Showing posts with label South Waziristan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label South Waziristan. Show all posts

Friday, 16 October 2009

American Influence in Pakistan and the Next 'Mother Of All Battles'

Thursday morning saw upwards of 38 people killed in a series of co-ordinated attacks across northwest Pakistan. As fierce gun battles raged between security forces and militants in Lahore, car bombs brought carnage to the streets of Peshawar and Kohat, representing the latest in a litany of bloody reminders of the turmoil and instability gripping parts of the country. These attacks follow hard on the heels of Monday’s suicide attack in the Swat Valley, and the weekend’s audacious assault on the Pakistan Army General Headquarters at Rawalpindi, which only ended when Pakistani commandos were sent in to kill the militants and free the hostages. The increasing number of attacks is in part a response to the government’s intensified activity and preparations for an all-out offensive into South Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, but also in more general terms is indicative of the violent opposition to the government policy of alliance with the US in its ‘war on terror’ since 2001. However, it is not only the frequency and audacity of the militant attacks, but also the expanding geographical area in which the attacks take place and from which the militants come that will be of grave concern to Islamabad and Washington.

The promised push into South Waziristan is something that President Obama has been pressing President Zardari to undertake as part of his broader strategy in the region to stop insurgents having a safe haven from which to plan and execute attacks in Afghanistan, but it does not come without its risks. On 27 March 2009 Obama explicitly linked the two conflicts in a speech announcing what he termed ‘a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan’, and since the death of Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud in a CIA drone attack on 5 August, a sustained ground offensive in South Waziristan has been expected. American special envoy Richard Holbrooke spent five days in Pakistan holding high-level meetings in August, and Chief of US Central Command David Petraeus was also in the country talking with army commanders about providing American logistical support to the operation. It appears that Islamabad believes the death of Mehsud has fundamentally weakened the Taliban position in South Waziristan, and following the army’s success in capturing Swat Valley from the militants in the North West Frontier Province, they have been preparing the ground for the looming offensive by sealing off the area and employing the use of artillery and aerial bombardments against Taliban positions.

On the surface, American and Pakistani policy seems to be working towards a common objective, namely the destruction of a common enemy, and the two countries appear to be co-operating as never before. Indeed President Obama has signalled his commitment to, and investment in Pakistan, through the Kerry-Lugar bill, which will provide $1.5 billion a year in American aid for the next 5 years to go towards Pakistani democratic, economic and social development programmes. A vast new American embassy in Islamabad for 1000 staff is also being planned. However, closer American engagement with Pakistan (even if it is a necessary part of Obama’s strategy for success in Afghanistan) brings into sharp focus the differences between the two countries, particularly in terms of cultural sensitivities and trust. As such, it risks alienating vast swathes of Pakistani society, including the very people that need to support the strategy if it is to succeed.

Opposition to the Kerry-Lugar bill in Pakistan has come from the military, opposition parliamentarians, and even members of the ruling coalition. Despite support for the bill from Zardari in principle, it remains unclear in what form the bill will finally be implemented. Many are opposed to what they see as unreasonable conditions attached to the aid package, which is seen as American meddling at best, national humiliation at worst. Pakistani Muslim League-N opposition member Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan articulated the concerns of many by stating that ‘each and every page of the bill is reflective of the insulting attitude towards Pakistan.’ Of most concern to Pakistan’s military is the condition that the US must assess the extent of control the government has over the armed forces, including budgets and the chain of command. The bill also refers to the southwest city of Quetta and the eastern town of Muridke as safe havens for militants, increasing the fear of US drone attacks, which many Pakistanis regard as a blatant infringement of sovereignty. Suspicion of American intentions in Pakistan has also been increased by the actions of US security contractors DynCorp, widely believed to be a tool of American foreign policy to develop a shadow network of security and intelligence personnel in the country. September saw a local company hired by DynCorp have its offices raided and its owner arrested. Islamabad is frustrated at not being more widely consulted in Washington’s decision to send more troops to Afghanistan, and in turn Washington is suspicious that the Pakistani military contains elements that support the militants, especially as the captured militant from the Rawalpindi siege, Mohammed Aquil, was himself once a member of Pakistan’s army.

The escalating violence and bitter opposition to the Kerry-Lugar bill in Pakistan do not provide an auspicious backdrop to Obama’s grand Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. The risk for Obama (and also for Pakistan) is that by being seen to influence or attempt to influence Pakistani policy, this will strengthen the hand of the militants and reduce the civilian government’s support. In a country that has spent roughly half of its existence under military rule, Obama must tread carefully or risk his strategy unravelling. However, events in Pakistan have produced their own momentum, and there are many reasons for those who crave stability to be pessimistic. Violent extremism appears to have gained a foothold across large areas of northwest Pakistan, as demonstrated in the past two weeks by attacks in the North West Frontier Province and Punjab, while the Federally Administered Tribal Areas remain outside Islamabad’s jurisdiction, and parts of Balochistan are believed to be safe havens for senior Taliban figures. It is a worrying phenomenon that in some cases of terrorism, al-Qaeda is thought to provide the funding, the Taliban the training and Punjabi organisations the militants. Indeed, it appears that the government is only now waking up to the Punjabi threat. In the Failed States Index, a collaboration between US ‘Foreign Policy Magazine’ and think-tank ‘The Fund For Peace’, Pakistan is ranked 9th, three places worse off than in 2007 when General Musharraf was in power.

Despite American support and a fresh determination from Islamabad to take the fight to the militants, it is by no means guaranteed that Pakistan’s offensive in South Waziristan will be successful, in terms of either Pakistani objectives of reducing acts of terrorism within its borders or US objectives of clearing areas from where militants launch attacks within Afghanistan. Monday’s attack in Swat Valley, an area supposedly cleared of militants at the cost of 300 soldiers this summer, only serves to demonstrate the risks inherent in taking on the Taliban on their own turf. South Waziristan is known as the Taliban heartland, or the ‘crucible of global terrorism’ according to Gordon Brown, and conditions are expected to be tougher for the army than was the case in the Swat Valley. South Waziristan can reach -20 degrees celcius in winter and the terrain is brutally unforgiving. It should not be forgotten that three times in the past has the army tried to take control of the area, failing each time. Between 2001 and 2008, somewhere in the region of 4000 troops are thought to have been lost trying to bring the Tribal Areas and the North West Frontier Province within Islamabad’s remit.

President Obama will be painfully aware that Afghanistan’s future stability is to a large extent dependent on public opinion in Pakistan, in that it remains to be seen how popular the military offensive in South Waziristan will be if the army suffers casualties on a large scale. It will be of concern to Washington that Islamabad may lose its nerve and leave the job ‘half-done’ by dealing only with the militants that pose a threat to Pakistani security, while stopping short of taking on (or worse, making a deal with) those that pose a threat to American interests in Afghanistan. American aid and support, however large, can only do so much to influence events on the ground, and the next few months will be critical. It is clear that what appears to be a plausible ‘comprehensive new strategy’ on paper, is in reality rife with pitfalls, assumptions, unknown quantities and risks at every turn. Indeed, there is no guarantee of success, and failure could potentially destabilise nuclear-armed Pakistan with disastrous consequences for the region and for the West. What should worry those who wish to see a moderate and stable Pakistan bordering a peaceful Afghanistan is not that the dangers of failure have been overlooked, but that this is still seen as the best shot at success.