Sunday, 10 October 2010

What's Wrong with Yemen?

Last week’s attack on the motorcade carrying British embassy staff in Sanaa has thrust Yemen back into the global media spotlight and has served to reinforce perceptions of the country as a hotbed of violent anti-western extremism. It has become all too easy to see Yemen’s ongoing crisis as simply part of the the American led campaign against militant Islam, and while al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) do pose a threat to western interests, the issues facing Yemen are more complicated, and the ultimate victims if the status quo is preserved will continue to be the Yemenis themselves.

During the 1990s al-Qaeda established roots in Yemen with the tacit approval of the government on the understanding that the organisation would not threaten the state. Since 2001 foreign militants have steadily filtered into the country, and since the Saudi operation against al-Qaeda within its own borders from 2003 to 2006 displaced extremists have arrived in Yemen in much greater numbers. Different factions of varying nationalities with their own agendas have thus emerged, not under the direct control of AQAP leader Nasser al-Wuhayshi. However, it was not until the failed Christmas day plane bombing in 2009 by AQAP-affiliated Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab that the US really began to engage with Yemen, indeed it was not until January 2010 that the US declared AQAP a terrorist group.

American policy makers were willing to turn a blind eye to the activities of extremists in Yemen so long as its vital interests were not threatened, and this remains the case today. Yemen is strategically important to the US due to the fact that the Gulf of Aden is the southern entrance to the Suez Canal, linking Europe and North America with Asia and East Africa. About 10% of the world’s shipping go through the Gulf of Aden each month, carrying about 4% of the world’s daily oil supply. If Yemen were to turn into a failed state in the same mould as Somalia on the other side of the Gulf of Aden then the resulting risk to shipping might be such that an alternative route would have to be taken round the Cape of Good Hope, at huge extra cost in time and resources. The response of the US to the crisis in Yemen has therefore been effectively to maintain the status quo, supporting President Saleh in fighting militants and stopping the export of terrorism but doing little to encourage the reform necessary to solve the core problems affecting the country.

The American military’s proposed aid package of 1 billion dollars to bolster the Yemeni security forces not only fails to address the root causes of the crisis in Yemen, but will serve to perpetuate the increasing levels of violence aimed against the state within Yemen’s borders. Yemeni officials and security forces have in recent months come under increased attack from AQAP, a fact that has been under-reported in the western media and conveniently ignored by western policy makers. Since President Saleh has publicly sided with the US and accepted American dollars, his government is now seen as a legitimate target by extremists. On 9 October AQAP claimed responsibility for a recent spate of attacks against security officials, intelligence agents and infrastructure across the country. These include the 25 September attack on a bus carrying intelligence officers in Sanaa which AQAP claims killed 14, and five separate attacks against intelligence facilities in Lahj province which included the assassination of the director of the security investigation department Colonel Ali Abdulkarim. Clashes between AQAP and government forces in the southern provinces of Abyan and Shabwa have increased in recent months, and due to the threat of ambush and assassination, local authorities in Abyan have banned motorcycles from the roads. In September extremists added to the climate of fear by posting the names on doors in Abyan of 55 security officials on their hitlist.

In response to the latest attack on British embassy staff in Sanaa, spokesman Mohammed al-Basha at the Yemeni embassy in Washington stated that ‘Yemen’s allies should continue to equip and train counter-terrorism forces, but the focus on development can no longer be ignored.’ This was said in recognition of the fact that Yemen faces myriad problems including a greatly increasing population, food insecurity, depleting oil and water supplies, as well as a rebellion in the north and a secessionist movement in the south. Corruption, large-scale unemployment and lawlessness have provided fertile ground for the growth of extremist ideology, and therefore it is these issues that need addressing rather than simply using military measures to counter Yemen’s problems. Al-Qaeda militants are a symptom of the political woes facing Yemen, where it is estimated that 40% of the population live on less than 2 dollars a day.

Western focus on Yemen has for too long been directed at creating a semblance of stability by helping to maintain President Saleh’s political dominance, backed with military force. However, the cause of the crisis engulfing Yemen is not the lack of military power, but the erosion of state control largely resulting from the absence of national unity. The danger for western interests is that American support for President Saleh decreases his political legitimacy and makes such national unity harder to achieve. Political reform and development in Yemen should be priorities for the government and its international allies in order to quell the instability that has enabled extremist groups such as al-Qaeda to thrive.

Sunday, 14 February 2010

Will Either Side Blink? Iran and the West go Eyeball to Eyeball

Thursday saw Iran mark the anniversary of the 1979 revolution that swept Ayatollah Khomeini to power as supreme leader of the new Islamic theocracy and ushered in an era of fractious relations with the West that continues to this day. As hundreds of thousands of Iranians rallied to mark the occasion, a reinforced security presence was on hand to ensure opponents of President Ahmadinejad were unable to use the anniversary to protest in any great number against the disputed election result of June 2008 that saw Ahmadinejad returned to office and the perceived failings of the Islamic Revolution. The President took the opportunity to further ramp up the tension between Tehran and the West over Iranian nuclear ambitions, declaring to a jubilant flag-waving crowd that Iran had produced its first stockpile of 20% enriched atomic fuel and that it was now able to enrich to 80%, just short of the 90% enrichment needed to build a bomb. Ahmadinejad’s bombastic rhetoric comes partly in response to American-led calls for harsher sanctions to be imposed on Tehran, which in turn has been played out against the backdrop of the increased militarisation of the region and a growing fear that preparations are being made for military confrontation.

Over the weekend of 30-31 January it emerged that the US is significantly increasing its missile defence systems in the region, and putting in place measures to protect its vital strategic interests in the event of an American or Israeli strike on targets within Iran. These measures include the deployment of two Patriot Missile Defence Systems on the ground in each of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. US Navy vessels with Aegis anti-missile systems are also to be stationed in the Mediterranean at all times, and the 10000 strong protection force trained to defend oil terminals and other key infrastructure in Saudi Arabia will be tripled in size. The region-wide military build-up is estimated to cost Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar in excess of $25 billion, with the UAE alone buying 80 F16 fighter jets.

On the face of it, this military build-up appears to be clear preparation for military confrontation with Iran, particularly as the threat of sanctions does not seem to overtly concern the government in Tehran, which has maintained its intransigent stance and belligerent tone. Tehran has in the past threatened to respond to any attack on its nuclear facilities with missile attacks of its own against Gulf states allied with the US. Defence adviser to Ayatollah Khamenei, Admiral Ali Shamkhani has declared that ‘The objective would be to overwhelm US missile defence systems with dozens and maybe hundreds of missiles fired simultaneously at specific targets.’ He also accused Gulf states of ‘helping the US establish legitimacy for its anticipated aggression against Iran.’ It would therefore appear prudent for the US to put plans in place to protect oil refineries and power stations in the region in the event of any conflict, not least because GCC countries are estimated to supply the US with a third of its oil and own up to $500 billion of US capital.

There are however suggestions that the sale of military hardware to GCC countries is less to do with preparing for military confrontation in the short term than further isolating Iran in the region and increasing the pressure on Tehran to offer concessions to the West over its disputed nuclear programme. Chief of staff of Iranian armed forces Major General Hassan Firouabadi has called the US move ‘psychological war.’ The predominantly Sunni Arab middle east has become increasingly wary of the growing influence of Shiite Iran, particularly as the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq has removed a counter-balance to Iranian power, giving Iran the space to expand its regional authority. Tehran for its part has portrayed the American plan as a classic ‘divide and rule’ strategy, and has cautioned its neighbours against allowing hostile US policy to come between them. President Ahmadinejad met the Crown Prince of Qatar on 2 February and warned him that ‘Westerners do not want friendly relations between countries in the region. Their life is dependent on rifts and insecurity.’

It could well simply be the case that this possible change of approach in US policy towards Iran has necessarily occurred as a result of the failure President Obama’s stated policy of engagement with Tehran. The deal brokered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna whereby Iran would send 75% of its low-enriched uranium abroad for conversion into fuel rods for its research reactor in Tehran has collapsed amidst recriminations from both sides, and Obama’s call for Ahmadinejad to unclench the Iranian fist and halt his country’s nuclear programme has not borne fruit. Whilst the aim of preventing Iran from acquiring the bomb has not changed, uncertainty over how to eventually deal with the issue appears to prevail in Washington, and the plan to further militarise the region can be regarded as indicative of this uncertainty rather than the manifestation of a well-planned and coherent Iran strategy. It is certainly the case that American desires to impose tougher sanctions on Iran through the UN Security Council has been hampered by Chinese unwillingness to target an important economic partner, and it should not be forgotten that China has lucrative business interests in Iran, particularly in the oil and gas sector. China has warned that talks of fresh sanctions would ‘complicate the situation’ and has stated its belief that such talk can only hinder diplomatic efforts.

Whether or not the bolstering of GCC countries’ defence capabilities and heightened military presence in the region is specifically put in place as a precursor to an attack on Iran, the danger is that such a military build-up will inevitably lead to an increased likelihood of violent confrontation. This American gambit in conjunction with combative rhetoric emanating from Washington has raised fears that the dispute between Tehran and the West will ultimately only be resolved by force. US Vice-President Joe Biden has stated that the Iranian leaders are ‘sowing the seeds of their own destruction’ and Israeli President Shimon Peres has also chosen to ratchet up the tension by declaring on 2 February that ‘We must recruit the whole world to fight Ahmadinejad.’ There are also signs that the stance of GCC nations is hardening in the face of what is perceived to be Iranian prevarication and obstinacy. Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University Dr Abdullah Al Shayji articulated the increasingly prevalent opinion among the ruling classes when he stated that ‘It is time to change course in order to deal with Iran.’ He further suggested that previous GCC attempts to productively engage with Tehran have only resulted in Iranian ‘bellicose [and] arrogant rhetoric.’ The parallels with the descent to war with Iraq during 2002 are obvious. Then as now, an American President is raising fears of a Middle Eastern country led by an anti-Western leader having the capability and desire to use weapons of mass destruction. The danger is that further militarising an already delicately balanced region risks events spinning out of control and leading to circumstances where war becomes the only (or easiest) option left. As Iran expert and chair of the Political Science Department at the University of Alabama Nader Entessar surmises: ‘Any time you [raise the tension] like that, the consequences of what may follow are unpredictable even if the intention is not necessarily to have near-term or medium-term military confrontation.’

Despite the risks inherent in facilitating an arms build-up in the region, there are still good reasons why an attack on Iran may not be in US interests and therefore not forthcoming. An unintended consequence of striking at Iran could well be that the position of the hardliners in Tehran is strengthened. As head of US Central Command General Petraeus himself stated, ‘It’s possible [a strike] could be used to play to nationalist tendencies.’ Indications from Iran are that the opposition Green Movement, who rally behind 2008’s defeated presidential candidate Mir Hossein Moussavi, are likely to be a permanent feature of the Iranian political landscape, and the US will not want to undermine this fledgling movement by playing into the hands of the hardline nationalists who currently hold power. It should also not be forgotten that Iran has the capability to create instability across the region and harm US interests by influencing and encouraging Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine and the Houthi rebels in Northern Yemen. Tehran also has the means to foment instability in Iraq, and has in the past also been accused of aiding insurgents in Afghanistan. Any strike against Iran would likely result in Tehran using its significant regional influence to hit back at American interests, with the potential to cause long-term setbacks to US strategic ambitions in the region.

President Obama will also have domestic economic considerations to take into account when deciding how to deal with Iran. The danger of a strike on Iran is that the price of oil will soar and the consequence will be to plunge the fragile global economy back into crisis and to cause a much dreaded ‘double dip’ recession. In 2008 the price of a barrel of oil reached $150, and if it were to rise to such a price again as a result of conflict in the Middle East then the cost to the American consumer in terms of heating and petrol prices would be considerable. As economic recovery depends on consumer spending, and with the American economy being particularly dependent on affordable fuel, the return to stability would be severely hindered. Uncertainty over oil supply in the short and medium term would affect the markets and greatly increase the price, which would benefit the oil producers, ironically including the Iranian government. Obama may decide that the political risk as well as the risk to the global economy is simply too great.

Those who pull the leavers in Iran will be well aware of the difficult position in which Obama and his Western allies find themselves in trying to prevent Iran from pursuing its nuclear programme, and are thus in a position of relative strength. However, the patience of Western leaders and the Israeli government is not without limit and the danger is that events will overtake any coherent diplomatic strategy and military confrontation will become the only option left on the table. The fact that Iranian atomic energy chief Ali Akbar Salehi declared on 7 February that Iran plans to build 10 new uranium enrichment facilities in the next Iranian year, coupled with Ahmadinejad effectively throwing down the gauntlet to the West by announcing the successful production of its first stockpile of 20% enriched atomic fuel, therefore appears to be a clumsy and unwise diplomatic gambit. These statements can only antagonise and provoke opponents of Tehran. However, this is in the context of the Western narrative; that time is running out. The clerical leadership of Iran, led by Ayatollah Khamenei, believes that the nuclear issue is just another stick for the West to beat Iran with; the ultimate goal being regime change in Tehran. They consequently do not see the potential benefits of making concessions, as the prevalent view is that the West would manufacture another crisis in an attempt to undermine the Islamic Republic. Ahmadinejad for his part has staked his personal authority on refusing to offer concessions to the West, and his weakened domestic position has further encouraged him to play to the hardliners and shore up his power base. American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is currently in Saudi Arabia to discuss the role Riyadh can play in reassuring China that any disruption in oil supplies as a result of further sanctions will be offset so as not to harm Chinese interests. It appears that in any event, further sanctions will be imposed on Iran, with their effectiveness or otherwise dependent on the level of Chinese support.  However, if they are ineffective this can only increase the chances of the standoff between Iran and the West reaching a violent climax.

Sunday, 10 January 2010

Same War, Different Backdrop: The 'War on Terror' Moves to Yemen

2010 looks set to see the American ‘War on Terror’ entering a new phase, with an escalation of the fight against the perceived threat of al-Qaeda this time taking place in Yemen, the poorest and arguably most unstable country in the middle east. In the wake of the failed Christmas day attempt by Nigerian suspect Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to bring down a Detroit-bound passenger plane, President Obama promised retribution, stating that ‘All those involved in the attempted act of terrorism on Christmas must know, you too will be held to account.’ Referring to the alleged would-be plane bomber, he pointed the finger of blame at Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which he said ‘trained him, equipped him with those explosives and directed him to attack that plane headed for America.’ While the American media set the scene and prepare public opinion for further US engagement in Yemen by typically describing the country as ‘an al-Qaeda bastion’ (New York Times) and ‘terrorism’s new home’ (CBS News), the Yemeni public will have to wait and see how this engagement manifests itself in their crisis-ridden country.

A plot such as that which nearly ended in Christmas day catastrophe in Detroit will understandably (and some would argue necessarily) provoke a response from the American government. However, there are further reasons why Obama is willing to potentially expand the War on Terror in Yemen. In the short term, the President has been facing mounting criticism at home that he does not appreciate the extent of the threat from Islamist terrorism, and therefore a demonstration of his mettle is expected to play well with an American public demanding revenge. Former Vice President Dick Cheney went so far as to suggest that Obama ‘is trying to pretend we are not at war’, provoking the President to toughen his stance and respond bluntly that ‘our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred, and that we will do whatever it takes to defeat them and defend our country’. With Obama’s approval ratings steadily declining throughout 2009 largely due to domestic issues such as his divisive healthcare reforms and the continuing economic difficulties, the attempted plane bombing of Christmas day represents an opportunity for the President to answer some of his critics and satisfy the electorate by showing his warrior instinct and willingness to take on America’s enemies.

Since 2004 when Saudi Arabia launched a crackdown on al-Qaeda within its own borders, the organisation has gained a stronger foothold in the relative safety of Yemen. AQAP is thought to have set up training camps in Abyan province, as well as establishing a presence in Aden, and in the Alehimp and Sanhan regions of Sanaa province, taking advantage of poverty and lack of government services to win support from local populations. However, there are also broader strategic reasons for increased US involvement in Yemen. Between Yemen and Djibouti flows the 20 mile wide Bab el-Mandeb strait, linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean via the Gulf of Aden. Through this narrow strait passes oil exports from the Persian Gulf before entering the Suez Canal. It was estimated by the US Energy Department in 2006 that 3.3 million barrels of oil a day pass through Bab el-Mandeb, making it of vital strategic importance. If the US could effectively control this waterway, it would have further leverage over a significant amount of the world’s oil supply. Furthermore, Yemen reportedly holds some the greatest untapped oil reserves in the Masila Basin and Shabwa basin, which the US would be in a position to best exploit with an increased presence (and therefore influence) in Yemen.

While there are clear reasons for American engagement in Yemen, there are also risks for both the US and for the Yemeni government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, which is broadly welcoming of American offers of money and military assistance to take on al-Qaeda. Yemen is beset by instability, now effectively fighting for survival on three fronts; against Houthi rebels in the North, separatists in the South and now also against al-Qaeda largely in the areas mentioned above. The danger for Saleh’s government is that if it bows to Washington’s whim in taking on al-Qaeda, it risks taking its eye off the ball when it comes to tackling elements that arguably pose more of an existential threat. In August 2009 the Yemeni government launched Operation Scorched Earth against the northern Houthi rebels led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, who have a mixture of local and tribal grievances stemming from the 1962 revolution. The dispute between Sanaa and the Houthis has turned into a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, threatening the stability of the entire region. The Iranian backed Shiite Houthis have attacked Saudi forces within Saudi Arabia, accusing Riyadh of allowing Yemen to launch attacks from its territory. In turn the Saudis have attacked the rebels in Northern Yemen with a succession of ground and air offensives, provoking the most vocal criticism from Tehran. In October a ship was reportedly seized by Yemeni security services carrying weapons bound for the rebels from Iran, plunging relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia to a new low and increasing the pressure on an already fragile Yemeni state.

As the conflict in the North threatens to spin out of control, an ongoing dispute between Sanaa and separatists in the South has also worsened in recent years, further weakening central government. The secessionist Southern Movement is a collection of various anti-government factions whose resentment can be traced back to the 1994 Civil War between North Yemen and South Yemen. After unification of the country in 1990 a power-sharing agreement was reached between the north and south but the disputed 1993 parliamentary elections dramatically increased the power of President Saleh’s northern-based General People’s Congress at the expense of the Yemeni Socialist Party of the south. A collapse in talks led to the Civil War, in which the South was defeated. Northern forces consolidated power by amending the constitution, thereby solidifying their dominance and making many in the south feel as though they were living under occupation and not receiving a fair share of the country’s wealth. Although there was no unified leadership when the Southern Movement came into existence in 2007, the organisation is now led within Yemen by Tariq al-Fadhli, who defected from the government in April 2009 and who controls armed militias. Riots increased in 2008, with multiple flashpoints in Dhale and Radfan provinces. July 2009 saw a rally in Zinjibar in Abyan Province result in the deaths of at least 16 when security forces were used to disperse the crowd. This led to separatists shelling the local police headquarters and other government buildings. Increased draconian measures imposed by central government appear to be increasing the support of the Southern Movement. So far the movement has not undertaken an organised and co-ordinated armed insurrection, but the longer their grievances are not addressed, the more likely this becomes. President Saleh must not ignore the southern issue at the expense of carrying out American policy against al-Qaeda. An all-out war against the Southern Movement would threaten the very viability of the state, and paradoxically lead to the increased likelihood of al-Qaeda being able to establish safe havens within Yemen.

There is currently no integrated anti-government response between the Houthis, al-Qaeda and the Southern Movement, though the Houthis and the Southern Movement have overlapping grievances, and al-Qaeda have recently expressed sympathy for the Southern Movement. However, the danger for Sanaa (and indeed for Washington) is that increased American involvement in Yemen will lead to enemies of the Yemeni state co-ordinating their activities and rallying behind the prevailing anti-American and anti-Imperialist sentiment. Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi summarised the risk in an interview with the Financial Times, in which he asserted that ‘Any action undertaken by outside agencies, whatever they are, will reflect government ineffectiveness, whether this is true or not’. He also stated that this is ‘usually taken advantage of by opposition parties, by any militants in the country’. Increased American involvement in Yemen, particularly if it includes a physical presence, could well be seen as a propaganda coup for al-Qaeda, as well as acting as a so-called ‘recruiting sergeant’ for the organisation. It should not be forgotten that al-Qaeda will relish a fight with the US, and Obama should be wary of falling into the trap of over-reacting to extremist provocations, which in the medium and long term will be counter-productive to Western interests.

As the US administration prepares to step up economic and military aid to Sanaa, it remains to be seen whether throwing money and arms at the perceived threat will prove to be ineffective. Since the attempted Christmas day plane bombing, President Obama has pledged to double US military assistance to Yemen, and to drastically increase development aid too. Details of the plan will likely become clearer after the London Conference later in January, which will aim to come up with a co-ordinated solution to the problems posed by Yemeni instability. Major hurdles will have to be overcome in ensuring that the Yemeni state can effectively absorb development assistance to help with its economic, political and social reform, and in persuading Sanaa of the wisdom of carrying out large-scale changes in terms of improving human rights and stamping out corruption. Obama should guard against playing into the hands of al-Qaeda by responding to the attempted Christmas day attack in a clumsy and heavy-handed manner to appease public opinion back home. Indeed, the most effective response with the greatest chance of long-term success will necessarily be more subtle in nature, in conjunction with regional players such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, who will also have their interests served by ensuring Yemen achieves security and stability.