This week saw the eighth anniversary of the beginning of the war in Afghanistan and the opening salvos of the so-called Global War on Terror, the American-led response to the terrorist atrocities of 9/11. In the aftermath of the Afghan Presidential election that appears to have divided more than unified the country, and as President Obama decides whether to deploy the extra tens of thousands of troops deemed necessary by NATO commander General McChrystal, it is now more than ever essential to assess the failings of Western powers and the mind-set that led to those failures, and to establish what can be done by NATO governments whereby the majority of foreign forces can leave the country and its destiny in Afghan hands as soon as is practically and politically possible.
Few would have argued in 2001 that what we are witnessing in Afghanistan in 2009 could be classed as anything other than failure for the West and for NATO. As the military offensive of Operation Enduring Freedom began in October 2001, talk was not only of destroying Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but of bringing freedom and democracy to a people that had for too long lived in fear, under dictatorship and brutal repression. Western leaders mistakenly saw 9/11 not as proof that the world-view famously espoused by Francis Fukuyama in his 1989 essay ‘The End of History?’ was a myth, but as a golden opportunity to confirm its pre-eminence. The belief that the final stage of mankind’s ideological evolution had been reached in the form of liberal democracy manifested itself as an ultimately clumsy and ill-conceived war and counter-insurgency from which the West does not seem able to extricate itself.
In the Afghan Presidential election of 2009 voter turnout particularly in Taliban-dominated territory was pitifully low, and as many as a quarter of votes cast are suspected of being fraudulent, according to EU election monitors. Given that NATO pledged thousands of extra troops to increase security ahead of the election, and that the holding of free and fair elections is a cornerstone of a democratic society, this begs the question of how the West got it so wrong in Afghanistan. Talk in NATO capitals is now of redefining what ‘victory’ entails and of scaling back ambitions when it comes to the imposition of democracy, whereby leaving behind a unified and stable country devoid of terrorist training camps can be presented as a success. Politicians, with a nod to public opinion, are making noises about modifying objectives and re-assessing what is actually achievable.
However, even public statements from Western leaders showing willingness to lower the threshold for what constitutes ‘victory’ does not mean that their troops will necessarily be able to withdraw any sooner. The reason for this can be traced back to the end of the Cold War and the seductive nature of Fukuyama’s thesis, which gained traction most notably among American neo-conservatives throughout the 1990s as previously closed societies, particularly in the former Eastern bloc, liberalised their economies and embraced Western-style democracy. Such events, which with the benefit of hindsight and historical perspective appear transient, were then widely perceived as evidence to support Fukuyama’s theory. The Western political class were won over by the idea of the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy, believing it to be the shining beacon that every closed society aspired to, an indefatigable system of government, and proof positive of Western cultural and moral superiority. Worryingly, the default view still appears to be of the perfection of such democracy. It is not only ironic, but tragic that a system of government that by its very nature allows criticism and scrutiny came to be the only system of government of which such scrutiny is deemed unnecessary.
The unquestioning belief in the supremacy of Western democracy has bred complacency to such an extent that democracy has taken on an almost mythical status; that democracy is the answer to all the world’s ills, and that anything ‘less’ than Western-style democracy is at best misguided and at worst evil. The belief that the end of the road has been reached in terms of ideological evolution is both foolish and dangerous. It implies that the West is not only further advanced and morally superior, but more importantly that no further improvement to this form of government can be made. This entrenched world-view among American and European decision makers paradoxically makes the triumph of ‘freedom and democracy’ in Afghanistan lesser rather than greater. The reason for this is that anything less than absolute victory is a defeat, because war is being fought on the premise that freedom does not come in degrees.
Western leaders, in an attempt to bolster support for the war in Afghanistan, declare that they are fighting for the freedom of those back home. They may not know it, but this is true. However, they have got the wrong enemy. The real enemy is not the man with a Kalashnikov taking pot shots at NATO forces in Helmand, nor is it the latest pantomime rabble-rouser provoking the right-wing press; rather it is the fear and misunderstanding that compels Western citizens to acquiesce in the erosion of the very principles people are dying for on their behalf. The successful execution of war necessarily requires the manipulation of information, in order not to give advantage to those against whom war is being waged. This is crudely exemplified by the fact that no government would be willing to declare how many soldiers they would be willing to lose before the war becomes unworthy of the cost. However, freedom of information is a vital pillar of a democratic society. It is therefore a paradox that waging war in the name of one’s democracy will inevitably chip away at the very freedoms that underpin that democracy. The fact that Western politicians are willing to accept that individuals’ liberties may be curtailed to preserve the principle of freedom proves that there are degrees of freedom. So where is the line to be drawn? And who is to judge? Western governments, with an arrogant belief that theirs is the system marking the final stage of ideological evolution, would appear to demonstrate by their actions that they believe this right is theirs. When war is being fought by a coalition that defines itself by its democratic principles, it becomes convenient for those pulling the levers to ignore the irony that they are reducing liberties in their own countries, lest it exposes the superficiality of the way they measure others’ worth.
Wars fought for strategic necessity or for natural resources (however morally questionable) can at least be rationalised. However, freedom as a principle is a subjective concept, and it does not make sense to fight for a principle that cannot be clearly defined. This is the reason the message of why the West is in Afghanistan is both confused and diffuse, and consequently misunderstood. It is easier for politicians to make the case for continuing the war in black and white terms, however misguided, than to convince people to die for a shade of grey. Western leaders need to adopt a more nuanced approach to democracy, its limitations and its relevance to the war in Afghanistan, if ever tangible achievements can be made before the withdrawal of their forces. Indeed, only by doing so will they be able to withdraw their forces at all. Unless it is accepted and admitted that democracy comes in degrees, NATO will be waging war indefinitely for a goal that cannot be realised and does not exist. And only by admitting to specific flaws in their own democracies can Western governments grow in moral stature and mitigate the effects of those flaws. For example, when America’s NATO allies are asked to send more troops to Afghanistan, the fact must be considered that it is easier even for democracies to escalate wars than to withdraw from them, as any elected leader will know that if all goes wrong, then after the next election it will be someone else’s war and someone else’s problem. Most importantly, it must be accepted that democracy is a process and can never be an end in itself. Democracy in every society must be an aspiration, and it must never be assumed that the End Of History has been reached.
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My tuppence: any form of government is legitimate as long as it represents some kind of consensus among the governed about how resources should organised. The legitimacy of government is also determined by the outcomes experienced by individuals. So whether a particular government is desirable is a function of the interlinked relationship between the ideology of the state and the effectiveness of the state. Western governments/citizens naturally buy in to the representative democracy model because that is their own self sustaining ideology of government. So you can see the desire to impose your own governing ideology on others as the natural result of a healthy consensus of government among the imposers. A lack of this desire might be seen as a worrying symptom of a fractured / failing state. For what is worth, I believe in encouraging representative government institutions as far as practicable in Britain and in Afghanistan. But then I would say that wouldn't I!
ReplyDeleteI too believe in encouraging representative government institutions as far as practicable in both Britain and Afghanistan, but Western democracy is not necessarily the only game in town. In a country such as Afghanistan where local, tribal and ethnic loyalties often run deeper than loyalty to the state, to try to impose a democratic/representative system much like Britain's (or indeed like the US') is unlikely to succeed.
ReplyDeleteThe main problem as I see it is not that leaders of western nations believe that theirs is the best system of government, but that they appear to believe that it is the default system of government in the absence of dictatorship, that it is 'natural' for peoples to desire such a system, and that it cannot be improved upon. I believe this can only lead to foreign soldiers fighting in Afghanistan indefinitely for an elusive ideal which cannot exist.