Last week ‘The Nation’ magazine published an explosive article by Jeremy Scahill exposing the extent to which American private security firm Blackwater has become embroiled in Pakistan since the US-led ‘War on Terror’ begun in 2001. Furthermore, the article alleges that Blackwater operatives have been planning and carrying out assassinations of Taliban and al-Qaeda figures in the north west of the country, in part through a secret drone bombing campaign separate from the well known CIA programme, as well as themselves having representatives in theatre within Pakistan’s borders. Not only does this increase the pressure on Islamabad and Washington, who have both long been at pains to deny the existence of such operations in Pakistan, it also raises broader questions over the wisdom (and indeed the legality) of relying on private security firms such as Blackwater to carry out tasks that have traditionally been the domain of the professional military.
It is an open secret that American agents and private contractors have been carrying out US foreign policy within Pakistan for a number of years. In 2006 a deal was done between the Bush administration and General Pervez Musharraf to allow US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) operatives into Pakistan ostensibly to hunt Osama bin Laden. Islamabad would effectively turn a blind eye, whilst publically denying such permission had been given, and feigning outrage whenever evidence of American military activity within Pakistan came to light. However, the extent to which private contractors have been operating outside the military chain of command, largely free from accountability, is only now becoming clear. Under US law all CIA operations have to be reported to Congress, but since Donald Rumsfeld was Defence Secretary JSOC has been used to commit some of the most controversial and secretive operations on behalf of the US government, in part to keep them concealed from Congress. JSOC developed a close relationship with Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney, and worked in direct co-ordination with the White House. However, it seems that JSOC has become increasingly reliant on Blackwater in carrying out its activities, and Blackwater’s contracts are approved on a rolling basis at the request of JSOC, beyond public scrutiny. Blackwater is largely made up of ex-Special Forces operatives, and this has helped facilitate the cosy and increasingly entrenched relationship that has been established with JSOC.
Since Obama came to office in January 2009 the number of pilotless drone strikes within Pakistan has surpassed the number carried out under President Bush. In June this year CIA director Leon Panetta announced the termination of the agency’s assassination programme, but drone strikes have continued. Such attacks, which are reported to be the work of the CIA, are now believed often to be undertaken by JSOC and enabled by Blackwater contractors, who due to the nature of their classified contracts, are not accountable to Congress or to the public. The fact that the new military commander of the Afghan war, General Stanley McChrystal, headed JSOC from 2003 to 2008 not only demonstrates the rise in power of JSOC within the US military framework, but could well also be indicative of the increased reliance on contractors to execute American war objectives in Pakistan and Afghanistan as part of Obama’s ‘Af-Pak Strategy’.
However, there is growing disquiet within Pakistan over the use of contractors within its borders. US ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson was forced to state in September this year that ‘Blackwater is not operating in Pakistan’, and Pakistani Interior Minister Rehman Malik said he would resign if Blackwater was found to be operating on Pakistani territory. Despite these statements, most still believe that Blackwater and other security firms acting on behalf of the US interests continue to operate in Pakistan. The prevailing view among much of Pakistani society is that America is meddling in Pakistani affairs, undermining and destabilising the country by continually infringing its sovereignty, and dragging it deeper into the US ‘War on Terror’. This burgeoning resentment was punctuated in September by the raiding of the Islamabad offices of Inter-Risk, a subsidiary of US security firm DynCorp, who are widely believed to be developing a clandestine network of security and intelligence personnel in the country. Suspicion of, and hostility towards US intentions can only increase as further evidence of shadowy American involvement in Pakistan emerges. There is a real danger for decision makers in Washington that the actions of a private company that increasingly cannot be held to account, operating outside the usual system of checks and balances, will lose the hearts and minds of a population that must be kept onside if any success is to be achieved in the ‘War on Terror’.
To have private contractors operating on the battlefield is not a new concept, but has grown to such an extent that it is generally accepted that in fighting a modern war, contractors will play an important role. The US has historically maintained a small army, and has only expanded its forces when facing a specific threat, such as during the Second World War. After the Korean War, in the context of the broader Cold War, US planners came to the conclusion that a large army must be maintained. As American soldiers became embroiled in Vietnam, the draft was introduced. The draft largely enabled the Vietnam adventure, and as the Vietnam War became increasingly unpopular, one aspect of the inevitable backlash was against the draft that facilitated it. However, the USSR was still perceived as a threat and an enemy, and the trend for utilising the private sector to effectively make up the shortfall in the professional military accelerated. This trend goes beyond military strategy, and is largely down to the enormous growth in the private sector since the end of the Cold War, exemplified by doubling in size of the US economy in this period. Dr James Carafano, author of ‘Private Sector and Public Wars’ has explained the phenomenon as ‘It’s really the United States leveraging the capabilities of the modern world efficiently that’s driving this’. While this is true to a certain extent, it also cannot be denied that US military strategy has become dependent on private contractors, and that US planners have made use of contractors for less honourable reasons than straightforward efficiency of service.
According to the Congressional Research Service, contractors accounted for 48% of the US Department of Defence workforce in Iraq, and 57% in Afghanistan. Such huge reliance on the private sector brings its own problems. There is undoubtedly a marked difference between contractors who prepare food or drive lorries to those security firms engaged in combat, but question marks will remain over loyalties and incentives for all contractors compared with the professional military, especially when it comes to local contractors in tribal societies in countries such as Afghanistan. However, the most pressing and potentially damaging issue arising from such dependence is that of accountability. The current situation with Blackwater in Pakistan is a prime example of this. While contractors have been traditionally used to overcome short-term strategic shortages, decision makers in Washington, particularly since the Bush era, have become increasingly willing to use contractors for reasons of so-called ‘plausible deniability’. A firm such as Blackwater can be used as a tool of US foreign policy in Pakistan, without an American soldier having to set foot in the country, and therefore the US government can deny all knowledge. Although this greater freedom to wage war will be seen by many in Washington as a good thing, it carries with it further risks. In order to continue to use private security firms in this capacity, contracts must be secretive and beyond public scrutiny. Therefore these private security firms act without accountability, which in turn makes them harder to control. Effectively, the government cannot have it both ways; it must either bring security firms under control, turning them over to public scrutiny and making them accountable to the public, or continue to use them to carry out their dirty work while running the risk that their actions cannot be contained.
Carafano states that ‘Winning wars is about matching ends, ways and means in the best combination’ and argues that the debate over the use of contractors should be framed in practical rather than ethical terms. However, the debate cannot take place in a moral vacuum. While the practical issues relating to the use of contractors, such as the clarity of the rules of engagement and co-ordination between the military and private security are essential in the undertaking of successful modern warfare, there is more at stake than trying to pay for a decent service at a decent price. The issue of accountability, whether seen as an ethical issue or not, can still have profound practical consequences for the success or otherwise in executing war. Private American military companies are now working for secretive organisations not answerable to Congress, in countries that the US has not declared war on, under contracts that are not scrutinised and are continually renewed while the public and those they elect to represent them largely turn a blind eye. It is perhaps inevitable that these security firms, allowed to act with impunity, will exercise less restraint than is wise in a war in which the capture of hearts and minds is of greater importance than the capture of any territory. As evidence mounts of growing US military activity in Pakistan, decision makers in Washington should not expect locals on the ground to emphasise the distinction between those in American uniform and those simply paid in American money.
Showing posts with label War on Terror. Show all posts
Showing posts with label War on Terror. Show all posts
Monday, 30 November 2009
Thursday, 12 November 2009
The War in Afghanistan and British Hearts and Minds
Historians of the future may well identify the past two weeks as the critical fortnight in which British public opinion turned decisively and irretrievably against the war in Afghanistan. A BBC poll taken over 4 and 5 November found that 64% of the public now believe the war is ‘unwinnable’, up 6% from July, and 63% now want to see all British forces withdrawn ‘as quickly as possible.’ Meanwhile, the Independent newspaper on 11 November reported that four out of five Britons do not believe that British involvement in Afghanistan is keeping the UK safe from terrorism. These figures come in the wake of a series of bad news stories coming out of Afghanistan, which have thrust Afghanistan to the top of the government’s agenda, and which have called into question the entire British mission. The Prime Minister’s speech of 6 November at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London, which aimed to clarify the mission’s objectives and shore up public support, has been widely portrayed in the media as contradictory and ineffective. Mr Brown appears to be on the defensive, reacting to events on the ground rather than affecting them. A catalogue of violent headline-grabbing incidents in the past 14 days has crystallised and underlined all that is going wrong for the British and NATO in Afghanistan, and brings into sharp relief the monumental difficulties inherent in bringing stability to a country all too used to brutality and bloodshed.
The dawn attack on the UN guest house in the Shar-i-Naw district of Kabul on 28 October was shocking in its audacity, and immediately made headlines around the world. Five UN staff were left dead and 9 injured in a brazen assault by insurgents with automatic weapons and grenades. However, more significant was the message this atrocity delivered; that even in the supposedly most secure part of the country, no institution can be safe from terrorism. The UN is an organisation with a stated purpose ‘to work for peace and development, based on the principles of justice, human dignity and the well-being of all people.’ As an act of terrorism, this attack was successful in that it emphasises the fact that there are those with the means and the will to fight against what are almost unanimously believed to be fundamental human values. Such barbarity, coupled with the ease with which the attackers were able to execute their plans, only serves to reinforce the impression of lawlessness, fragility and vulnerability enveloping the country. As a result of the attack, it was declared that almost half of the 1300 foreign UN staff in Afghanistan are to be relocated. This has given the impression that law and order has broken down and that insurgents are setting the agenda. It also serves as a reminder of the 2003 bombing of the UN in Baghdad, which came to be emblematic of the moment any victory became unattainable, and came to be symbolic of the ‘lost cause’.
The attack on the UN was carried out against the backdrop of the then ongoing Afghan election saga, which has caused a real crisis of confidence in the ability of Afghan politicians to solve the myriad problems that beset the country. Since the original election of 20 August, now exposed as marred by widespread fraud, the electoral process has descended into farce. In the original poll, 1.3 million votes for Hamid Karzai were eventually judged to be invalid by the Electoral Complaints Commission, thus leaving him with less than the 50% needed to avoid a run-off with his main challenger, Dr Abdullah Abdullah. Just days before the second round of voting was to take place on 7 November, Dr Abdullah pulled out of the race as his demands that election officials involved in the discredited first poll be sacked were refused by Karzai. The seven members of Afghanistan’s so-called Independent Election Commission (IEC), in reality appointed by Karzai and arguably Karzai stooges, called off the election and declared Karzai the winner. Notwithstanding the fact that Karzai did not achieve a majority in the only vote and whose legitimacy is therefore doubtful, this whole process begs the question of whether a man as tainted by fraud and corruption as the current President can govern successfully. Free and fair this election certainly was not. It should not be forgotten that at the time of writing, at least 39 British soldiers have died since July, the month when 700 extra British troops were sent to Afghanistan to provide extra security for the election. The British public are entitled to wonder if British soldiers are fighting (and dying) for a corrupt, illegitimate and morally bankrupt regime.
Barely a day after Hamid Karzai was declared the winner of the election that never was, and Western leaders congratulated him on his ‘victory’, news filtered through of the deaths of 5 British servicemen, murdered on 3 November by a member of the Afghan police they were training. The attack occurred in the Nad Ali district of Helmand province, at a national police checkpoint. Eight more were wounded at the scene before the killer fled. As with the attack on the UN guest house, it is the ease with which such an act of violence can occur which is most shocking. It also calls into question the loyalty of the Afghan police and inevitably will lead to suspicions that trust has broken down between the British army in Helmand and those they are supposed to be mentoring. As if to emphasise this point, British General Jim Dutton has stated publically that this ‘probably won’t be the last’ of this kind of atrocity. Gordon Brown underlined the importance of the mentoring of the Afghan police by declaring that this strategy of mentoring ‘is what distinguishes a liberating army from an army of occupation.’ However, when ‘liberators’ are killed by the supposed liberated, it is logical to question whether the ‘liberators’ are any longer welcome. And when an apparently central plank of the British strategy suffers such a failure, it is legitimate to question the very validity of the entire strategy, which appears more untenable with each seemingly inevitable setback.
In Brown’s speech at the Royal College of Defence Studies on 6 November, he stated that ‘what separates successful counter-insurgency from unsuccessful counter-insurgency is that it is won on the ground and not in the air.’ As if to reinforce the point, on the very same day at least 8 Afghans working with US forces were mistakenly killed by a NATO airstrike. While this is not by a distance the most innocents killed in one strike by NATO (for example upwards of 30 civilians were killed in a NATO airstrike in Kunduz province in September this year and 40 were killed in a strike on a wedding party in Kandahar in November 2008), the timing of the blunder could not have come at a worse time for NATO, when it appears that bad news follows worse coming out of Afghanistan on an almost daily basis. The airstrike on 6 November occurred in Badghis province in the northwest of the country, where a ceasefire deal was made in July this year with the Taliban, a ceasefire now in tatters. It is the seemingly indiscriminate nature of attacks from the air as well as the more general problem of civilian casualties that have been blamed time and again for the Afghan population turning against NATO, and what appears to be indicative of a failing strategy in the case of the Badghis attack will undoubtedly add to the pressure on leaders such as Gordon Brown to begin winding down the whole Afghan mission.
The Prime Minister’s speech of 6 November, which was written with the aim of clarifying the British mission, was riddled with contradictions. For example, Brown called the war in Afghanistan one fought out ‘of necessity, not of choice’ and then stated that he was ‘not prepared to put the lives of British men and women in harm’s way for a government that does not stand up against corruption’, suggesting that he could still yet choose to cease the fight. The Afghan electoral process was defended with talk of ‘A people for so long denied a say in their future, now beginning to take the destiny of their country into their own hands.’ This appears to be wilfully ignoring the fact that the votes cast in the Presidential election have been proven not to fairly represent the will of the people. The very same people were denied their right to vote in the second round by Karzai’s refusal to remove those involved in the fraudulent first round of voting, and the IEC decision to hand the election to Karzai. It seems that the British public are becoming wise to the fact that despite what Western leaders say, elections in themselves are not proof positive of progress, let alone representative government.
When Brown spoke of British soldiers ‘protecting our nation and the rest of the world from the threat of global terrorism’, the public simply do not believe him. Defenders of the Afghan mission claim that this is because the Prime Minister is unpopular and blame his poor communication skills; that a more popular leader will be able to win over public opinion. However, winning back public opinion would be a herculean task, and most observers would surely have to admit that once it’s lost, it’s lost. This is particularly true with regards to the way the media now report the general perception of the Afghan war. Eight years ago, those who opposed the war were seen as self-indulgent eccentrics. They were the usual suspects, old-fashioned, misguided and therefore essentially harmless. They were to be humoured and basically ignored. However, the very same people are now seen as holding mainstream views. The debate has moved on, and it now appears that the British public think it is Mr Brown whose views are stuck in the past.
The dawn attack on the UN guest house in the Shar-i-Naw district of Kabul on 28 October was shocking in its audacity, and immediately made headlines around the world. Five UN staff were left dead and 9 injured in a brazen assault by insurgents with automatic weapons and grenades. However, more significant was the message this atrocity delivered; that even in the supposedly most secure part of the country, no institution can be safe from terrorism. The UN is an organisation with a stated purpose ‘to work for peace and development, based on the principles of justice, human dignity and the well-being of all people.’ As an act of terrorism, this attack was successful in that it emphasises the fact that there are those with the means and the will to fight against what are almost unanimously believed to be fundamental human values. Such barbarity, coupled with the ease with which the attackers were able to execute their plans, only serves to reinforce the impression of lawlessness, fragility and vulnerability enveloping the country. As a result of the attack, it was declared that almost half of the 1300 foreign UN staff in Afghanistan are to be relocated. This has given the impression that law and order has broken down and that insurgents are setting the agenda. It also serves as a reminder of the 2003 bombing of the UN in Baghdad, which came to be emblematic of the moment any victory became unattainable, and came to be symbolic of the ‘lost cause’.
The attack on the UN was carried out against the backdrop of the then ongoing Afghan election saga, which has caused a real crisis of confidence in the ability of Afghan politicians to solve the myriad problems that beset the country. Since the original election of 20 August, now exposed as marred by widespread fraud, the electoral process has descended into farce. In the original poll, 1.3 million votes for Hamid Karzai were eventually judged to be invalid by the Electoral Complaints Commission, thus leaving him with less than the 50% needed to avoid a run-off with his main challenger, Dr Abdullah Abdullah. Just days before the second round of voting was to take place on 7 November, Dr Abdullah pulled out of the race as his demands that election officials involved in the discredited first poll be sacked were refused by Karzai. The seven members of Afghanistan’s so-called Independent Election Commission (IEC), in reality appointed by Karzai and arguably Karzai stooges, called off the election and declared Karzai the winner. Notwithstanding the fact that Karzai did not achieve a majority in the only vote and whose legitimacy is therefore doubtful, this whole process begs the question of whether a man as tainted by fraud and corruption as the current President can govern successfully. Free and fair this election certainly was not. It should not be forgotten that at the time of writing, at least 39 British soldiers have died since July, the month when 700 extra British troops were sent to Afghanistan to provide extra security for the election. The British public are entitled to wonder if British soldiers are fighting (and dying) for a corrupt, illegitimate and morally bankrupt regime.
Barely a day after Hamid Karzai was declared the winner of the election that never was, and Western leaders congratulated him on his ‘victory’, news filtered through of the deaths of 5 British servicemen, murdered on 3 November by a member of the Afghan police they were training. The attack occurred in the Nad Ali district of Helmand province, at a national police checkpoint. Eight more were wounded at the scene before the killer fled. As with the attack on the UN guest house, it is the ease with which such an act of violence can occur which is most shocking. It also calls into question the loyalty of the Afghan police and inevitably will lead to suspicions that trust has broken down between the British army in Helmand and those they are supposed to be mentoring. As if to emphasise this point, British General Jim Dutton has stated publically that this ‘probably won’t be the last’ of this kind of atrocity. Gordon Brown underlined the importance of the mentoring of the Afghan police by declaring that this strategy of mentoring ‘is what distinguishes a liberating army from an army of occupation.’ However, when ‘liberators’ are killed by the supposed liberated, it is logical to question whether the ‘liberators’ are any longer welcome. And when an apparently central plank of the British strategy suffers such a failure, it is legitimate to question the very validity of the entire strategy, which appears more untenable with each seemingly inevitable setback.
In Brown’s speech at the Royal College of Defence Studies on 6 November, he stated that ‘what separates successful counter-insurgency from unsuccessful counter-insurgency is that it is won on the ground and not in the air.’ As if to reinforce the point, on the very same day at least 8 Afghans working with US forces were mistakenly killed by a NATO airstrike. While this is not by a distance the most innocents killed in one strike by NATO (for example upwards of 30 civilians were killed in a NATO airstrike in Kunduz province in September this year and 40 were killed in a strike on a wedding party in Kandahar in November 2008), the timing of the blunder could not have come at a worse time for NATO, when it appears that bad news follows worse coming out of Afghanistan on an almost daily basis. The airstrike on 6 November occurred in Badghis province in the northwest of the country, where a ceasefire deal was made in July this year with the Taliban, a ceasefire now in tatters. It is the seemingly indiscriminate nature of attacks from the air as well as the more general problem of civilian casualties that have been blamed time and again for the Afghan population turning against NATO, and what appears to be indicative of a failing strategy in the case of the Badghis attack will undoubtedly add to the pressure on leaders such as Gordon Brown to begin winding down the whole Afghan mission.
The Prime Minister’s speech of 6 November, which was written with the aim of clarifying the British mission, was riddled with contradictions. For example, Brown called the war in Afghanistan one fought out ‘of necessity, not of choice’ and then stated that he was ‘not prepared to put the lives of British men and women in harm’s way for a government that does not stand up against corruption’, suggesting that he could still yet choose to cease the fight. The Afghan electoral process was defended with talk of ‘A people for so long denied a say in their future, now beginning to take the destiny of their country into their own hands.’ This appears to be wilfully ignoring the fact that the votes cast in the Presidential election have been proven not to fairly represent the will of the people. The very same people were denied their right to vote in the second round by Karzai’s refusal to remove those involved in the fraudulent first round of voting, and the IEC decision to hand the election to Karzai. It seems that the British public are becoming wise to the fact that despite what Western leaders say, elections in themselves are not proof positive of progress, let alone representative government.
When Brown spoke of British soldiers ‘protecting our nation and the rest of the world from the threat of global terrorism’, the public simply do not believe him. Defenders of the Afghan mission claim that this is because the Prime Minister is unpopular and blame his poor communication skills; that a more popular leader will be able to win over public opinion. However, winning back public opinion would be a herculean task, and most observers would surely have to admit that once it’s lost, it’s lost. This is particularly true with regards to the way the media now report the general perception of the Afghan war. Eight years ago, those who opposed the war were seen as self-indulgent eccentrics. They were the usual suspects, old-fashioned, misguided and therefore essentially harmless. They were to be humoured and basically ignored. However, the very same people are now seen as holding mainstream views. The debate has moved on, and it now appears that the British public think it is Mr Brown whose views are stuck in the past.
Labels:
Afghanistan,
British public opinion,
War on Terror
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