Saturday, 24 October 2009

Iran's War on Terror and the New Great Game

Last Sunday’s bomb attack in the southeast Iranian province of Sistan-Balochistan, while on the face of it appearing to be carried out by local militants with local grievances, may yet have far-reaching implications for the wider region and the outside world. Much will depend on the reaction of the Iranian government. Details of the attack still remain unclear, but it seems that a suicide bomber from the Sunni militant group Jundullah detonated an explosive belt in the city of Sarbaz, killing at least 42 people including 6 Revolutionary Guard Commanders at a meeting between members of the Revolutionary Guard and tribal leaders, set up to foster better relations between the Shiite government of Iran and the Balochis, who are a mainly Sunni people living in southeast Iran and southwest Pakistan, as well as in southwest Afghanistan. Given the shocking nature of this act of terrorism, which killed the second in command of the Revolutionary Guard’s ground forces, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Iranian authorities have reverted to the default position of blaming the US and Britain. Also held responsible has been Pakistan, for allegedly harbouring Jundullah militants within its borders. However, to best understand the reasons for the bombing and the potential consequences, attention must be given to who stands to benefit from the attack, and to the violent resentment of the Iranian government felt by many Balochis.

It is estimated that 6 million Balochis live on the Pakistani side of the border while 4 million live on the Iranian side. The province of Sistan-Balochistan, in which Sarbaz is located, is the poorest of Iran’s 30 provinces, largely neglected by Tehran. Criminal gangs operate largely unchecked, while the majority Sunni population that live there are conservative in outlook. It was against this backdrop in 2003 that Jundullah was formed, under the leadership of Abdolmalek Rigi. He has claimed that Jundullah, which is based on the Pakistani side of the border, does not harbour separatist ambitions for the Balochis, but rather seeks equal rights for the Sunnis of the region. Jundullah, or ‘Soldiers of God’, have engaged in acts of terrorism in the past, most notably the Zahedan bombing of 2007, and are also accused of kidnappings and drug smuggling to fund their activities.

In a statement following the Sarbaz attack, the head of the Revolutionary Guards ground forces, General Mohammad Pakpour claimed that ‘The terrorists were trained in the neighbouring country by the Americans and British’, promising a ‘very harsh and crushing response’. While it is true that the CIA are alleged to have aided Jundullah in a bid to undermine Iran’s government, a claim notably made by the captured brother of the Jundullah leader before his execution in Iran earlier this year, it is unlikely that the US had any direct involvement in this attack. It would not make sense for Washington to antagonise or provoke Tehran in such a manner while negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme are ongoing, especially as they enter a delicate and critical stage. It should not be forgotten that President Obama has invested significant political capital in engaging with Iran to try to find a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue.

Iranian President Ahmadinajad has also laid blame at Pakistan’s door, asserting that ‘some security agents in Pakistan are co-operating with the main elements of this terrorist incident’ and demanding Pakistan hand over those responsible. There is little doubt that Jundullah has been operating from within Pakistan, but it would be entirely misleading to suggest the Pakistani authorities encouraged the Sarbaz bombing. Pakistan has no strategic interest in allying itself with Sunni militants against the Iranian government when it is engaged in a fierce battle against Sunni extremism in South Waziristan, and there is nothing for Pakistan to gain in making an enemy of Iran when it is not only preoccupied with its fight against the Pakistani Taliban, but has to contend with ever-present tensions on the border with India and in Kashmir. It is also unlikely that Pakistan would risk supporting a militant group comprising of ethnic Balochis within its own borders, despite the claims of Jundullah that it is a sectarian rather than separatist group.

Islamabad and Tehran have also been enjoying relatively good relations, exemplified by the signing in May 2009 of an agreement between the two countries whereby Iran would sell gas to Pakistan from its South Pars field for 25 years. Under this agreement, the Iran-Pakistan pipeline (IP pipeline, or ‘Peace Pipeline’) would be built, against the wishes of the US, who favour a trans-Afghan pipeline running from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. Jundullah opposes the IP pipeline, which would run through Pakistani Balochistan and Iranian Balochistan, as they do not want to see Balochistan used as a gas corridor, and do not believe resulting gas profits would be redistributed to the Sunnis of the region. Last Sunday’s bombing may well serve to make foreign and domestic investors think twice about the risks involved in the IP pipeline, as well as sowing suspicion between Tehran and Islamabad. Such a scenario would not only harm Iran, but also China, who had agreed with Pakistan to import most of the Iranian gas from the IP pipeline in order that it would not have to import so much through the Strait of Malacca, which Beijing sees as less secure. The US would benefit if the trans-Afghan pipeline became a more viable alternative, as it has always favoured a pipeline bypassing Iran and Russia for its own energy security. Paradoxically, the US could stand to benefit further if Iran launches its own military action against Balochi militants, creating further instability in the region where the proposed IP pipeline is to run.

The Iranian government has been quick to blame its external rivals for the Sarbaz bombing, and it is possible that the US could benefit strategically in the medium or long term if events in Sistan-Balochistan make the IP pipeline unviable. However, such accusations from Iran and speculation over the potential strategic consequences deflects attention from the fact that to carry out such a well planned and executed attack, Jundullah must have had good intelligence on the ground. This points to there being strong local tribal alliances across the Pakistan-Iran border. Indeed, it is hard to see how such an attack could be carried out without significant intelligence from within Iran, especially as such high-ranking Revolutionary Guards from Tehran were killed in the blast. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, Iran has chosen to lash out at foreign agents rather than to look at the long-standing problems festering in its most restive region. The border area between Iran and Pakistan is impoverished and volatile, where criminal groups act with impunity. Armed organisations with varying ethnic, religious and nationalist agendas operate against a backdrop made more complex by the fact that it is where the 21st century’s great powers- China, the US and Russia- are overtly and covertly vying for influence. It remains to be seen whether what begun as a local dispute will grow into a wider conflict of global strategic significance.

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