2010 looks set to see the American ‘War on Terror’ entering a new phase, with an escalation of the fight against the perceived threat of al-Qaeda this time taking place in Yemen, the poorest and arguably most unstable country in the middle east. In the wake of the failed Christmas day attempt by Nigerian suspect Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to bring down a Detroit-bound passenger plane, President Obama promised retribution, stating that ‘All those involved in the attempted act of terrorism on Christmas must know, you too will be held to account.’ Referring to the alleged would-be plane bomber, he pointed the finger of blame at Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which he said ‘trained him, equipped him with those explosives and directed him to attack that plane headed for America.’ While the American media set the scene and prepare public opinion for further US engagement in Yemen by typically describing the country as ‘an al-Qaeda bastion’ (New York Times) and ‘terrorism’s new home’ (CBS News), the Yemeni public will have to wait and see how this engagement manifests itself in their crisis-ridden country.
A plot such as that which nearly ended in Christmas day catastrophe in Detroit will understandably (and some would argue necessarily) provoke a response from the American government. However, there are further reasons why Obama is willing to potentially expand the War on Terror in Yemen. In the short term, the President has been facing mounting criticism at home that he does not appreciate the extent of the threat from Islamist terrorism, and therefore a demonstration of his mettle is expected to play well with an American public demanding revenge. Former Vice President Dick Cheney went so far as to suggest that Obama ‘is trying to pretend we are not at war’, provoking the President to toughen his stance and respond bluntly that ‘our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred, and that we will do whatever it takes to defeat them and defend our country’. With Obama’s approval ratings steadily declining throughout 2009 largely due to domestic issues such as his divisive healthcare reforms and the continuing economic difficulties, the attempted plane bombing of Christmas day represents an opportunity for the President to answer some of his critics and satisfy the electorate by showing his warrior instinct and willingness to take on America’s enemies.
Since 2004 when Saudi Arabia launched a crackdown on al-Qaeda within its own borders, the organisation has gained a stronger foothold in the relative safety of Yemen. AQAP is thought to have set up training camps in Abyan province, as well as establishing a presence in Aden, and in the Alehimp and Sanhan regions of Sanaa province, taking advantage of poverty and lack of government services to win support from local populations. However, there are also broader strategic reasons for increased US involvement in Yemen. Between Yemen and Djibouti flows the 20 mile wide Bab el-Mandeb strait, linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean via the Gulf of Aden. Through this narrow strait passes oil exports from the Persian Gulf before entering the Suez Canal. It was estimated by the US Energy Department in 2006 that 3.3 million barrels of oil a day pass through Bab el-Mandeb, making it of vital strategic importance. If the US could effectively control this waterway, it would have further leverage over a significant amount of the world’s oil supply. Furthermore, Yemen reportedly holds some the greatest untapped oil reserves in the Masila Basin and Shabwa basin, which the US would be in a position to best exploit with an increased presence (and therefore influence) in Yemen.
While there are clear reasons for American engagement in Yemen, there are also risks for both the US and for the Yemeni government of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, which is broadly welcoming of American offers of money and military assistance to take on al-Qaeda. Yemen is beset by instability, now effectively fighting for survival on three fronts; against Houthi rebels in the North, separatists in the South and now also against al-Qaeda largely in the areas mentioned above. The danger for Saleh’s government is that if it bows to Washington’s whim in taking on al-Qaeda, it risks taking its eye off the ball when it comes to tackling elements that arguably pose more of an existential threat. In August 2009 the Yemeni government launched Operation Scorched Earth against the northern Houthi rebels led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, who have a mixture of local and tribal grievances stemming from the 1962 revolution. The dispute between Sanaa and the Houthis has turned into a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, threatening the stability of the entire region. The Iranian backed Shiite Houthis have attacked Saudi forces within Saudi Arabia, accusing Riyadh of allowing Yemen to launch attacks from its territory. In turn the Saudis have attacked the rebels in Northern Yemen with a succession of ground and air offensives, provoking the most vocal criticism from Tehran. In October a ship was reportedly seized by Yemeni security services carrying weapons bound for the rebels from Iran, plunging relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia to a new low and increasing the pressure on an already fragile Yemeni state.
As the conflict in the North threatens to spin out of control, an ongoing dispute between Sanaa and separatists in the South has also worsened in recent years, further weakening central government. The secessionist Southern Movement is a collection of various anti-government factions whose resentment can be traced back to the 1994 Civil War between North Yemen and South Yemen. After unification of the country in 1990 a power-sharing agreement was reached between the north and south but the disputed 1993 parliamentary elections dramatically increased the power of President Saleh’s northern-based General People’s Congress at the expense of the Yemeni Socialist Party of the south. A collapse in talks led to the Civil War, in which the South was defeated. Northern forces consolidated power by amending the constitution, thereby solidifying their dominance and making many in the south feel as though they were living under occupation and not receiving a fair share of the country’s wealth. Although there was no unified leadership when the Southern Movement came into existence in 2007, the organisation is now led within Yemen by Tariq al-Fadhli, who defected from the government in April 2009 and who controls armed militias. Riots increased in 2008, with multiple flashpoints in Dhale and Radfan provinces. July 2009 saw a rally in Zinjibar in Abyan Province result in the deaths of at least 16 when security forces were used to disperse the crowd. This led to separatists shelling the local police headquarters and other government buildings. Increased draconian measures imposed by central government appear to be increasing the support of the Southern Movement. So far the movement has not undertaken an organised and co-ordinated armed insurrection, but the longer their grievances are not addressed, the more likely this becomes. President Saleh must not ignore the southern issue at the expense of carrying out American policy against al-Qaeda. An all-out war against the Southern Movement would threaten the very viability of the state, and paradoxically lead to the increased likelihood of al-Qaeda being able to establish safe havens within Yemen.
There is currently no integrated anti-government response between the Houthis, al-Qaeda and the Southern Movement, though the Houthis and the Southern Movement have overlapping grievances, and al-Qaeda have recently expressed sympathy for the Southern Movement. However, the danger for Sanaa (and indeed for Washington) is that increased American involvement in Yemen will lead to enemies of the Yemeni state co-ordinating their activities and rallying behind the prevailing anti-American and anti-Imperialist sentiment. Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi summarised the risk in an interview with the Financial Times, in which he asserted that ‘Any action undertaken by outside agencies, whatever they are, will reflect government ineffectiveness, whether this is true or not’. He also stated that this is ‘usually taken advantage of by opposition parties, by any militants in the country’. Increased American involvement in Yemen, particularly if it includes a physical presence, could well be seen as a propaganda coup for al-Qaeda, as well as acting as a so-called ‘recruiting sergeant’ for the organisation. It should not be forgotten that al-Qaeda will relish a fight with the US, and Obama should be wary of falling into the trap of over-reacting to extremist provocations, which in the medium and long term will be counter-productive to Western interests.
As the US administration prepares to step up economic and military aid to Sanaa, it remains to be seen whether throwing money and arms at the perceived threat will prove to be ineffective. Since the attempted Christmas day plane bombing, President Obama has pledged to double US military assistance to Yemen, and to drastically increase development aid too. Details of the plan will likely become clearer after the London Conference later in January, which will aim to come up with a co-ordinated solution to the problems posed by Yemeni instability. Major hurdles will have to be overcome in ensuring that the Yemeni state can effectively absorb development assistance to help with its economic, political and social reform, and in persuading Sanaa of the wisdom of carrying out large-scale changes in terms of improving human rights and stamping out corruption. Obama should guard against playing into the hands of al-Qaeda by responding to the attempted Christmas day attack in a clumsy and heavy-handed manner to appease public opinion back home. Indeed, the most effective response with the greatest chance of long-term success will necessarily be more subtle in nature, in conjunction with regional players such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, who will also have their interests served by ensuring Yemen achieves security and stability.
Showing posts with label Southern Movement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Southern Movement. Show all posts
Sunday, 10 January 2010
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
