Despite the protraction of negotiations between Iran and the West over Tehran’s nuclear programme and the palpable sense of frustration emanating from Washington over what are perceived to be Iranian stalling tactics, there is more reason than ever to be optimistic that a peaceful solution to the impasse can be achieved. As Tehran makes its initial response to the deal formed in Vienna last week, attention now shifts to how Washington will react. Under the terms of the deal brokered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran would send about 75% (1200kg) of its low-enriched uranium to Russia, from where it would be sent to France for conversion into fuel rods, before being shipped back to Iran for use in Tehran’s research reactor, which produces radioisotopes for medical use. As the technology used to enrich uranium for use as fuel in nuclear power is the same as that of the higher-level enrichment needed to make the fissile core of an atomic bomb, it would be a significant step towards decreasing tensions if most of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium is removed from the country. The amount of low-enriched uranium needed to produce a single nuclear bomb is 1000kg, so the proposal would theoretically prevent Iran from being able to build a bomb, at least until it has enriched enough uranium to replace what has been shipped abroad. The deal would thus buy time and create space for further negotiations.
Thursday’s response from Tehran to the IAEA proposal, while far from being the blanket positive response desired by the US, Russia and France, at least leaves the door open for further discussion. Prospects for breaking the deadlock had looked unlikely when speaker of the Iranian parliament Ali Larijani had declared that ‘Westerners are insisting to go in a direction that speaks of cheating’, but President Ahmadinejad has since expressed willingness to work within the framework of the IAEA deal, albeit with conditions of his own. Tehran would like to amend the proposal so that its low-enriched uranium would be gradually shipped abroad, and so that the ‘simultaneous exchange’ of nuclear fuel takes place in return.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the Iranian response. Firstly, it appears that the Iranian leadership is divided over how to react to the IAEA proposal, and that Ahmadinejad’s conditions for accepting the deal are to demonstrate to his hard-line power base that he will not sacrifice too much in negotiating with the West. It must also be borne in mind that the Iranian ‘right’ to enrich uranium for fuel on its own soil is supported by the majority of Iranians. However, the disputed presidential election of June 2009 and the economic hardship in Iran have weakened Ahmadinejad’s position at home, and if further economic sanctions are to be imposed by the US and its allies, then the President needs to be in a position where he can blame the West for the breakdown of negotiations. Secondly, the Iranian response, while seen by many as a delaying tactic in Washington, can be read as an indication of the mistrust that exists between the US and Iran. To use diplomatic parlance, it is this ‘trust deficit’, stretching back well into the last century, which is at the root of the Iranian nuclear impasse, and which must be overcome if a solution is to be found. While negotiations can appear frustratingly slow, it is only by such negotiations that trust and understanding can be built, two necessary preconditions for any long-term settlement.
A major sticking point in the terms of the current proposal for Tehran is the fact that it historically does not trust other countries when it comes to energy security or fuel supply. This mistrust can be traced back to Iranian dealings with the British controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in the first half of the 20th century, which Iran believed was unfairly profiting from Iranian resources at the expense of the Iranian people. Following the AIOC’s nationalisation and the subsequent American organised and British backed coup to remove the popular pro-nationalisation Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq from power, Iranian mistrust of Western intentions relating to energy provision in Iran have only intensified. Suspicions that the West is using the nuclear issue to try to stop Iran developing into a regional power based on its energy security have been strengthened only in the past few days as the ‘Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act’ passed the committee stage in US Congress. This law would hinder Iran’s ability to import and produce petroleum products, having a potentially profound effect on the Iranian economy, as Iran currently imports nearly 40% of its gas and diesel. Tehran also does not see France as an honest link in the fuel-providing chain in the current dispute, as President Sarkozy has manoeuvred the French position much closer to that of the US than his predecessor in the Elysee Palace.
Further proof in Iranian eyes that the nuclear issue is being used as cover for surreptitious Western plans to keep Iran weak can be found in the American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2007. NIEs are produced by the US intelligence community to provide the American administration with up to date and authoritative information in order that decision makers can make sound judgements relating to matters of national security. The NIE of 2007 stated that ‘We judge with high confidence that in the fall of 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons programme’. It further stated that ‘Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons programme suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005.’ These statements, coupled with IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei’s assertion in September 2009 that ‘I do not think based on what we see that Iran has an ongoing nuclear weapons programme’ have further served to increase Tehran’s suspicions of duplicitous Western motives.
However, Western mistrust of Iranian intentions is equally as entrenched, and must equally be conquered if a means can be found to overcome the US-Iranian deadlock. The US and its allies declare the need to be sure that Iran will not build a bomb, and that the best way to do this is to ensure it cannot do so. They point to the fact that for 18 years the Iranians ran a covert nuclear weapons programme, and that therefore stringent measures and rules must now be put in place in order that no such concealment can occur in future. Western leaders believe that they simply cannot afford to take stated Iranian intentions at face value, given Tehran’s past record of deception. The West sees further evidence of Iranian untrustworthiness demonstrated by the fact that numerous United Nations resolutions calling for Tehran to cease enriching uranium have been ignored, and President Ahmadinejad’s talk of wiping Israel off the map is at the very least unhelpful and at the other extremity dangerously threatening, and either way is too serious to turn a blind eye to.
Iranian non-disclosure of its second enrichment plant near Qom is indicative of mutual suspicions between the protagonists in the ongoing dispute. This plant is thought to be big enough to enrich enough uranium for a bomb, though Tehran’s position is that its existence was declared to the IAEA in time, and that it will only be used to enrich uranium to a low level. While some in Washington see the second plant as proof that Iran has something to hide, many in Iran see the Qom plant as an insurance policy, given that if the US or Israel attacked Iran, the well-known plant of Natanz would be a certain target. This mindset is especially prevalent, as Iran sees itself surrounded by hostile forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, and interprets American talk of ‘all options being on the table’ as a blatant threat to its security. Add to this reports coming out of Washington in early October that a new 30000 pound ‘bunker-buster’ bomb known as the ‘Massive Ordnance Penetrator’ is being developed, and it is easy to understand the feeling in Iran that such an insurance policy might be necessary, as such a weapon is clearly not designed for fighting insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Despite the history of antagonism, provocation and mutual suspicion between particularly the US and Iran, and despite the frustratingly slow nature of the negotiations between the two sides so far, there are grounds for optimism. Firstly, it is in everyone’s interests to find a peaceful solution to the standoff. From the Iranian domestic perspective, President Ahmadinejad would have nothing to gain in being seen to provoke a military strike from the US, and the long term anti-American backlash across the Muslim (and Arab) world if military action was taken would immediately negate any (short-term) benefits the US might theoretically gain from delaying any perceived Iranian nuclear weapons development. Tehran does not stand to gain from having continuous economic sanctions imposed against it in a political climate where dissatisfaction with the establishment in its handling of the economy, and of the disputed election, has been visible and growing. Obama will also want to be seen to be giving negotiations every possible chance, so as not to shore up the position of the hardliners in Iran.
The stated aims of the US and Iran are not incompatible in their simplest forms, in that Washington states it does not want Iran to have a bomb, and Tehran states it does not seek one. The main issue dividing the two sides is the lack of trust. Only by continued engagement can trust be established, whereby a solution can be agreed. Both sides of the negotiating table want to be seen to be making an offer the other would appear unreasonable to refuse, given their stated aims. While this is making negotiations extremely protracted, it is a necessary prerequisite to establishing trust, in that this form of shadow boxing is a way of ensuring that those round the table are willing to take actions that match their words. In the latest talks, American acceptance of low-level enrichment of uranium in Iran before shipment to Russia implies a flexibility and pragmatism in Obama’s approach that his predecessor lacked. It is small steps such as this that will prepare the ground for a future settlement. No one should be in any doubt that this will be a drawn-out process, probably with many setbacks on the way, but mutual acrimony will only be dissipated through understanding. The art of successful diplomacy necessarily requires empathy, and this requires engagement. To find a lasting solution requires trust, which in turn requires patience. Negotiations between the West and Iran are in their infancy and it will be a long and difficult road, but optimism should be taken from the fact that the right track has now been taken.
Showing posts with label IAEA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IAEA. Show all posts
Sunday, 1 November 2009
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