Showing posts with label Obama. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Obama. Show all posts

Sunday, 10 January 2010

Same War, Different Backdrop: The 'War on Terror' Moves to Yemen

2010 looks set to see the American ‘War on Terror’ entering a new phase, with an escalation of the fight against the perceived threat of al-Qaeda this time taking place in Yemen, the poorest and arguably most unstable country in the middle east. In the wake of the failed Christmas day attempt by Nigerian suspect Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to bring down a Detroit-bound passenger plane, President Obama promised retribution, stating that ‘All those involved in the attempted act of terrorism on Christmas must know, you too will be held to account.’ Referring to the alleged would-be plane bomber, he pointed the finger of blame at Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which he said ‘trained him, equipped him with those explosives and directed him to attack that plane headed for America.’ While the American media set the scene and prepare public opinion for further US engagement in Yemen by typically describing the country as ‘an al-Qaeda bastion’ (New York Times) and ‘terrorism’s new home’ (CBS News), the Yemeni public will have to wait and see how this engagement manifests itself in their crisis-ridden country.

A plot such as that which nearly ended in Christmas day catastrophe in Detroit will understandably (and some would argue necessarily) provoke a response from the American government. However, there are further reasons why Obama is willing to potentially expand the War on Terror in Yemen. In the short term, the President has been facing mounting criticism at home that he does not appreciate the extent of the threat from Islamist terrorism, and therefore a demonstration of his mettle is expected to play well with an American public demanding revenge. Former Vice President Dick Cheney went so far as to suggest that Obama ‘is trying to pretend we are not at war’, provoking the President to toughen his stance and respond bluntly that ‘our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred, and that we will do whatever it takes to defeat them and defend our country’. With Obama’s approval ratings steadily declining throughout 2009 largely due to domestic issues such as his divisive healthcare reforms and the continuing economic difficulties, the attempted plane bombing of Christmas day represents an opportunity for the President to answer some of his critics and satisfy the electorate by showing his warrior instinct and willingness to take on America’s enemies.

Since 2004 when Saudi Arabia launched a crackdown on al-Qaeda within its own borders, the organisation has gained a stronger foothold in the relative safety of Yemen. AQAP is thought to have set up training camps in Abyan province, as well as establishing a presence in Aden, and in the Alehimp and Sanhan regions of Sanaa province, taking advantage of poverty and lack of government services to win support from local populations. However, there are also broader strategic reasons for increased US involvement in Yemen. Between Yemen and Djibouti flows the 20 mile wide Bab el-Mandeb strait, linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean via the Gulf of Aden. Through this narrow strait passes oil exports from the Persian Gulf before entering the Suez Canal. It was estimated by the US Energy Department in 2006 that 3.3 million barrels of oil a day pass through Bab el-Mandeb, making it of vital strategic importance. If the US could effectively control this waterway, it would have further leverage over a significant amount of the world’s oil supply. Furthermore, Yemen reportedly holds some the greatest untapped oil reserves in the Masila Basin and Shabwa basin, which the US would be in a position to best exploit with an increased presence (and therefore influence) in Yemen.

While there are clear reasons for American engagement in Yemen, there are also risks for both the US and for the Yemeni government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, which is broadly welcoming of American offers of money and military assistance to take on al-Qaeda. Yemen is beset by instability, now effectively fighting for survival on three fronts; against Houthi rebels in the North, separatists in the South and now also against al-Qaeda largely in the areas mentioned above. The danger for Saleh’s government is that if it bows to Washington’s whim in taking on al-Qaeda, it risks taking its eye off the ball when it comes to tackling elements that arguably pose more of an existential threat. In August 2009 the Yemeni government launched Operation Scorched Earth against the northern Houthi rebels led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, who have a mixture of local and tribal grievances stemming from the 1962 revolution. The dispute between Sanaa and the Houthis has turned into a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, threatening the stability of the entire region. The Iranian backed Shiite Houthis have attacked Saudi forces within Saudi Arabia, accusing Riyadh of allowing Yemen to launch attacks from its territory. In turn the Saudis have attacked the rebels in Northern Yemen with a succession of ground and air offensives, provoking the most vocal criticism from Tehran. In October a ship was reportedly seized by Yemeni security services carrying weapons bound for the rebels from Iran, plunging relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia to a new low and increasing the pressure on an already fragile Yemeni state.

As the conflict in the North threatens to spin out of control, an ongoing dispute between Sanaa and separatists in the South has also worsened in recent years, further weakening central government. The secessionist Southern Movement is a collection of various anti-government factions whose resentment can be traced back to the 1994 Civil War between North Yemen and South Yemen. After unification of the country in 1990 a power-sharing agreement was reached between the north and south but the disputed 1993 parliamentary elections dramatically increased the power of President Saleh’s northern-based General People’s Congress at the expense of the Yemeni Socialist Party of the south. A collapse in talks led to the Civil War, in which the South was defeated. Northern forces consolidated power by amending the constitution, thereby solidifying their dominance and making many in the south feel as though they were living under occupation and not receiving a fair share of the country’s wealth. Although there was no unified leadership when the Southern Movement came into existence in 2007, the organisation is now led within Yemen by Tariq al-Fadhli, who defected from the government in April 2009 and who controls armed militias. Riots increased in 2008, with multiple flashpoints in Dhale and Radfan provinces. July 2009 saw a rally in Zinjibar in Abyan Province result in the deaths of at least 16 when security forces were used to disperse the crowd. This led to separatists shelling the local police headquarters and other government buildings. Increased draconian measures imposed by central government appear to be increasing the support of the Southern Movement. So far the movement has not undertaken an organised and co-ordinated armed insurrection, but the longer their grievances are not addressed, the more likely this becomes. President Saleh must not ignore the southern issue at the expense of carrying out American policy against al-Qaeda. An all-out war against the Southern Movement would threaten the very viability of the state, and paradoxically lead to the increased likelihood of al-Qaeda being able to establish safe havens within Yemen.

There is currently no integrated anti-government response between the Houthis, al-Qaeda and the Southern Movement, though the Houthis and the Southern Movement have overlapping grievances, and al-Qaeda have recently expressed sympathy for the Southern Movement. However, the danger for Sanaa (and indeed for Washington) is that increased American involvement in Yemen will lead to enemies of the Yemeni state co-ordinating their activities and rallying behind the prevailing anti-American and anti-Imperialist sentiment. Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi summarised the risk in an interview with the Financial Times, in which he asserted that ‘Any action undertaken by outside agencies, whatever they are, will reflect government ineffectiveness, whether this is true or not’. He also stated that this is ‘usually taken advantage of by opposition parties, by any militants in the country’. Increased American involvement in Yemen, particularly if it includes a physical presence, could well be seen as a propaganda coup for al-Qaeda, as well as acting as a so-called ‘recruiting sergeant’ for the organisation. It should not be forgotten that al-Qaeda will relish a fight with the US, and Obama should be wary of falling into the trap of over-reacting to extremist provocations, which in the medium and long term will be counter-productive to Western interests.

As the US administration prepares to step up economic and military aid to Sanaa, it remains to be seen whether throwing money and arms at the perceived threat will prove to be ineffective. Since the attempted Christmas day plane bombing, President Obama has pledged to double US military assistance to Yemen, and to drastically increase development aid too. Details of the plan will likely become clearer after the London Conference later in January, which will aim to come up with a co-ordinated solution to the problems posed by Yemeni instability. Major hurdles will have to be overcome in ensuring that the Yemeni state can effectively absorb development assistance to help with its economic, political and social reform, and in persuading Sanaa of the wisdom of carrying out large-scale changes in terms of improving human rights and stamping out corruption. Obama should guard against playing into the hands of al-Qaeda by responding to the attempted Christmas day attack in a clumsy and heavy-handed manner to appease public opinion back home. Indeed, the most effective response with the greatest chance of long-term success will necessarily be more subtle in nature, in conjunction with regional players such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, who will also have their interests served by ensuring Yemen achieves security and stability.

Sunday, 1 November 2009

Iranian Nuclear Negotiations and the 'Trust Deficit'

Despite the protraction of negotiations between Iran and the West over Tehran’s nuclear programme and the palpable sense of frustration emanating from Washington over what are perceived to be Iranian stalling tactics, there is more reason than ever to be optimistic that a peaceful solution to the impasse can be achieved. As Tehran makes its initial response to the deal formed in Vienna last week, attention now shifts to how Washington will react. Under the terms of the deal brokered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran would send about 75% (1200kg) of its low-enriched uranium to Russia, from where it would be sent to France for conversion into fuel rods, before being shipped back to Iran for use in Tehran’s research reactor, which produces radioisotopes for medical use. As the technology used to enrich uranium for use as fuel in nuclear power is the same as that of the higher-level enrichment needed to make the fissile core of an atomic bomb, it would be a significant step towards decreasing tensions if most of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium is removed from the country. The amount of low-enriched uranium needed to produce a single nuclear bomb is 1000kg, so the proposal would theoretically prevent Iran from being able to build a bomb, at least until it has enriched enough uranium to replace what has been shipped abroad. The deal would thus buy time and create space for further negotiations.

Thursday’s response from Tehran to the IAEA proposal, while far from being the blanket positive response desired by the US, Russia and France, at least leaves the door open for further discussion. Prospects for breaking the deadlock had looked unlikely when speaker of the Iranian parliament Ali Larijani had declared that ‘Westerners are insisting to go in a direction that speaks of cheating’, but President Ahmadinejad has since expressed willingness to work within the framework of the IAEA deal, albeit with conditions of his own. Tehran would like to amend the proposal so that its low-enriched uranium would be gradually shipped abroad, and so that the ‘simultaneous exchange’ of nuclear fuel takes place in return.

Two conclusions can be drawn from the Iranian response. Firstly, it appears that the Iranian leadership is divided over how to react to the IAEA proposal, and that Ahmadinejad’s conditions for accepting the deal are to demonstrate to his hard-line power base that he will not sacrifice too much in negotiating with the West. It must also be borne in mind that the Iranian ‘right’ to enrich uranium for fuel on its own soil is supported by the majority of Iranians. However, the disputed presidential election of June 2009 and the economic hardship in Iran have weakened Ahmadinejad’s position at home, and if further economic sanctions are to be imposed by the US and its allies, then the President needs to be in a position where he can blame the West for the breakdown of negotiations. Secondly, the Iranian response, while seen by many as a delaying tactic in Washington, can be read as an indication of the mistrust that exists between the US and Iran. To use diplomatic parlance, it is this ‘trust deficit’, stretching back well into the last century, which is at the root of the Iranian nuclear impasse, and which must be overcome if a solution is to be found. While negotiations can appear frustratingly slow, it is only by such negotiations that trust and understanding can be built, two necessary preconditions for any long-term settlement.

A major sticking point in the terms of the current proposal for Tehran is the fact that it historically does not trust other countries when it comes to energy security or fuel supply. This mistrust can be traced back to Iranian dealings with the British controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in the first half of the 20th century, which Iran believed was unfairly profiting from Iranian resources at the expense of the Iranian people. Following the AIOC’s nationalisation and the subsequent American organised and British backed coup to remove the popular pro-nationalisation Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq from power, Iranian mistrust of Western intentions relating to energy provision in Iran have only intensified. Suspicions that the West is using the nuclear issue to try to stop Iran developing into a regional power based on its energy security have been strengthened only in the past few days as the ‘Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act’ passed the committee stage in US Congress. This law would hinder Iran’s ability to import and produce petroleum products, having a potentially profound effect on the Iranian economy, as Iran currently imports nearly 40% of its gas and diesel. Tehran also does not see France as an honest link in the fuel-providing chain in the current dispute, as President Sarkozy has manoeuvred the French position much closer to that of the US than his predecessor in the Elysee Palace.

Further proof in Iranian eyes that the nuclear issue is being used as cover for surreptitious Western plans to keep Iran weak can be found in the American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2007. NIEs are produced by the US intelligence community to provide the American administration with up to date and authoritative information in order that decision makers can make sound judgements relating to matters of national security. The NIE of 2007 stated that ‘We judge with high confidence that in the fall of 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons programme’. It further stated that ‘Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons programme suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005.’ These statements, coupled with IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei’s assertion in September 2009 that ‘I do not think based on what we see that Iran has an ongoing nuclear weapons programme’ have further served to increase Tehran’s suspicions of duplicitous Western motives.

However, Western mistrust of Iranian intentions is equally as entrenched, and must equally be conquered if a means can be found to overcome the US-Iranian deadlock. The US and its allies declare the need to be sure that Iran will not build a bomb, and that the best way to do this is to ensure it cannot do so. They point to the fact that for 18 years the Iranians ran a covert nuclear weapons programme, and that therefore stringent measures and rules must now be put in place in order that no such concealment can occur in future. Western leaders believe that they simply cannot afford to take stated Iranian intentions at face value, given Tehran’s past record of deception. The West sees further evidence of Iranian untrustworthiness demonstrated by the fact that numerous United Nations resolutions calling for Tehran to cease enriching uranium have been ignored, and President Ahmadinejad’s talk of wiping Israel off the map is at the very least unhelpful and at the other extremity dangerously threatening, and either way is too serious to turn a blind eye to.

Iranian non-disclosure of its second enrichment plant near Qom is indicative of mutual suspicions between the protagonists in the ongoing dispute. This plant is thought to be big enough to enrich enough uranium for a bomb, though Tehran’s position is that its existence was declared to the IAEA in time, and that it will only be used to enrich uranium to a low level. While some in Washington see the second plant as proof that Iran has something to hide, many in Iran see the Qom plant as an insurance policy, given that if the US or Israel attacked Iran, the well-known plant of Natanz would be a certain target. This mindset is especially prevalent, as Iran sees itself surrounded by hostile forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, and interprets American talk of ‘all options being on the table’ as a blatant threat to its security. Add to this reports coming out of Washington in early October that a new 30000 pound ‘bunker-buster’ bomb known as the ‘Massive Ordnance Penetrator’ is being developed, and it is easy to understand the feeling in Iran that such an insurance policy might be necessary, as such a weapon is clearly not designed for fighting insurgents in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Despite the history of antagonism, provocation and mutual suspicion between particularly the US and Iran, and despite the frustratingly slow nature of the negotiations between the two sides so far, there are grounds for optimism. Firstly, it is in everyone’s interests to find a peaceful solution to the standoff. From the Iranian domestic perspective, President Ahmadinejad would have nothing to gain in being seen to provoke a military strike from the US, and the long term anti-American backlash across the Muslim (and Arab) world if military action was taken would immediately negate any (short-term) benefits the US might theoretically gain from delaying any perceived Iranian nuclear weapons development. Tehran does not stand to gain from having continuous economic sanctions imposed against it in a political climate where dissatisfaction with the establishment in its handling of the economy, and of the disputed election, has been visible and growing. Obama will also want to be seen to be giving negotiations every possible chance, so as not to shore up the position of the hardliners in Iran.

The stated aims of the US and Iran are not incompatible in their simplest forms, in that Washington states it does not want Iran to have a bomb, and Tehran states it does not seek one. The main issue dividing the two sides is the lack of trust. Only by continued engagement can trust be established, whereby a solution can be agreed. Both sides of the negotiating table want to be seen to be making an offer the other would appear unreasonable to refuse, given their stated aims. While this is making negotiations extremely protracted, it is a necessary prerequisite to establishing trust, in that this form of shadow boxing is a way of ensuring that those round the table are willing to take actions that match their words. In the latest talks, American acceptance of low-level enrichment of uranium in Iran before shipment to Russia implies a flexibility and pragmatism in Obama’s approach that his predecessor lacked. It is small steps such as this that will prepare the ground for a future settlement. No one should be in any doubt that this will be a drawn-out process, probably with many setbacks on the way, but mutual acrimony will only be dissipated through understanding. The art of successful diplomacy necessarily requires empathy, and this requires engagement. To find a lasting solution requires trust, which in turn requires patience. Negotiations between the West and Iran are in their infancy and it will be a long and difficult road, but optimism should be taken from the fact that the right track has now been taken.