are also accused of kidnappings and drug smuggling to fund their activities.
In a statement following the Sarbaz attack, the head of the Revolutionary Guards ground forces, General Mohammad Pakpour claimed that ‘The terrorists were trained in the neighbouring country by the Americans and British’, promising a ‘very harsh and crushing response’. While it is true that the CIA are alleged to have aided Jundullah in a bid to undermine Iran’s government, a claim notably made by the captured brother of the Jundullah leader before his execution in Iran earlier this year, it is unlikely that the US had any direct involvement in this attack. It would not make sense for Washington to antagonise or provoke Tehran in such a manner while negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme are ongoing, especially as they enter a delicate and critical stage. It should not be forgotten that President Obama has invested significant political capital in engaging with Iran to try to find a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue.
Iranian President Ahmadinajad has also laid blame at Pakistan’s door, asserting that ‘some security agents in Pakistan are co-operating with the main elements of this terrorist incident’ and demanding Pakistan hand over those responsible. There is little doubt that Jundullah has been operating from within Pakistan, but it would be entirely misleading to suggest the Pakistani authorities encouraged the Sarbaz bombing. Pakistan has no strategic interest in allying itself with Sunni militants against the Iranian government when it is engaged in a fierce battle against Sunni extremism in South Waziristan, and there is nothing for Pakistan to gain in making an enemy of Iran when it is not only preoccupied with its fight against the Pakistani Taliban, but has to contend with ever-present tensions on the border with India and in Kashmir. It is also unlikely that Pakistan would risk supporting a militant group comprising of ethnic Balochis within its own borders, despite the claims of Jundullah that it is a sectarian rather than separatist group.
Islamabad and Tehran have also been enjoying relatively good relations, exemplified by the signing in May 2009 of an agreement between the two countries whereby Iran would sell gas to Pakistan from its South Pars field for 25 years. Under this agreement, the Iran-Pakistan pipeline (IP pipeline, or ‘Peace Pipeline’) would be built, against the wishes of the US, who favour a trans-Afghan pipeline running from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. Jundullah opposes the IP pipeline, which would run through Pakistani Balochistan and Iranian Balochistan, as they do not want to see Balochistan used as a gas corridor, and do not believe resulting gas profits would be redistributed to the Sunnis of the region. Last Sunday’s bombing may well serve to make foreign and domestic investors think twice about the risks involved in the IP pipeline, as well as sowing suspicion between Tehran and Islamabad. Such a scenario would not only harm Iran, but also China, who had agreed with Pakistan to import most of the Iranian gas from the IP pipeline in order that it would not have to import so much through the Strait of Malacca, which Beijing sees as less secure. The US would benefit if the trans-Afghan pipeline became a more viable alternative, as it has always favoured a pipeline bypassing Iran and Russia for its own energy security. Paradoxically, the US could stand to benefit further if Iran launches its own military action against Balochi militants, creating further instability in the region where the proposed IP pipeline is to run.
The Iranian government has been quick to blame its external rivals for the Sarbaz bombing, and it is possible that the US could benefit strategically in the medium or long term if events in Sistan-Balochistan make the IP pipeline unviable. However, such accusations from Iran and speculation over the potential strategic consequences deflects attention from the fact that to carry out such a well planned and executed attack, Jundullah must have had good intelligence on the ground. This points to there being strong local tribal alliances across the Pakistan-Iran border. Indeed, it is hard to see how such an attack could be carried out without significant intelligence from within Iran, especially as such high-ranking Revolutionary Guards from Tehran were killed in the blast. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, Iran has chosen to lash out at foreign agents rather than to look at the long-standing problems festering in its most restive region. The border area between Iran and Pakistan is impoverished and volatile, where criminal groups act with impunity. Armed organisations with varying ethnic, religious and nationalist agendas operate against a backdrop made more complex by the fact that it is where the 21st century’s great powers- China, the US and Russia- are overtly and covertly vying for influence. It remains to be seen whether what begun as a local dispute will grow into a wider conflict of global strategic significance.
It is estimated that 6 million Balochis live on the Pakistani side of the border while 4 million live on the Iranian side. The province of Sistan-Balochistan, in which Sarbaz is located, is the poorest of Iran’s 30 provinces, largely neglected by Tehran. Criminal gangs operate largely unchecked, while the majority Sunni population that live there are conservative in outlook. It was against this backdrop in 2003 that Jundullah was formed, under the leadership of Abdolmalek Rigi. He has claimed that Jundullah, which is based on the Pakistani side of the border, does not harbour separatist ambitions for the Balochis, but rather seeks equal rights for the Sunnis of the region. Jundullah, or ‘Soldiers of God’, have engaged in acts of terrorism in the past, most notably the Zahedan bombing of 2007, and are also accused of kidnappings and drug smuggling to fund their activities.
In a statement following the Sarbaz attack, the head of the Revolutionary Guards ground forces, General Mohammad Pakpour claimed that ‘The terrorists were trained in the neighbouring country by the Americans and British’, promising a ‘very harsh and crushing response’. While it is true that the CIA are alleged to have aided Jundullah in a bid to undermine Iran’s government, a claim notably made by the captured brother of the Jundullah leader before his execution in Iran earlier this year, it is unlikely that the US had any direct involvement in this attack. It would not make sense for Washington to antagonise or provoke Tehran in such a manner while negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme are ongoing, especially as they enter a delicate and critical stage. It should not be forgotten that President Obama has invested significant political capital in engaging with Iran to try to find a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue.
Iranian President Ahmadinajad has also laid blame at Pakistan’s door, asserting that ‘some security agents in Pakistan are co-operating with the main elements of this terrorist incident’ and demanding Pakistan hand over those responsible. There is little doubt that Jundullah has been operating from within Pakistan, but it would be entirely misleading to suggest the Pakistani authorities encouraged the Sarbaz bombing. Pakistan has no strategic interest in allying itself with Sunni militants against the Iranian government when it is engaged in a fierce battle against Sunni extremism in South Waziristan, and there is nothing for Pakistan to gain in making an enemy of Iran when it is not only preoccupied with its fight against the Pakistani Taliban, but has to contend with ever-present tensions on the border with India and in Kashmir. It is also unlikely that Pakistan would risk supporting a militant group comprising of ethnic Balochis within its own borders, despite the claims of Jundullah that it is a sectarian rather than separatist group.
Islamabad and Tehran have also been enjoying relatively good relations, exemplified by the signing in May 2009 of an agreement between the two countries whereby Iran would sell gas to Pakistan from its South Pars field for 25 years. Under this agreement, the Iran-Pakistan pipeline (IP pipeline, or ‘Peace Pipeline’) would be built, against the wishes of the US, who favour a trans-Afghan pipeline running from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. Jundullah opposes the IP pipeline, which would run through Pakistani Balochistan and Iranian Balochistan, as they do not want to see Balochistan used as a gas corridor, and do not believe resulting gas profits would be redistributed to the Sunnis of the region. Last Sunday’s bombing may well serve to make foreign and domestic investors think twice about the risks involved in the IP pipeline, as well as sowing suspicion between Tehran and Islamabad. Such a scenario would not only harm Iran, but also China, who had agreed with Pakistan to import most of the Iranian gas from the IP pipeline in order that it would not have to import so much through the Strait of Malacca, which Beijing sees as less secure. The US would benefit if the trans-Afghan pipeline became a more viable alternative, as it has always favoured a pipeline bypassing Iran and Russia for its own energy security. Paradoxically, the US could stand to benefit further if Iran launches its own military action against Balochi militants, creating further instability in the region where the proposed IP pipeline is to run.
The Iranian government has been quick to blame its external rivals for the Sarbaz bombing, and it is possible that the US could benefit strategically in the medium or long term if events in Sistan-Balochistan make the IP pipeline unviable. However, such accusations from Iran and speculation over the potential strategic consequences deflects attention from the fact that to carry out such a well planned and executed attack, Jundullah must have had good intelligence on the ground. This points to there being strong local tribal alliances across the Pakistan-Iran border. Indeed, it is hard to see how such an attack could be carried out without significant intelligence from within Iran, especially as such high-ranking Revolutionary Guards from Tehran were killed in the blast. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, Iran has chosen to lash out at foreign agents rather than to look at the long-standing problems festering in its most restive region. The border area between Iran and Pakistan is impoverished and volatile, where criminal groups act with impunity. Armed organisations with varying ethnic, religious and nationalist agendas operate against a backdrop made more complex by the fact that it is where the 21st century’s great powers- China, the US and Russia- are overtly and covertly vying for influence. It remains to be seen whether what begun as a local dispute will grow into a wider conflict of global strategic significance.
Labels:
Iran,
Jundullah,
New Great Game,
Sistan-Balochistan
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