Historians of the future may well identify the past two weeks as the critical fortnight in which British public opinion turned decisively and irretrievably against the war in Afghanistan. A BBC poll taken over 4 and 5 November found that 64% of the public now believe the war is ‘unwinnable’, up 6% from July, and 63% now want to see all British forces withdrawn ‘as quickly as possible.’ Meanwhile, the Independent newspaper on 11 November reported that four out of five Britons do not believe that British involvement in Afghanistan is keeping the UK safe from terrorism. These figures come in the wake of a series of bad news stories coming out of Afghanistan, which have thrust Afghanistan to the top of the government’s agenda, and which have called into question the entire British mission. The Prime Minister’s speech of 6 November at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London, which aimed to clarify the mission’s objectives and shore up public support, has been widely portrayed in the media as contradictory and ineffective. Mr Brown appears to be on the defensive, reacting to events on the ground rather than affecting them. A catalogue of violent headline-grabbing incidents in the past 14 days has crystallised and underlined all that is going wrong for the British and NATO in Afghanistan, and brings into sharp relief the monumental difficulties inherent in bringing stability to a country all too used to brutality and bloodshed.
The dawn attack on the UN guest house in the Shar-i-Naw district of Kabul on 28 October was shocking in its audacity, and immediately made headlines around the world. Five UN staff were left dead and 9 injured in a brazen assault by insurgents with automatic weapons and grenades. However, more significant was the message this atrocity delivered; that even in the supposedly most secure part of the country, no institution can be safe from terrorism. The UN is an organisation with a stated purpose ‘to work for peace and development, based on the principles of justice, human dignity and the well-being of all people.’ As an act of terrorism, this attack was successful in that it emphasises the fact that there are those with the means and the will to fight against what are almost unanimously believed to be fundamental human values. Such barbarity, coupled with the ease with which the attackers were able to execute their plans, only serves to reinforce the impression of lawlessness, fragility and vulnerability enveloping the country. As a result of the attack, it was declared that almost half of the 1300 foreign UN staff in Afghanistan are to be relocated. This has given the impression that law and order has broken down and that insurgents are setting the agenda. It also serves as a reminder of the 2003 bombing of the UN in Baghdad, which came to be emblematic of the moment any victory became unattainable, and came to be symbolic of the ‘lost cause’.
The attack on the UN was carried out against the backdrop of the then ongoing Afghan election saga, which has caused a real crisis of confidence in the ability of Afghan politicians to solve the myriad problems that beset the country. Since the original election of 20 August, now exposed as marred by widespread fraud, the electoral process has descended into farce. In the original poll, 1.3 million votes for Hamid Karzai were eventually judged to be invalid by the Electoral Complaints Commission, thus leaving him with less than the 50% needed to avoid a run-off with his main challenger, Dr Abdullah Abdullah. Just days before the second round of voting was to take place on 7 November, Dr Abdullah pulled out of the race as his demands that election officials involved in the discredited first poll be sacked were refused by Karzai. The seven members of Afghanistan’s so-called Independent Election Commission (IEC), in reality appointed by Karzai and arguably Karzai stooges, called off the election and declared Karzai the winner. Notwithstanding the fact that Karzai did not achieve a majority in the only vote and whose legitimacy is therefore doubtful, this whole process begs the question of whether a man as tainted by fraud and corruption as the current President can govern successfully. Free and fair this election certainly was not. It should not be forgotten that at the time of writing, at least 39 British soldiers have died since July, the month when 700 extra British troops were sent to Afghanistan to provide extra security for the election. The British public are entitled to wonder if British soldiers are fighting (and dying) for a corrupt, illegitimate and morally bankrupt regime.
Barely a day after Hamid Karzai was declared the winner of the election that never was, and Western leaders congratulated him on his ‘victory’, news filtered through of the deaths of 5 British servicemen, murdered on 3 November by a member of the Afghan police they were training. The attack occurred in the Nad Ali district of Helmand province, at a national police checkpoint. Eight more were wounded at the scene before the killer fled. As with the attack on the UN guest house, it is the ease with which such an act of violence can occur which is most shocking. It also calls into question the loyalty of the Afghan police and inevitably will lead to suspicions that trust has broken down between the British army in Helmand and those they are supposed to be mentoring. As if to emphasise this point, British General Jim Dutton has stated publically that this ‘probably won’t be the last’ of this kind of atrocity. Gordon Brown underlined the importance of the mentoring of the Afghan police by declaring that this strategy of mentoring ‘is what distinguishes a liberating army from an army of occupation.’ However, when ‘liberators’ are killed by the supposed liberated, it is logical to question whether the ‘liberators’ are any longer welcome. And when an apparently central plank of the British strategy suffers such a failure, it is legitimate to question the very validity of the entire strategy, which appears more untenable with each seemingly inevitable setback.
In Brown’s speech at the Royal College of Defence Studies on 6 November, he stated that ‘what separates successful counter-insurgency from unsuccessful counter-insurgency is that it is won on the ground and not in the air.’ As if to reinforce the point, on the very same day at least 8 Afghans working with US forces were mistakenly killed by a NATO airstrike. While this is not by a distance the most innocents killed in one strike by NATO (for example upwards of 30 civilians were killed in a NATO airstrike in Kunduz province in September this year and 40 were killed in a strike on a wedding party in Kandahar in November 2008), the timing of the blunder could not have come at a worse time for NATO, when it appears that bad news follows worse coming out of Afghanistan on an almost daily basis. The airstrike on 6 November occurred in Badghis province in the northwest of the country, where a ceasefire deal was made in July this year with the Taliban, a ceasefire now in tatters. It is the seemingly indiscriminate nature of attacks from the air as well as the more general problem of civilian casualties that have been blamed time and again for the Afghan population turning against NATO, and what appears to be indicative of a failing strategy in the case of the Badghis attack will undoubtedly add to the pressure on leaders such as Gordon Brown to begin winding down the whole Afghan mission.
The Prime Minister’s speech of 6 November, which was written with the aim of clarifying the British mission, was riddled with contradictions. For example, Brown called the war in Afghanistan one fought out ‘of necessity, not of choice’ and then stated that he was ‘not prepared to put the lives of British men and women in harm’s way for a government that does not stand up against corruption’, suggesting that he could still yet choose to cease the fight. The Afghan electoral process was defended with talk of ‘A people for so long denied a say in their future, now beginning to take the destiny of their country into their own hands.’ This appears to be wilfully ignoring the fact that the votes cast in the Presidential election have been proven not to fairly represent the will of the people. The very same people were denied their right to vote in the second round by Karzai’s refusal to remove those involved in the fraudulent first round of voting, and the IEC decision to hand the election to Karzai. It seems that the British public are becoming wise to the fact that despite what Western leaders say, elections in themselves are not proof positive of progress, let alone representative government.
When Brown spoke of British soldiers ‘protecting our nation and the rest of the world from the threat of global terrorism’, the public simply do not believe him. Defenders of the Afghan mission claim that this is because the Prime Minister is unpopular and blame his poor communication skills; that a more popular leader will be able to win over public opinion. However, winning back public opinion would be a herculean task, and most observers would surely have to admit that once it’s lost, it’s lost. This is particularly true with regards to the way the media now report the general perception of the Afghan war. Eight years ago, those who opposed the war were seen as self-indulgent eccentrics. They were the usual suspects, old-fashioned, misguided and therefore essentially harmless. They were to be humoured and basically ignored. However, the very same people are now seen as holding mainstream views. The debate has moved on, and it now appears that the British public think it is Mr Brown whose views are stuck in the past.
Showing posts with label British public opinion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label British public opinion. Show all posts
Thursday, 12 November 2009
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