Thursday morning saw upwards of 38 people killed in a series of co-ordinated attacks across northwest Pakistan. As fierce gun battles raged between security forces and militants in Lahore, car bombs brought carnage to the streets of Peshawar and Kohat, representing the latest in a litany of bloody reminders of the turmoil and instability gripping parts of the country. These attacks follow hard on the heels of Monday’s suicide attack in the Swat Valley, and the weekend’s audacious assault on the Pakistan Army General Headquarters at Rawalpindi, which only ended when Pakistani commandos were sent in to kill the militants and free the hostages. The increasing number of attacks is in part a response to the government’s intensified activity and preparations for an all-out offensive into South Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, but also in more general terms is indicative of the violent opposition to the government policy of alliance with the US in its ‘war on terror’ since 2001. However, it is not only the frequency and audacity of the militant attacks, but also the expanding geographical area in which the attacks take place and from which the militants come that will be of grave concern to Islamabad and Washington.
The promised push into South Waziristan is something that President Obama has been pressing President Zardari to undertake as part of his broader strategy in the region to stop insurgents having a safe haven from which to plan and execute attacks in Afghanistan, but it does not come without its risks. On 27 March 2009 Obama explicitly linked the two conflicts in a speech announcing what he termed ‘a comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan’, and since the death of Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud in a CIA drone attack on 5 August, a sustained ground offensive in South Waziristan has been expected. American special envoy Richard Holbrooke spent five days in Pakistan holding high-level meetings in August, and Chief of US Central Command David Petraeus was also in the country talking with army commanders about providing American logistical support to the operation. It appears that Islamabad believes the death of Mehsud has fundamentally weakened the Taliban position in South Waziristan, and following the army’s success in capturing Swat Valley from the militants in the North West Frontier Province, they have been preparing the ground for the looming offensive by sealing off the area and employing the use of artillery and aerial bombardments against Taliban positions.
On the surface, American and Pakistani policy seems to be working towards a common objective, namely the destruction of a common enemy, and the two countries appear to be co-operating as never before. Indeed President Obama has signalled his commitment to, and investment in Pakistan, through the Kerry-Lugar bill, which will provide $1.5 billion a year in American aid for the next 5 years to go towards Pakistani democratic, economic and social development programmes. A vast new American embassy in Islamabad for 1000 staff is also being planned. However, closer American engagement with Pakistan (even if it is a necessary part of Obama’s strategy for success in Afghanistan) brings into sharp focus the differences between the two countries, particularly in terms of cultural sensitivities and trust. As such, it risks alienating vast swathes of Pakistani society, including the very people that need to support the strategy if it is to succeed.
Opposition to the Kerry-Lugar bill in Pakistan has come from the military, opposition parliamentarians, and even members of the ruling coalition. Despite support for the bill from Zardari in principle, it remains unclear in what form the bill will finally be implemented. Many are opposed to what they see as unreasonable conditions attached to the aid package, which is seen as American meddling at best, national humiliation at worst. Pakistani Muslim League-N opposition member Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan articulated the concerns of many by stating that ‘each and every page of the bill is reflective of the insulting attitude towards Pakistan.’ Of most concern to Pakistan’s military is the condition that the US must assess the extent of control the government has over the armed forces, including budgets and the chain of command. The bill also refers to the southwest city of Quetta and the eastern town of Muridke as safe havens for militants, increasing the fear of US drone attacks, which many Pakistanis regard as a blatant infringement of sovereignty. Suspicion of American intentions in Pakistan has also been increased by the actions of US security contractors DynCorp, widely believed to be a tool of American foreign policy to develop a shadow network of security and intelligence personnel in the country. September saw a local company hired by DynCorp have its offices raided and its owner arrested. Islamabad is frustrated at not being more widely consulted in Washington’s decision to send more troops to Afghanistan, and in turn Washington is suspicious that the Pakistani military contains elements that support the militants, especially as the captured militant from the Rawalpindi siege, Mohammed Aquil, was himself once a member of Pakistan’s army.
The escalating violence and bitter opposition to the Kerry-Lugar bill in Pakistan do not provide an auspicious backdrop to Obama’s grand Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. The risk for Obama (and also for Pakistan) is that by being seen to influence or attempt to influence Pakistani policy, this will strengthen the hand of the militants and reduce the civilian government’s support. In a country that has spent roughly half of its existence under military rule, Obama must tread carefully or risk his strategy unravelling. However, events in Pakistan have produced their own momentum, and there are many reasons for those who crave stability to be pessimistic. Violent extremism appears to have gained a foothold across large areas of northwest Pakistan, as demonstrated in the past two weeks by attacks in the North West Frontier Province and Punjab, while the Federally Administered Tribal Areas remain outside Islamabad’s jurisdiction, and parts of Balochistan are believed to be safe havens for senior Taliban figures. It is a worrying phenomenon that in some cases of terrorism, al-Qaeda is thought to provide the funding, the Taliban the training and Punjabi organisations the militants. Indeed, it appears that the government is only now waking up to the Punjabi threat. In the Failed States Index, a collaboration between US ‘Foreign Policy Magazine’ and think-tank ‘The Fund For Peace’, Pakistan is ranked 9th, three places worse off than in 2007 when General Musharraf was in power.
Despite American support and a fresh determination from Islamabad to take the fight to the militants, it is by no means guaranteed that Pakistan’s offensive in South Waziristan will be successful, in terms of either Pakistani objectives of reducing acts of terrorism within its borders or US objectives of clearing areas from where militants launch attacks within Afghanistan. Monday’s attack in Swat Valley, an area supposedly cleared of militants at the cost of 300 soldiers this summer, only serves to demonstrate the risks inherent in taking on the Taliban on their own turf. South Waziristan is known as the Taliban heartland, or the ‘crucible of global terrorism’ according to Gordon Brown, and conditions are expected to be tougher for the army than was the case in the Swat Valley. South Waziristan can reach -20 degrees celcius in winter and the terrain is brutally unforgiving. It should not be forgotten that three times in the past has the army tried to take control of the area, failing each time. Between 2001 and 2008, somewhere in the region of 4000 troops are thought to have been lost trying to bring the Tribal Areas and the North West Frontier Province within Islamabad’s remit.
President Obama will be painfully aware that Afghanistan’s future stability is to a large extent dependent on public opinion in Pakistan, in that it remains to be seen how popular the military offensive in South Waziristan will be if the army suffers casualties on a large scale. It will be of concern to Washington that Islamabad may lose its nerve and leave the job ‘half-done’ by dealing only with the militants that pose a threat to Pakistani security, while stopping short of taking on (or worse, making a deal with) those that pose a threat to American interests in Afghanistan. American aid and support, however large, can only do so much to influence events on the ground, and the next few months will be critical. It is clear that what appears to be a plausible ‘comprehensive new strategy’ on paper, is in reality rife with pitfalls, assumptions, unknown quantities and risks at every turn. Indeed, there is no guarantee of success, and failure could potentially destabilise nuclear-armed Pakistan with disastrous consequences for the region and for the West. What should worry those who wish to see a moderate and stable Pakistan bordering a peaceful Afghanistan is not that the dangers of failure have been overlooked, but that this is still seen as the best shot at success.
Friday, 16 October 2009
Saturday, 10 October 2009
Afghanistan, Democracy and the End of the Beginning of the End of History
This week saw the eighth anniversary of the beginning of the war in Afghanistan and the opening salvos of the so-called Global War on Terror, the American-led response to the terrorist atrocities of 9/11. In the aftermath of the Afghan Presidential election that appears to have divided more than unified the country, and as President Obama decides whether to deploy the extra tens of thousands of troops deemed necessary by NATO commander General McChrystal, it is now more than ever essential to assess the failings of Western powers and the mind-set that led to those failures, and to establish what can be done by NATO governments whereby the majority of foreign forces can leave the country and its destiny in Afghan hands as soon as is practically and politically possible.
Few would have argued in 2001 that what we are witnessing in Afghanistan in 2009 could be classed as anything other than failure for the West and for NATO. As the military offensive of Operation Enduring Freedom began in October 2001, talk was not only of destroying Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but of bringing freedom and democracy to a people that had for too long lived in fear, under dictatorship and brutal repression. Western leaders mistakenly saw 9/11 not as proof that the world-view famously espoused by Francis Fukuyama in his 1989 essay ‘The End of History?’ was a myth, but as a golden opportunity to confirm its pre-eminence. The belief that the final stage of mankind’s ideological evolution had been reached in the form of liberal democracy manifested itself as an ultimately clumsy and ill-conceived war and counter-insurgency from which the West does not seem able to extricate itself.
In the Afghan Presidential election of 2009 voter turnout particularly in Taliban-dominated territory was pitifully low, and as many as a quarter of votes cast are suspected of being fraudulent, according to EU election monitors. Given that NATO pledged thousands of extra troops to increase security ahead of the election, and that the holding of free and fair elections is a cornerstone of a democratic society, this begs the question of how the West got it so wrong in Afghanistan. Talk in NATO capitals is now of redefining what ‘victory’ entails and of scaling back ambitions when it comes to the imposition of democracy, whereby leaving behind a unified and stable country devoid of terrorist training camps can be presented as a success. Politicians, with a nod to public opinion, are making noises about modifying objectives and re-assessing what is actually achievable.
However, even public statements from Western leaders showing willingness to lower the threshold for what constitutes ‘victory’ does not mean that their troops will necessarily be able to withdraw any sooner. The reason for this can be traced back to the end of the Cold War and the seductive nature of Fukuyama’s thesis, which gained traction most notably among American neo-conservatives throughout the 1990s as previously closed societies, particularly in the former Eastern bloc, liberalised their economies and embraced Western-style democracy. Such events, which with the benefit of hindsight and historical perspective appear transient, were then widely perceived as evidence to support Fukuyama’s theory. The Western political class were won over by the idea of the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy, believing it to be the shining beacon that every closed society aspired to, an indefatigable system of government, and proof positive of Western cultural and moral superiority. Worryingly, the default view still appears to be of the perfection of such democracy. It is not only ironic, but tragic that a system of government that by its very nature allows criticism and scrutiny came to be the only system of government of which such scrutiny is deemed unnecessary.
The unquestioning belief in the supremacy of Western democracy has bred complacency to such an extent that democracy has taken on an almost mythical status; that democracy is the answer to all the world’s ills, and that anything ‘less’ than Western-style democracy is at best misguided and at worst evil. The belief that the end of the road has been reached in terms of ideological evolution is both foolish and dangerous. It implies that the West is not only further advanced and morally superior, but more importantly that no further improvement to this form of government can be made. This entrenched world-view among American and European decision makers paradoxically makes the triumph of ‘freedom and democracy’ in Afghanistan lesser rather than greater. The reason for this is that anything less than absolute victory is a defeat, because war is being fought on the premise that freedom does not come in degrees.
Western leaders, in an attempt to bolster support for the war in Afghanistan, declare that they are fighting for the freedom of those back home. They may not know it, but this is true. However, they have got the wrong enemy. The real enemy is not the man with a Kalashnikov taking pot shots at NATO forces in Helmand, nor is it the latest pantomime rabble-rouser provoking the right-wing press; rather it is the fear and misunderstanding that compels Western citizens to acquiesce in the erosion of the very principles people are dying for on their behalf. The successful execution of war necessarily requires the manipulation of information, in order not to give advantage to those against whom war is being waged. This is crudely exemplified by the fact that no government would be willing to declare how many soldiers they would be willing to lose before the war becomes unworthy of the cost. However, freedom of information is a vital pillar of a democratic society. It is therefore a paradox that waging war in the name of one’s democracy will inevitably chip away at the very freedoms that underpin that democracy. The fact that Western politicians are willing to accept that individuals’ liberties may be curtailed to preserve the principle of freedom proves that there are degrees of freedom. So where is the line to be drawn? And who is to judge? Western governments, with an arrogant belief that theirs is the system marking the final stage of ideological evolution, would appear to demonstrate by their actions that they believe this right is theirs. When war is being fought by a coalition that defines itself by its democratic principles, it becomes convenient for those pulling the levers to ignore the irony that they are reducing liberties in their own countries, lest it exposes the superficiality of the way they measure others’ worth.
Wars fought for strategic necessity or for natural resources (however morally questionable) can at least be rationalised. However, freedom as a principle is a subjective concept, and it does not make sense to fight for a principle that cannot be clearly defined. This is the reason the message of why the West is in Afghanistan is both confused and diffuse, and consequently misunderstood. It is easier for politicians to make the case for continuing the war in black and white terms, however misguided, than to convince people to die for a shade of grey. Western leaders need to adopt a more nuanced approach to democracy, its limitations and its relevance to the war in Afghanistan, if ever tangible achievements can be made before the withdrawal of their forces. Indeed, only by doing so will they be able to withdraw their forces at all. Unless it is accepted and admitted that democracy comes in degrees, NATO will be waging war indefinitely for a goal that cannot be realised and does not exist. And only by admitting to specific flaws in their own democracies can Western governments grow in moral stature and mitigate the effects of those flaws. For example, when America’s NATO allies are asked to send more troops to Afghanistan, the fact must be considered that it is easier even for democracies to escalate wars than to withdraw from them, as any elected leader will know that if all goes wrong, then after the next election it will be someone else’s war and someone else’s problem. Most importantly, it must be accepted that democracy is a process and can never be an end in itself. Democracy in every society must be an aspiration, and it must never be assumed that the End Of History has been reached.
Few would have argued in 2001 that what we are witnessing in Afghanistan in 2009 could be classed as anything other than failure for the West and for NATO. As the military offensive of Operation Enduring Freedom began in October 2001, talk was not only of destroying Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but of bringing freedom and democracy to a people that had for too long lived in fear, under dictatorship and brutal repression. Western leaders mistakenly saw 9/11 not as proof that the world-view famously espoused by Francis Fukuyama in his 1989 essay ‘The End of History?’ was a myth, but as a golden opportunity to confirm its pre-eminence. The belief that the final stage of mankind’s ideological evolution had been reached in the form of liberal democracy manifested itself as an ultimately clumsy and ill-conceived war and counter-insurgency from which the West does not seem able to extricate itself.
In the Afghan Presidential election of 2009 voter turnout particularly in Taliban-dominated territory was pitifully low, and as many as a quarter of votes cast are suspected of being fraudulent, according to EU election monitors. Given that NATO pledged thousands of extra troops to increase security ahead of the election, and that the holding of free and fair elections is a cornerstone of a democratic society, this begs the question of how the West got it so wrong in Afghanistan. Talk in NATO capitals is now of redefining what ‘victory’ entails and of scaling back ambitions when it comes to the imposition of democracy, whereby leaving behind a unified and stable country devoid of terrorist training camps can be presented as a success. Politicians, with a nod to public opinion, are making noises about modifying objectives and re-assessing what is actually achievable.
However, even public statements from Western leaders showing willingness to lower the threshold for what constitutes ‘victory’ does not mean that their troops will necessarily be able to withdraw any sooner. The reason for this can be traced back to the end of the Cold War and the seductive nature of Fukuyama’s thesis, which gained traction most notably among American neo-conservatives throughout the 1990s as previously closed societies, particularly in the former Eastern bloc, liberalised their economies and embraced Western-style democracy. Such events, which with the benefit of hindsight and historical perspective appear transient, were then widely perceived as evidence to support Fukuyama’s theory. The Western political class were won over by the idea of the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy, believing it to be the shining beacon that every closed society aspired to, an indefatigable system of government, and proof positive of Western cultural and moral superiority. Worryingly, the default view still appears to be of the perfection of such democracy. It is not only ironic, but tragic that a system of government that by its very nature allows criticism and scrutiny came to be the only system of government of which such scrutiny is deemed unnecessary.
The unquestioning belief in the supremacy of Western democracy has bred complacency to such an extent that democracy has taken on an almost mythical status; that democracy is the answer to all the world’s ills, and that anything ‘less’ than Western-style democracy is at best misguided and at worst evil. The belief that the end of the road has been reached in terms of ideological evolution is both foolish and dangerous. It implies that the West is not only further advanced and morally superior, but more importantly that no further improvement to this form of government can be made. This entrenched world-view among American and European decision makers paradoxically makes the triumph of ‘freedom and democracy’ in Afghanistan lesser rather than greater. The reason for this is that anything less than absolute victory is a defeat, because war is being fought on the premise that freedom does not come in degrees.
Western leaders, in an attempt to bolster support for the war in Afghanistan, declare that they are fighting for the freedom of those back home. They may not know it, but this is true. However, they have got the wrong enemy. The real enemy is not the man with a Kalashnikov taking pot shots at NATO forces in Helmand, nor is it the latest pantomime rabble-rouser provoking the right-wing press; rather it is the fear and misunderstanding that compels Western citizens to acquiesce in the erosion of the very principles people are dying for on their behalf. The successful execution of war necessarily requires the manipulation of information, in order not to give advantage to those against whom war is being waged. This is crudely exemplified by the fact that no government would be willing to declare how many soldiers they would be willing to lose before the war becomes unworthy of the cost. However, freedom of information is a vital pillar of a democratic society. It is therefore a paradox that waging war in the name of one’s democracy will inevitably chip away at the very freedoms that underpin that democracy. The fact that Western politicians are willing to accept that individuals’ liberties may be curtailed to preserve the principle of freedom proves that there are degrees of freedom. So where is the line to be drawn? And who is to judge? Western governments, with an arrogant belief that theirs is the system marking the final stage of ideological evolution, would appear to demonstrate by their actions that they believe this right is theirs. When war is being fought by a coalition that defines itself by its democratic principles, it becomes convenient for those pulling the levers to ignore the irony that they are reducing liberties in their own countries, lest it exposes the superficiality of the way they measure others’ worth.
Wars fought for strategic necessity or for natural resources (however morally questionable) can at least be rationalised. However, freedom as a principle is a subjective concept, and it does not make sense to fight for a principle that cannot be clearly defined. This is the reason the message of why the West is in Afghanistan is both confused and diffuse, and consequently misunderstood. It is easier for politicians to make the case for continuing the war in black and white terms, however misguided, than to convince people to die for a shade of grey. Western leaders need to adopt a more nuanced approach to democracy, its limitations and its relevance to the war in Afghanistan, if ever tangible achievements can be made before the withdrawal of their forces. Indeed, only by doing so will they be able to withdraw their forces at all. Unless it is accepted and admitted that democracy comes in degrees, NATO will be waging war indefinitely for a goal that cannot be realised and does not exist. And only by admitting to specific flaws in their own democracies can Western governments grow in moral stature and mitigate the effects of those flaws. For example, when America’s NATO allies are asked to send more troops to Afghanistan, the fact must be considered that it is easier even for democracies to escalate wars than to withdraw from them, as any elected leader will know that if all goes wrong, then after the next election it will be someone else’s war and someone else’s problem. Most importantly, it must be accepted that democracy is a process and can never be an end in itself. Democracy in every society must be an aspiration, and it must never be assumed that the End Of History has been reached.
Monday, 5 October 2009
The Commonwealth at 60
The Commonwealth is 60 years old this year, though one can be forgiven for not having noticed. This 53 nation club appears to be marking the occasion with just enough fanfare to justify its existence, while simultaneously attempting not to draw too much attention to itself, lest awkward questions are asked of its purpose in the modern world. Sixty years on from the London Declaration that marked the birth of the modern Commonwealth, it is now fitting to shine the spotlight on the workings of this organisation, to ask whether it can achieve its aims and objectives, and to question whether it can live up to the principles its members have pledged to embrace.
On 1 September this year, Commonwealth Secretary-General Kamalesh Sharma announced ‘with deep regret’ that Fiji was suspended from the association. With no indication that Fiji was ready to comply with the terms set out by the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group in July 2009 to restore democracy following the 2006 coup, this was not an unexpected move. After all, one of the guiding principles of the Commonwealth is the supremacy of democracy, and any member found not to abide by these principles can expect censure.
But this is not always the case. While Fiji may miss out on taking part in Commonwealth sporting events and attending intergovernmental Commonwealth meetings (something that Tony Blair reportedly said in 2002 he would rather be at home watching football than doing), another member of the Commonwealth family appears to be able to flout its guiding principles with impunity. Sri Lanka’s 26 year civil war was declared over in May this year, amidst widespread celebrations within the country’s Sinhalese majority, but the steady trickle of information in the form of eye-witness testimony and video evidence emerging from the war-torn region of the rebels’ last stand is raising serious questions as to the conduct of the Sri Lankan military and the nature of the Sri Lankan government itself.
The Commonwealth cannot argue that the issues currently affecting Sri Lanka do not fall within its remit. On conflict prevention and mediation the Commonwealth asserts ‘The Secretariat’s objective is to prevent and resolve conflict while also strengthening the ability of member countries to promote our fundamental values.’ The Commonwealth has however remained silent as thousands of Tamil civilians were killed during army shelling in the last weeks of the war and stood idly by as scores of Tamils have ‘disappeared’ both during and after the fighting. Conflict mediation this is not. On human rights the Commonwealth declares ‘The Secretariat aims to increase awareness of and respect for human rights in the Commonwealth’. At the time of writing, up to 300 000 Tamils remain interned in camps, one third of under-fives reportedly suffering malnutrition. The Sri Lankan government state that they have arrested at least 10000 suspects, although the International Committee of the Red Cross has access to only 2000. These suspects have no access to legal support and next to no hope of a fair trial. While Minister for Disaster Management and Human Rights Mahinda Samarasinghe assures UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon that the Sri Lankan government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa is committed to resettling the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), it seems certain that this process is set to drag on much longer than the six months promised by the Sri Lankan government back in May.
Freedom of speech, a vital pillar of democracy, has also been compromised. Journalists have been murdered and intimidated, and the courts have been politicised, giving the government a stick with which to beat those who have the nerve to speak out. The journalist J. S. Tissainayagan was sentenced to 20 years hard labour in August for criticising army tactics, a fate President Obama declared was ‘emblematic of the hundreds of journalists who face intimidation, censorship and arbitrary arrest’. It is not only Obama who has criticised the Sri Lankan government. Amnesty International have criticised not only the conduct of the war but also the government’s denial of basic human rights including freedom of movement to civilians in the internment camps, and the EU has stated that ‘Sri Lanka has failed to honour important human-rights commitments.’ Human Rights Watch has reasserted the need for an international commission of inquiry into possible war crimes following the video obtained by ‘Journalists for Democracy’ showing alleged executions of naked and bound Tamils by government soldiers. The Sri Lankan government has claimed the video is a fake and has threatened legal action against Channel 4 for airing the video, though UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has discussed the implications of the images with the human rights minister, and the US ambassador to the UN has expressed ‘grave concern.’
So why has the Commonwealth apparently turned a blind eye to the ongoing crisis in Sri Lanka? One problem is that the organisation has no clear role and mission. For all its (no doubt well-intentioned) public utterances and assertions on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, the Commonwealth has few real powers, and therefore has little influence. The Commonwealth does not coordinate foreign or defence policy, and lacks the budget and authority to make a real difference in the world. There is nothing in the way of trade privileges for members that could be seen as adding purpose to the organisation. Self-interest will always take precedence over commonwealth solidarity, and it is more convenient for countries such as Britain to express mild concern over events in Sri Lanka and be thankful that the war is over than to ask awkward questions, especially when the British government has itself waged divisive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This does however mean that the Commonwealth all too frequently fails to practice what it preaches and takes the path of least resistance, only taking uncontroversial decisions leading to inconsequential outcomes.
The Commonwealth covers 2 billion people around the world, and to mark 60 years since the London Declaration, the Royal Commonwealth Society in London is ‘facilitating the largest global dialogue ever undertaken between peoples of the Commonwealth about their association.’ To the question ‘Do you think the Commonwealth is still relevant?’, at the time of writing only 35% have answered in the affirmative, but much more telling is the number of votes cast, just 743. It is also to be noted that 81% of respondents associate the Commonwealth with empire. This feeds into the widespread impression that the Commonwealth is an anachronism, an echo of a bygone age, and increasingly superfluous in the modern world.
The Commonwealth prides itself on being a values-based organisation and a forum for dialogue, and no doubt it has proved useful, arguably in no small part for Britain in easing the decline from imperial overlord to mid-ranking European power. However, it needs to stop appearing to wear its weakness as a badge of honour. Events in Sri Lanka should serve to highlight the impotence of the Commonwealth in its current guise, and to expose as hollow its assertions on standing up for the principles on which it is based. The fact that the Commonwealth appears unwilling, unable, or more likely both to get its hands dirty in Sri Lanka, is symptomatic of the impotence which feeds the organisation’s inertia. When Commonwealth leaders meet in Trinidad and Tobago in November, it should not this time be to hammer out a justification for meeting again in two years time. It should be to reassess its aims and objectives and how it will realise them, and to find a viable way to adapt to meet the challenges facing the world of today. Failure to do so will only make it increasingly unlikely that the association will be celebrating anything 60 years hence.
On 1 September this year, Commonwealth Secretary-General Kamalesh Sharma announced ‘with deep regret’ that Fiji was suspended from the association. With no indication that Fiji was ready to comply with the terms set out by the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group in July 2009 to restore democracy following the 2006 coup, this was not an unexpected move. After all, one of the guiding principles of the Commonwealth is the supremacy of democracy, and any member found not to abide by these principles can expect censure.
But this is not always the case. While Fiji may miss out on taking part in Commonwealth sporting events and attending intergovernmental Commonwealth meetings (something that Tony Blair reportedly said in 2002 he would rather be at home watching football than doing), another member of the Commonwealth family appears to be able to flout its guiding principles with impunity. Sri Lanka’s 26 year civil war was declared over in May this year, amidst widespread celebrations within the country’s Sinhalese majority, but the steady trickle of information in the form of eye-witness testimony and video evidence emerging from the war-torn region of the rebels’ last stand is raising serious questions as to the conduct of the Sri Lankan military and the nature of the Sri Lankan government itself.
The Commonwealth cannot argue that the issues currently affecting Sri Lanka do not fall within its remit. On conflict prevention and mediation the Commonwealth asserts ‘The Secretariat’s objective is to prevent and resolve conflict while also strengthening the ability of member countries to promote our fundamental values.’ The Commonwealth has however remained silent as thousands of Tamil civilians were killed during army shelling in the last weeks of the war and stood idly by as scores of Tamils have ‘disappeared’ both during and after the fighting. Conflict mediation this is not. On human rights the Commonwealth declares ‘The Secretariat aims to increase awareness of and respect for human rights in the Commonwealth’. At the time of writing, up to 300 000 Tamils remain interned in camps, one third of under-fives reportedly suffering malnutrition. The Sri Lankan government state that they have arrested at least 10000 suspects, although the International Committee of the Red Cross has access to only 2000. These suspects have no access to legal support and next to no hope of a fair trial. While Minister for Disaster Management and Human Rights Mahinda Samarasinghe assures UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon that the Sri Lankan government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa is committed to resettling the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), it seems certain that this process is set to drag on much longer than the six months promised by the Sri Lankan government back in May.
Freedom of speech, a vital pillar of democracy, has also been compromised. Journalists have been murdered and intimidated, and the courts have been politicised, giving the government a stick with which to beat those who have the nerve to speak out. The journalist J. S. Tissainayagan was sentenced to 20 years hard labour in August for criticising army tactics, a fate President Obama declared was ‘emblematic of the hundreds of journalists who face intimidation, censorship and arbitrary arrest’. It is not only Obama who has criticised the Sri Lankan government. Amnesty International have criticised not only the conduct of the war but also the government’s denial of basic human rights including freedom of movement to civilians in the internment camps, and the EU has stated that ‘Sri Lanka has failed to honour important human-rights commitments.’ Human Rights Watch has reasserted the need for an international commission of inquiry into possible war crimes following the video obtained by ‘Journalists for Democracy’ showing alleged executions of naked and bound Tamils by government soldiers. The Sri Lankan government has claimed the video is a fake and has threatened legal action against Channel 4 for airing the video, though UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has discussed the implications of the images with the human rights minister, and the US ambassador to the UN has expressed ‘grave concern.’
So why has the Commonwealth apparently turned a blind eye to the ongoing crisis in Sri Lanka? One problem is that the organisation has no clear role and mission. For all its (no doubt well-intentioned) public utterances and assertions on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, the Commonwealth has few real powers, and therefore has little influence. The Commonwealth does not coordinate foreign or defence policy, and lacks the budget and authority to make a real difference in the world. There is nothing in the way of trade privileges for members that could be seen as adding purpose to the organisation. Self-interest will always take precedence over commonwealth solidarity, and it is more convenient for countries such as Britain to express mild concern over events in Sri Lanka and be thankful that the war is over than to ask awkward questions, especially when the British government has itself waged divisive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This does however mean that the Commonwealth all too frequently fails to practice what it preaches and takes the path of least resistance, only taking uncontroversial decisions leading to inconsequential outcomes.
The Commonwealth covers 2 billion people around the world, and to mark 60 years since the London Declaration, the Royal Commonwealth Society in London is ‘facilitating the largest global dialogue ever undertaken between peoples of the Commonwealth about their association.’ To the question ‘Do you think the Commonwealth is still relevant?’, at the time of writing only 35% have answered in the affirmative, but much more telling is the number of votes cast, just 743. It is also to be noted that 81% of respondents associate the Commonwealth with empire. This feeds into the widespread impression that the Commonwealth is an anachronism, an echo of a bygone age, and increasingly superfluous in the modern world.
The Commonwealth prides itself on being a values-based organisation and a forum for dialogue, and no doubt it has proved useful, arguably in no small part for Britain in easing the decline from imperial overlord to mid-ranking European power. However, it needs to stop appearing to wear its weakness as a badge of honour. Events in Sri Lanka should serve to highlight the impotence of the Commonwealth in its current guise, and to expose as hollow its assertions on standing up for the principles on which it is based. The fact that the Commonwealth appears unwilling, unable, or more likely both to get its hands dirty in Sri Lanka, is symptomatic of the impotence which feeds the organisation’s inertia. When Commonwealth leaders meet in Trinidad and Tobago in November, it should not this time be to hammer out a justification for meeting again in two years time. It should be to reassess its aims and objectives and how it will realise them, and to find a viable way to adapt to meet the challenges facing the world of today. Failure to do so will only make it increasingly unlikely that the association will be celebrating anything 60 years hence.
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